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INTRODUCTION

Throughout its short life, the constitutional right of privacy has
been surrounded by controversy. Most recently, "privacy" provided the
Supreme Court with a rationale for the holding in Roe v. Wade1 that a
woman has the right to choose to have an abortion. This decision
prompted reactions ranging from cries of moral outrageP to expressions
of delights to accusations that the Court had usurped a legislative function.4 The birth of the right of privacy, in Griswold v. Connectictu,
was no less provocative. In Griswold, the Court held that "privacy"
protected a married couple's decision to use contraceptives. The constitutional origins of this right were hotly disputed; no more than three
Justices could agree on any one theory about its parentage. Nonetheless,
seven Justices did agree that a protectable interest had been asserted.
Despite Justice Douglas' protestations, the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right to use contraceptives, a right to have an
abortion, or a right of privacy. Griswold and Roe must be read as endorsing the view that individuals have an implicit constitutional right'
to make certain decisions regarding the conduct of their personal lives
even though the right is nowhere enumerated in the Constitution.
This idea is scarcely novel. Historically, unenumerated rights have
been protected under the aegis of the fifth and fourteenth amendments'
1 410 US. 113 (1973).
2 See, e.g., 119 Cong. Rec. S9973-10,001 (daily ed. May 31, 1973); Byrn, An
American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 807
(1973) ; N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1973, at 1, coL 2, 20, cols. 1-2; id. at 22, col. 1.

3 See, e.g., Heymann & Barzelay, Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, S3 B.UL. Rev.
765 (1973); Note, In Defense of Liberty: A Look at the Abortion Decisions, 61
Geo. L.J. 1559 (1973); Lewis, Liberty, New and Old, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1973, at

29, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1973, at 1, col. 2, 20, cols. 1-2; id. at 40, cols. 3-4.
4 See generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973); Note, Roe v.Wade and Doe v.Bolton: The Compelling State Interest Test in Substantive Due Process, 30 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
628, 634-35, 642-43 (1973); Comment, 10 San Diego L. Rev. 844, 848-51 (1973).
5 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

6 The Supreme Court has recently acknowledged that "implicit" constitutional
rights may be equal in dimension to "explicit" rights. See San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-34 (1973).
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guarantee of "liberty." This use of the due process clauses is generally
referred to as substantive due process. During the early years of this
century, when the doctrine first achieved prominence, the Court used
substantive due process freely and impoliticly to strike laws regulating
economic relationships and practices. 7 When Justice Holmes condemned
the Court's lack of restraint in his famous dissent in Lochner v. New
York, 8 the golden days of substantive due process were numbered. By
the early 1930's, a majority of the Court had adopted Holmes' views;D
substantive due process and Lochner became epithets for unstructured
judicial fiat.
For four decades, the Court repudiated the Lochner philosophy.
Even the opinions in Griswold'10 and Roe v. Wade"1 begin by trying to
exorcise its ghost. But the Court's decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska1 2 and

Pierce v. Society of Sisters,13 made during the Lochner era and within
the same doctrinal framework, escaped the brunt of the criticism. During the forty years' wanderings, the Court was quietly affording protection to certain unenumerated rights.14 In retrospect, the Court has
justified and adopted these decisions, while reiterating the repudiation
of Lochner, by use of a double standard:1r personal liberties are protected by the due process clause; "economic" rights are not. 16
Griswold marks an important turning point in a renaissance of
protection for unenumerated rights. The blatantly offensive nature of
Connecticut's intrusion into the personal lives of its citizens prompted
the Court to find a right of privacy that could not be infringed by government without substantial justification. But because of the Lochner
debacle, there was no clear, acceptable doctrinal path to the result seven
7 E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. $25 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. Now
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Holding that the due process clause protected property
and liberty of contract, the Court purported to measure such laws against a twopronged standard: (1) is the state goal legitimate, i.e., within the police power?
and (2) is the statute rationally related to the achievement of the goal? See, e.g.,
Lochner v. New York, supra at 57-58. The major weakness of these cases lay less In
the Court's use of the theory than in its total lack of judicial restraint, Its failure
to presume most statutes valid and its failure to apply the test honestly. See Ely,
supra note 4, at 941-43; Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine Is Changing, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 185, 224-26 (1969).
8 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1908).
9 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 530-39 (1934).
10 381 U.S. at 481-82.
11 410 U.S. at 117.
12 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (the right to study a foreign language).
13 268 U.S. 910 (1925)
(the right to educate a child in the school of the
parents' choice).
14 See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (the right to
travel); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (the right to travel); Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (the right to practice a profession).
15 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
16 See note 190 infra. For recent criticism of this distinction, see Tribe, Fore.
word: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 Hare. L.
Rev. 1, 9 (1973).
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Justices ultimately reached. Justices Douglas and Goldberg devised two
creative theories by which to justify the holding. 17 But Justice Stewart
pierced through these solutions to point out that Griswold was nothing
but a substantive due process decision in disguise.' 8
In Roe v. Wade, the Court admitted that substantive due process
is no longer anathema, but a preferred ground of decision when a right
of privacy is at stake.' 9 If the Court is returning to a full-scale use of
substantive due process, it faces the pitfalls of the Lochner era. The
primary question to be asked here is whether there is any way to distinguish those personal interests that merit protection as aspects of
privacy from interests that are of lesser significance. Nearly any human
activity can press for recognition under the theories of Griswold and
Roe. If the right of privacy is to be a viable doctrine, there must be
limits to its application, but none of the opinions in Griswold was very
helpful to courts trying to identify those limits. The purpose of this
Note is to examine the struggles of lower courts trying to apply Griswold and to derive from their labors, and the pronouncements of the
Court, a set of standards for deciding which unenumerated rights should
be deemed constitutionally protectable rights of privacy.
The following section of this Note will be devoted to a detailed
analysis of Griswold and subsequent Supreme Court decisions expanding
the right of privacy, through Roe v. Wade. On the basis of this analysis,
a doctrinal framework within which to view privacy claims will be suggested. We will then examine privacy claims in the lower courts, starting
with the rights endorsed by Griswold and Roe-rights pertaining to
family planning. Subsequent discussion will deal with rights extrapolated
from a broader reading of Griswold: the right to engage in private sexual
activities; rights pertaining to structuring one's family and home life;
the right to engage in certain activities in the home, such as marijuana
use; and broader rights of autonomy not confined to the home, such as
the right to control the length of one's hair. The underlying concerns
will be, first, to examine how decisions were made and, second, to determine what role the right of privacy has played, or might play, in the
protection of personal liberties.
II
PRIVACY n TEE SUPREM COURT
A. Griswold v. Connecticut: The Fountainheadof Privacy
For close to eight years, Griswold v. Connecticut20 contained the
Supreme Court's only explication of the right of privacy. Lower courts
17 See text accompanying notes 26-65 infra.
Is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479, 527-31

(1965) (dissenting opinion);

see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-68 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
19 By analogy, other unenumerated rights not yet considered could also be

lodged in the due process clause. For example, the Court could find a right to
choice of employment, which would not be a right of privacy. Consideration of
potential constitutional rights other than privacy rights is beyond the scope of
this Note.
20 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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confronted with privacy arguments scrutinized the case and selected
ideas, sentences, even single words from the majority and concurring
opinions in an attempt to answer the myriad questions Griswold left
open. Because the opinion of the Court and the three separate concurrences are complex and often contradictory, Griswold does not afford
any clear or simple finswers. Focusing on one thought in one opinion or
trying to explain Griswold in a sentence is almost necessarily manipulative or misleading. The only way to determine what Griswold actually
said and did is to examine all four opinions in some detail.
The relevant facts of the case are easily recited. The Connecticut
law being challenged 2' prohibited the use and, through the state's general accessory statute,2 2 aiding and abetting the use of any contraceptive
device. Appellant Griswold, director of the Planned Parenthood League
of Connecticut, had been convicted as an accessory for giving information and medical advice about contraceptives to a married couple. Griswold alleged that the statute violated the constitutional right of the
married couple to use contraceptives.
One significant aspect of Griswold is that the Court decided to
hurdle procedural barriers and to consider the substantive constitutional
24
issues. The same statute had been attacked in Tileston v. Ullman
25
and in Poe v. Ullman, but the doctrines of standing and ripeness had
proved fatal to those challenges.
The truly remarkable feature of Griswold, however, is that seven
Justices, with neither precedent nor textual support from the Constitution to guide them, agreed that the Connecticut statute was unconstitutional. In order to reach that conclusion, each opinion had to answer
three questions: (1) what constitutional provision is the source of protection for an unenumerated right? (2) why is the specific right of a
married couple to use contraceptives a constitutionally protected right?
and (3) why does the Connecticut statute abridge that right-is the
right absolute, is the state's interest insufficient, or is the statute merely
overbroad?
1. The Opinion of the Court: Mr. Justice Douglas and
"Limited Natural Law"
Under Justice Douglas' exposition, certain unenumerated rights,
including a right of privacy, are found in the "penumbra" formed by
emanations of specific constitutional guarantee 20 Douglas began his
Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 53-32 (1958).
Id. § 54-196.
381 U.S. at 481 (concluding that Griswold had standing to raise the constitutionality of the statute).
21
22
23

24 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
25 367 U.S. 497 (1961). For criticism of the Court's retreat from decision In
Poe, see Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights ...Retained by the People"?, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 787 (1962); Comment, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 106 (1962).

26 381 U.S. at 484. The concept of a constitutional penumbra did not originate

with Douglas. Justice Holmes spoke of a fourth and fifth amendment penumbra
in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928). Douglas' use
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analysis of the purported right by citing a number of cases where the
Court had recognized and upheld rights not specifically mentioned in
the Constitution 2 7 including the family rights vindicated in Aeyer v.
Nebraska28 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters'0 The concept of freedom

of association and other outgrowths of the first amendment were used
to show that the Court had in the past extrapolated from specific rights

in order to protect activities thought to be corollaries of those rights.3°

From the fact that the first amendment has a penumbra of protected
activity, Douglas concluded that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
can all have penumbras, "formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance." 31 The first, third, fourth and
fifth amendments all evince a concern with protecting interests which
may be generally subsumed under the heading of "privacy"-or a right
to be let alone. This pervasive constitutional concern, together with the
ninth amendment's provision that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitu-

tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people," 32 led Douglas to postulate that there is a general constitutional zone of3 privacy existing outside of and peripheral to
the specified guarantees.

Having thus grounded privacy in the Constitution, Douglas simply
concluded that "[t]he present case... concerns a relationship lying
of the penumbra concept in Griswold was foreshadowed by his dissent in Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521-22 (1961): "This notion of privacy is not drawn from
the blue. It emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which
we live."
27 381 US. at 482-83.
28 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (the right of a child to study a foreign language).
29 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(the right to educate a child in a school of the
parents' choice).
30 381 US. at 482-83: 'Without those peripheral rights the specific rights
would be less secure. And so we reaffirm the principle of the Pierce and the Meyer
cases." See also Poe v. Ulman, 367 US. 497, 518 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
31 381 U.S. at 484.
32 U.S. Const. amend. IX. "[Douglas] also threw in for good measure the
ninth amendment, although its relevancy to his argument in showing a zone of
privacy is not apparenL" Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things
Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 235,
243 (1965). Professor Kauper's comment was apt at the time it was written.
Douglas' use of the ninth amendment has since been elucidated. The ninth amendment is a "rule of construction, applicable to the entire constitution. O3born v.
United States, 385 U.S. 323, 352-53 n.15 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting
Note, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. ChL L. Rev. 814,
835 (1966).
Professor Emerson suggested that Douglas' use of the ninth amendment carries
a greater potential than Goldberg's and might be used to expand the concept of
privacy or to guarantee other basic rights. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a
Doctrine, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 219, 228 (1965). For a fulfillment of Emerson's
prophecy, see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233-37 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the ninth amendments reserved rights include the
right to be free from discrimination based on race, creed or color).
33 381 U.S. at 484-85.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:670

within the zone of privacy. 3 4 While this conclusion was abrupt and
unexplained, Douglas went on to mention several factors which might
be viewed as rationales for placing a married couple's use of contraceptives within that zone. First, he commented that marriage is an old,
intimate and noble institution,35 apparently assuming that there are
natural notions of privacy, or intimacy, surrounding the marital relationship. Second, Douglas stated that it would be "repulsive" to "allow
the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale
signs of the use of contraceptives." 8 6 This idea suggests that the decision
might lie in the periphery of the fourth amendment's proscription of
unreasonable searches and seizures-that the most offensive aspect of
the Connecticut statute was the mode of enforcement it necessitated.
Third, Douglas defined marriage as an "association that promotes a
way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions." 37 Taking
this statement together with Douglas' explication of the first amendment
peripheral right of association, and his statement that "we have protected forms of 'association' that are not political in the customary sense
but pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the members,"'3B
one might infer that the marriage relationship, as an association, is
located near the first amendment periphery8 0
In his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman,4" Douglas had articulated a more general theory for deciding what rights are protected by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although the Bill
of Rights is the "primary source of expressed information as to what is
meant by constitutional liberty,"41 it is not a complete expression of
rights "implicit in a free society." 42 Douglas thought allowing the state
leeway to intrude upon certain intimacies to be simply irreconcilable
34
85
36
seizure

Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
Id. at 486.
Id. at 485. Douglas referred to a number of fourth amendment search and
cases in building the right to privacy. Id. at 484-85.

37 Id.

at 486.

38 Id. at 483.
39 While Douglas' seemingly random comments are not very helpful In

analyzing his opinion, they have assumed importance in another context. A
number of courts have thought that the protection of the right Involved In
Griswold turned on one or another of these factors. See, e.g., Lewis v. Stark,

312 F. Supp. 197, 206 (N.). Cal. 1968) (three-judge court), rev'd sub nor. Lewis
v. Martin, 397 U.S. $52 (1970) (distinguishing Griswold on the ground that the
state's practices in enforcing California's "man-in-the-house rule" would not be as

"repulsive" as the enforcement techniques Douglas mentioned in Griswold);
People v. Frazier, 256 Cal. App. 2d 630, 631, 64 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1967) (distinguish-

ing Griswold on the ground that sodomy, unlike marriage, is not for a noble
purpose). Professor Kauper thought that Griswold might be limited to an Idea of

the "association" of marital partners, or the privacy of the home. Kauper, supra
note 32, at 244.
40 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961).
41 Id. at 516.
42 Id. at 521.
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with a free, constitutional society and "congenial only to a totalitarian
regime."4 3 Despite a nod to the Bill of Rights which grew into a full
constitutional theory in Griswold, Douglas seemed to be propounding
fairly subjective criteria for decision: a right is protected if it is implicit
in a free society and if state incursion upon it would be totalitarian."
Douglas apparently thought that his creative penumbra theory immunized his Griswold opinion from accusations of returning to the
Lochner philosophy.&5 His primary focus in Griswold had a more objective referent than did his opinion in Poe: would protecting certain
phases of human activity help to preserve and give substance to the
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights? If this inquiry is viewed as
determinative, the penumbra theory would be more limited than HarIan's due process formulation, or Douglas' opinion in Poe. Rather than
affording protection to unspecified rights, the penumbra approach would
only extend the protection given to specific guarantees.
Yet even if Douglas' explanation of how unenumerated rights gain
constitutional protection is viewed as more limited and structured than
"natural justice" formulations, his determination that the specific right
involved in Griswold could claim constitutional protection cannot be
distinguished from "natural law" analysis 40 Unlike the zone of privacy
itself, the right of married couples to use contraceptives is not shown
to have any solid basis in the Bill of Rights. Notions of the venerability
of the marriage institution or the sanctity of the marital bedroom can
only be derived from "natural law' thinking: the marital bedroom is
protected if a certain number of Justices think marriage is special. Thus
Douglas' opinion might best be described as an exercise in limited
natural law.
In addition to leaving lower courts on their own to determine when
a specific activity falls within the zone of privacy, Douglas' opinion was
ambiguous about the nature of the test to be applied in order to determine whether a state's intrusion into a protected area is constitutional. It is clear that the right to use contraceptives is not absoluteDouglas included it in the category of "'activities constitutionally subject to state regulation.' ,',7 Without any preliminaries of balancing or
considering the state's justifications for the statute, Douglas resorted to
Id. at 522.
These standards are typical of the Harlan approach to substantive due
process. See text accompanying notes 73-79 infra.
45 381 U.S. at 482; see Doe v. Bolton, 410 US. 179, 212 nA (1973) (Douglas,
43
44

J, concurring). In fact, Douglas now abhors substantive due process, in theory if
not in result. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383-86 (1971) (Douglas, J,
concurring). But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-71 (1973), where Justice

Stewart insisted that Grivold could only be rationally understood as a substantive
due process decision.
46 Indeed, Justice Black complained in dissent that the majority opinion was
"natural justice" in disguise. 381 U.S. at 511-12; see Beaney, The Griswold Case
and The Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 979, 982 (referring to

Douglas' opinion as an exercise in "modified natural law").
47

381 U.S. at 485, quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
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the doctrine of overbreadth and concluded that regulating the use of
contraceptives" 'sweep [s] unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade [s]
the area of protected freedoms.' 48 Thus, Griswold effectively guaranteed the freedom to use contraceptives for the unmarried residents of
Connecticut as well as for the married couple Douglas' opinion exalted.
2. Mr. Justice Goldberg: The Discovery of the Ninth Amendment
Justices Goldberg, Warren and Brennan concurred in the opinion
of the Court, but felt it necessary to write a separate opinion emphasizing the role of the ninth amendment in the decision. 4 Goldberg did not
believe that the due process clause incorporates the Bill of Rights in
toto. Rather, he felt that it protects "those personal rights that are
fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of
Rights." 50 Goldberg explained that the long-dormant ninth amendment
is not a source of new rights, but "simply lends strong support to the
view that the 'liberty' protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal Government or the States is
not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments." 51 Thus, under Goldberg's view, finding the right in question to
be lodged in a penumbra of the Bill of Rights would be neither conclusive (if the right is not "fundamental"), nor strictly necessary. The
ninth amendment was used to repudiate Justice Black's notion that only
rights specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights may be protected
against state intrusion.
It has been argued that the ninth amendment presents a more
limited and ascertainable standard for decisionmaking than the fundamental rights due process approach, because the language and history
of the amendment indicate that the rights reserved to the people must
be "of a nature comparable to the rights enumerated.1 52 Whether or not
Goldberg's approach, relying on the ninth amendment and the fundamental rights due process theory, may be distinguished from the usual
approach to fundamental rights due process is open to question. After
explaining the relevance of the ninth amendment to the decision at
hand, Goldberg went on to discuss the standards to be used in trying to
determine whether an unspecified right is "fundamental." He quoted
8
approvingly the statement from Snyder v. Massachusetts,O
a classic
exposition of fundamental rights due process: a judge must "look to the
'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people' to determine
whether a principle is 'so rooted [there] ...as to be ranked as fundamental.' "54 In another formulation, "[t]he inquiry is whether a right
involved 'isof such a character that it cannot be denied without violat48 381 U.S. at 485, quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
49 381 U.S. at 486-99.
5o Id. at 486.
51 Id. at 493.

52 Redlich, supra note 25, at 810.
53 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
54 381 U.S. at 493.
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ing those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions"
.' " Fundamental
rights also emanate from the " 'totality of the constitutional scheme
under which we live.' "56 Goldberg quoted the famous Brandeis dissent
in Olmstead v. United States,57 which spoke in broad terms of the "right
to be let alone," as "comprehensively summariz[ing] the principles
underlying the Constitution's guarantees."r s One commentator thought
that, by citing traditional fundamental rights due process tests, Goldberg "failed to differentiate between the ninth amendment 'retained'
rights and the flexible due process concept ....There is indeed much
merit in Mr. Justice Black's complaint that the Harlan due process
argument and the Goldberg ninth amendment argument 'turn out to be
the same thing.' "59
Yet Goldberg's opinion must be read in conjunction with the
opinion of the Court, in which he concurred. He expressly endorsed
Douglas' statement that liberty "also 'gains content from the emanations of... specific [constitutional] guarantees' and 'from experience
with the requirements of a free society.'" 00 Goldberg's due process test
may be interpreted as laying a new emphasis on the specific guarantees
of the Bill of Rights and their underlying philosophy as a source for
judicial decisions under the due process clause, and endorsing a narrower
definition of liberty.
In deciding that the specific right of a married couple to use contraceptives is constitutionally protected, Goldberg drew upon sources
demonstrating that "the rights to marital privacy and to marry and
raise a family are of similar order ad magnitude as the fundamental
rights specifically protected." 61 Goldberg stressed the tradition protecting the marital relationship and the nature of that relationship, perhaps
to show that these are things rooted in our collective conscience, but he
also drew upon the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights in arriving
at his decision. In fact, Goldberg's use of the Bill of Rights as a yardstick to determine whether the specific right is covered by the zone of
privacy bears less resemblance to flexible due process than Douglas'
treatment of that question.
According to Goldberg, the appropriate test where a state statute
abridges a fundamental personal right is whether the state can show
that the law is necessary to effectuate a compelling state interest.G
Goldberg found the state's rationale, that the law helped prevent in55 Id. at 493, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
56 381 U.S. at 493, quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas,

J., dissenting).

57 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).

58 381 US. at 494.
59 McKay, Emanations and Intimations, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 259, 270 (1965).
60 381 US. at 493, quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas,

J., dissenting).
61 381 U.S. at 495 (emphasis added).
62 Id. at 497.
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dulgence in extramarital relations, "dubious, particularly in light of the
admitted widespread availability to all persons in the State of Connec-

ticut, unmarried as well as married, of birth control devices for the pre-

vention of disease."6 3 "But, in any event," he concluded, "the state
interest in safeguarding marital fidelity can be served by a more discriminately tailored statute, which does not, like the present one, sweep

unnecessarily broadly, reaching far beyond the evil sought to be dealt
with."64 Thus, Goldberg did not decide that the law was not necessary

to promote a compelling state interest. Like Justice Douglas, he fell back
on the concept of overbreadth to invalidate the statute.

In closing, Goldberg added a caveat that the Court's holding "in
no way interferes with a State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity
or misconduct."0 5 The significant impact this comment had will be explored later. 6
3. Mr. Justice Harlan:The Rational Continuum ol Liberty
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion,07 unlike those of Justices
Douglas and Goldberg, presented no surprises. Harlan had appraised
the Connecticut statute at length four years earlier in Poe v. Ullman;08
in Griswold he did little more than incorporate his earlier views by
reference. 69 Using a theory of substantive due process tempered by judicial restraint,70 Harlan lodged the right of privacy firmly within the
confines of the "liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
63 Id. at 498.
04

Id.

65 Id. at 498-99; see text accompanying notes 303-419 infra.
66 See text accompanying notes 313-19 infra.
67 381 U.S. at 499-502.
68 367 U.S. 497, 539-55 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
69 381 U.S. at 500. Hereinafter, Harlan's opinion in Poe will be treated as the
expression of his opinion in Griswold.
70 The school of thought to which Harlan belonged traces its origins to
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937), where Justice Cardozo stated
that the fourteenth amendment affords protection to personal rights "implicit In
the concept of ordered liberty" so that fundamental fairness will be assured. This
approach gives substance to the due process clause not by focusing on potential
"economic" rights, but by examining "personal" freedoms. See text accompanying
notes 14-16 supra. Yet, it is indistinguishable in theory from the line of cases
typified by Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), absent a clear, theoretical
basis for distinguishing personal and economic interests.
In applying his version of substantive due process, Harlan avoided the abuses
to which the doctrine is potentially subject by exercising judicial restraint and
upholding state action in the vast majority of cases, even when it abridged rights
that would have been secured to a defendant in a federal action. See, e.g., Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171-93 (1968) (dissenting opinion); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 14-33 (1964) (dissenting opinion). When he did find that federal rights
should be protected against state action, it was because of their "fundamentaity,"
not their inclusion in the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
408-09 (1965) (concurring opinion); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355, 349-52
(1963) (concurring opinion).
In the words of one commentator, "[review of state action on the basis of

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

October 1973]

CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY

Harlan rejected the Court's opinion in Griswold because it seemed
to him to make the same assumption made by Justices Black and Stewart in dissent: if a right is not mentioned or implicit in the first eight
amendments, it is not protected against state incursion by the fourteenth amendment due process clause.1 Harlan believed that this theory
-that the entire Bill of Rights and only the Bill of Rights is "incorporated" into the due process clause72-rests on an inflexible reading of
the Constitution.73 To Harlan, fourteenth amendment "liberty" is "not
a series of isolated points pricked out" in the form of specific Bill of
Rights guarantees, but rather "a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions
and purposeless restraints." 74 Identifying the rights comprising the continuum is no easy task. They are "fundamentalV' 5 and "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty; "7 they emerge from the history, traditions
and basic values of American society; 77 they are reflected in the concerns that moved the Framers to embody some of them in the Bill of
Rights 8 But further definition is impossible7 9
fundamental fairness is simply a prevention-of-atrocities doctrine." Laughlin, A

Requiem for Requiems: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Reality, 6S Mich. L.
Rev. 1389, 1397-98 (1970). Although this is an overstatement, it may help to
explain Griswold-Poe--one of the few instances in which Harlan was willing to
curb state action. See Dorsen, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: A Constitutional
Conservative, 44 N.Y.UL. Rev. 249, 267-69 (1969).
71 381 U.S. at 499. Justice Black rejected the Court's decision because he
could find no mention in the Bill of Rights of the form of privacy at issue and was
unwilling to inflate the amendments to penumbral dimensions. Id. at 50-10. His
opinion summarizes his previously advanced criticisms of Harlan's flexible due
process approach. Id. at 510-27; see Adamson v. California, 332 U.. 46, 68-92
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart shared Black's view generally, but seemed particularly concerned that Griswold represented an exhumation of substantive due process, which,
in his view, had been formally buried only two years earlier in Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 US. 726 (1963). See 381 US. at 527-28. This thought also disturbed Black.
Id. at 523-24.
72 This "incorporation" doctrine can be seen as yet another attempt to give
substance to the fourteenth amendment due process clause, without lapsing into
judicial legislation. Advocates hold that incorporation keeps the judges from
"roam[ing] at large" by confining them within the bounds of the Bill of Rights.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); see Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.. 145, 168-71 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
73 See 381 US. at 500; Poe v. Ullman, 367 US. 497, 540-41 (1961) (dissenting
opinion). Harlan also rejected the theory that the fourteenth amendment ensured
procedural due process alone. Poe,supra at 540-41.
74 Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
75 Id. at 541.
76 381 U.S. at 500, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US. 319, 325 (1937);
see note 69 supra.
77 381 U.S. at 501; Poe v. Ullman, 367 US. 497, 542-43 (1961) (dissenting
opinion).
78 See 381 U.S. at 500; Poe v. Ullman, 367 US. 497, 544 (1961) (dissenting
opinion). This point is implicit in Harlan's use of the third and fourth amendments
to argue for finding a right of privacy in fourteenth amendment liberty. See Poe,
supra at 549-51; note 82 infra.
79 Harlan countered accusations that his standards led to subjective review
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Reasoning from the "common understanding [of] the Englishspeaking world," 80 from the traditional protections given to marriage in
American society, 81 and from the concerns reflected in the third and
fourth amendments, 82 Harlan found that "the privacy of the home" was
one aspect of fourteenth amendment liberty. He did not describe this
privacy precisely, but presented its outlines. Harlan was not concerned
with physical invasion and saw no visions of state troopers in the marital bedroom. 88 Rather, he focused on the right of a couple to control
information about their intimacy 4 and, more importantly, on their
"'right to be let alone'" in directing and conducting their family life.8 5
The "private use of their marital intimacy" should not subject them to
the state's rude intrusion, with the intimidating baggage of the criminal
law, into their home life. 80 Thus, Harlan's "privacy of the home" combined the idea of a place where activities beyond the state's purview
commonly occur with the notion that an individual could decide the
form and extent of those activities.

Yet each of these concepts was weakened by the limitations Harlan
placed on the right of privacy. Perceiving that this constitutional right
87
could be used to strike at fornication, adultery and sodomy laws,
and lack of judicial restraint by claiming that the first eight amendments were just
as susceptible to varied interpretations as the due process clause. See 381 U.S. at
501. Critics have pointed out that this is not necessarily the case, since the Bill of
Rights at least provides a specific referent for reasoning. See, e.g., Cushman, Incorporation: Due Process and the Bill of Rights, 51 Cornell L.Q. 467, 499 (1966). See
also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
8O Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
81 Id. at 546, 551-53.
82 Id. at 549-51. Harlan argued that although the third and fourth amendments
limited the "methods" of state intrusion, the underlying concern of the Framers
was to protect the privacy of home life. At the time the Bill of Rights was drafted,
experience suggested that the quartering of soldiers in homes and the general warrant constituted the most severe threats to such privacy. The specific constitutional
provisions that guarded our ancestors are not directly applicable to consideration
of the contraception statute except as they indicate this underlying concern. Id.
83 See id. at 549.
84 Id. at 548. Only Harlan expressed concern with the individual's ability to
control personal information, which one commentator has viewed as the central
interest protected by any legally recognized right of privacy. See Gross, The Concept
of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 34, 35-38 (1967). Control over personal information
is the primary interest protected by tort privacy law. Id. at 46-54; see text accompanying notes 650-60 infra. Rights to seclusion and autonomy, on which the
Griswold Court focused, may enable an individual to protect this narrowly conceived right of privacy more easily. See id. at 39. Yet, the "right to be let alone"
and the right to make personal decisions certainly have value independent of their
function as preconditions for the effective control of information.
85 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 550-51 (1961) (dissenting opinion), quoting
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
86 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
87 Harlan made no effort to differentiate among these "crimes" according to
the intensity of the personal interest or the harm done to other members of society.
Indeed, he rejected the idea that "consensual behavior having little or no direct
impact on others" was in any way beyond state regulation by virtue of that fact
alone. Id. at 546.
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Harlan asserted that the privacy of the home presented no barrier to
state intrusion when those dwelling within were homosexuals or unmarried heterosexuals. Although such persons have a right of privacy a
it is negated in this context by the state interest in limiting sexual conduct to married couples. Harlan did not explain why the liberty of the
unmarried is so much less substantial than that of the married that the
state can forbid all sexual activity to the former but cannot interfere
with the latter. He did not speak of the imposition on, for example, two
homosexuals forced to reveal the details of their intimacy in a public
forum, although he was outraged and eloquent when describing a married couple in the same situation.8 9 Instead, he argued that tradition
and law specified marriage as the approved locus for sexual activity.
Having "fostered and protected" an institution in which sexual intimacy
was "essential and accepted," the state could not "regulate... the details of that intimacy."'90 His argument amounts to an assertion of
estoppel: since the state has promoted sex within marriage, it cannot
regulate it; since it has never promoted fornication and sodomy, it may
continue to forbid them.
Nevertheless, Harlan seemed willing to circumscribe a couple's
right to use contraceptives. Although a statute prohibiting use is "unjustifiable," a statute discouraging use indirectly might well be legitimate. 91 He did not discuss whether the state could regulate distribution
of contraceptives so as to prohibit them in effect.92 Thus, the right of
privacy recognized by Harlan contains notions of the home as a center
of personal life and of the ability to make decisions within that context,
but is not exempted in either aspect from some forms of state intrusion.
Since a "basic liberty" was involved in Poe and Griswold, Harlan
was unwilling to presume the Connecticut statute constitutional and be
subjected it to "closer scrutiny," using what is in essence an overbreadth
test to measure its legitimacy.93 He found that the state's ultimate goal
-to protect morality-was within the police power and that its immediate goal-to discourage contraception-was at least arguably
valid.r But the means the state had chosen were "obnoxiously intrusive;" the statute was unconstitutional.P 5
Harlan's substantive due process theory, to which he clung tena88 See id. at 552.
89 Id. at 548, 553.
90 Id. at 553.
91 Id. at 539, 546-48.
92 Harlan did compare the Connecticut statute to other statutes that forbade

or regulated distribution of contraceptives. Although his implication was that such
statutes were preferable, he did not discuss how they might be limited by the privacy
of the home. Id. at 554-55. For a discussion of subsequent litigation in this area, see
text accompanying notes 162-84, 221-26 infra.
93 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545, 547, 548, 554 (1961) (dissenting opinion);
see 381 U.S. at 500.
94 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 645-47 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
95 Id. at 554-55.
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ciously during the turbulent days of piecemeal incorporation 0 and experimentation with equal protection 97 in the 1960's, has assumed greater
importance since his retirement and death. Although the Supreme Court
has not abandoned the theory of incorporation, 98 it has indicated that
protection will be given to certain fundamental, unenumerated rights."
Since incorporation as expounded so far provides no theoretical basis
for extending protection beyond the Bill of Rights, the Court may have
to turn to other theories if it decides to protect other unenumerated
rights. The Court has recently stated that the source of the right of
privacy-and presumably of other unenumerated rights--is "the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action."10 If so, Harlan's approach may well supply the framework for some of the Court's future decisions.
4. Mr. Justice White: A NarrowerFocus
Justice White agreed with Justice Harlan that the traditional approach to invalidation of a statute through the due process clause was
preferable to the novel routes chosen by their colleagues. But White's
opinion' 01 differed from Harlan's-and indeed from Douglas' and Goldberg's-in one important respect. Alone among the Justices in the majority, White seemed reluctant to term the right infringed by the statute
a "right of privacy." Instead, he viewed the freedom to use contraceptives as a narrow, specific liberty, protected in itself rather than because
02
it could be viewed as an aspect of privacy.
The opinion wasted few words on doctrinal theory. Claiming that
it would be "unduly repetitious, and belaboring the obvious," to describe the perimeters of the liberty secured by the fourteenth amend96 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 118, 129-33 (1970) (concurring
opinion); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171-83 (1968) (dissenting opinion);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 352 (1963) (concurring opinion).
97 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661-63, 669-77 (1969) (dissenting opinion); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 360-67 (1963) (dissenting

opinion).
98 It has, however, adopted a different approach in applying the theory.
While the Warren Court applied broadly viewed federal guarantees against the
states, the Burger Court has "diluted" federal standards by finding that lesser state
requirements satisfy constitutional demands. The common components of certain

enumerated rights have been found not constitutionally compelled, but simply a
matter of federal judicial practice. Thus, although the sixth amendment right to
a jury trial in criminal cases applies equally to the state and federal governments,
the only constitutional requirement is the presence of a jury. The practice in federal

courts of having 12 persons and unanimous verdicts is not constitutionally necessary. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360 (1972) ; Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 86 (1970).

99 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). See also San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32, 33-36 (1973) (reaffirmation of right

to interstate travel; discussion of "implicit" rights).
100 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).

101 381 U.S. at 502-07.
102 The one time White employed the term "privacy," he appeared to bo

criticizing the cursory treatment of the test used in other opinions. Id. at 503.
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ment, White simply stated that the statute "deprives [married couples]
of 'liberty' without due process of law."'10 3 He buttressed this contention
by citing other cases in which unenumerated rights had been granted
constitutional protection, 10 4 but declined to propose standards by which
an aspect of liberty might be identified-neglecting even general referents like the Bill of Rights, history and tradition, and "fundamentality."
Nor did White define in detail the interest invaded and why it is
constitutionally protected by the concept of "liberty." Framing the
issue narrowly, he described the constitutional liberty in Griswold as
"the right... to be free of regulation of the intimacies of the marriage
relationsbip.!"'0 5 By associating this right with certain other protected
unenumerated rights,'106 White fixed it within "'a realm of family life'"
that is generally beyond the scope of governmental regulation.107 It is
not clear whether White viewed this "realm" as in any way coextensive
with Harlan's concept of "home."
White's focus was clearly on the marriage relationship and the
kinds of decisions necessarily reserved to those who establish such a
relationship1 08 Like Harlan, White did not seem concerned with physical intrusion into the house so much as with mental and emotional intrusion into the household. 109 But, unlike Harlan, he made no attempt
to say why marital status invokes certain protections not given to other
citizens. By confining the nature of the right and framing it with the
marriage relationship, White avoided having to consider the possibility
that unmarried persons have a comparable right to govern their intimate
behavior. Instead, he assumed that the state can regulate their conu
duct."0 Furthermore, White did not suggest what other narrow rightsm
103

Id. at 502.

104 Among the cases he cited are: Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. C00
(1964) (the right to travel); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232
(1957) (the right to choose one's profession); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 26S
U.S. 510 (1925) (the right to direct the education of one's children); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 US. 390, 399 (1923) (the right to marry and raise a family);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (the right to control one's body).

381 U.S. at 504 n.

105 381 U.S. at 502-03.
106 The rights he mentions are protected in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 53S
(1942) (the right to procreate); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(the right to direct the education of one's children); Aleyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (the right to marry and raise a family).
107 381 US. at 502, quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).

White contrasts this type of personal liberty with liberties derived "'from shifting
economic arrangements.' "381 U.S. at 503, quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
108 381 U.S. at 503. To a lesser extent, White was also concerned about the
inhibiting effect the statute might have on doctors and about the denial of equal
protection to poor persons who could not afford private counselling on birth control.

Id.

109 This judgment is implicit in White's conclusion that the statute was an
ineffective device by wh ch to control the sexual behavior of individuals. Id. at
506-07; see text accompanying note 83 supra.
110 381 U.S. at 505-07.
111 Given White's narrow definition of the right and his lack of measurable

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:670

might fall within the "realm of family life" or how one should determine whether a right is protected under this rubric, protected under the
more general concept of liberty or not protected at all.
White devoted most of his opinion to applying the appropriate
test to the facts of the case. When a "sensitive area of liberty" is invaded, the statute demands "strict scrutiny." If this scrutiny reveals
that "less drastic means" are available to accomplish the state end, the
statute will fall. If there is an unavoidable conflict, only a "subordinating interest which is compelling" will justify the state's action.11 2
In this case, White found that the state's purpose was not to discourage contraception per se'1 3 but to reinforce prohibitions on "promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships,... concededly a permissible and
legitimate legislative goal.""14 He could not understand how a ban on
the use of contraceptives by married persons furthered such a purpose,
particularly when other laws allowed unmarried persons access to contraceptives for reasons of health. Because of its "marginal utility" and
overbreadth, the statute was unconstitutiona. 1 1 5
White's reasoning in applying the test is unassailable, given his initial conclusions. His doctrinal approach through substantive due process represents one major-albeit somewhat iscredited"Q-tradition
in Supreme Court adjudication. His reluctance to acknowledge a broad
right of privacy is understandable; he may well have concluded that
finding "privacy" an aspect of "liberty" merely would give the Court
two difficult concepts to characterize instead of one. Yet his failure to
delineate standards by which to discriminate among interests potentially
entitled to constitutional protection as aspects of "liberty" made his
opinion almost useless in subsequent adjudication concerning unenumerated rights. Although White clearly mapped the route that lower
courts are to follow once a basic liberty has been recognized, he gave
them no guidance at the initial fork in the road.
standards by which to estimate the magnitude of personal liberties, one can explain
his dissent in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221-23 (1973), without great difficulty.
Since White does not acknowledge a right of privacy, he did not have to grapple
with the notion that a woman's decision to have an abortion might be an aspect of
such a right. Instead, he construed her interest narrowly as "the convenience, whim,
or caprice of the putative mother" and found it easily outweighed by the state's
interest in protecting fetal life. Id. at 221.
112 381 U.S. at 503-04. In constructing the test, White quoted heavily from
other cases, mixing indiscriminately decisions involving equal protection, due process
and first amendment issues. Id.
113 Id. at 505. The state had abandoned the argument that contraception
was immoral in itself, which contention it had advanced in Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S.
497, 545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
114

381 U.S. at 505.

115 Id. at 505-07.

116 See text accompanying notes 8-11 supra. Both Harlan and White used this
doctrinal approach without embarrassment, although other Justices were distressed
at the notion of a possible return to the era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). See text accompanying note 45 supra; note 71 supra. For a recent view that
privacy decisions, particularly Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), involve greater
judicial incontinence than Lochner, see Ely, supra note 4, at 937-49.
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B. The Expanding Right of Privacy
While Griswold announced the existence of a constitutional zone
of privacy, it did little to sketch the perimeters of that zone. The factual setting of the case combined several different elements which various Justices found relevant in differing ways. First, the protected
activity took place in the home-a private locus which for several
reasons might itself invoke constitutional protection. Second, the challenged statute purported to regulate marital intimacies, intruding upon
a type of association possibly entitled to constitutional protection.
Finally, the prohibition on the use of contraceptives involved the state
in the highly personal determination of whether or not to have children
-a decision which the Constitution arguably reserves as a right of
autonomy to the individual. These three themes reappeared in varying
combinations in subsequent privacy cases.
1. Stanley v. Georgia: Privacyof the Home
In Stanley v. Georgia,1 7 the Supreme Court combined the concept of the privacy of the home, derived from Griswold, with peripheral
first amendment rights to invalidate a state statute that prohibited possession of obscene materials in one's own home. 18 When the opinion
was first handed down, it seemed to signal a new, enlightened approach
to the problem of obscenity" 9 and to create a powerful hybrid right to
freedom of thought and moral self-determination. 1-° Mfore recent decisions,'2 however, have whittled Stanley's holding down to its facts and
reneged on much of the language and reasoning in its majority opinion.
The Court's current view is that Stanley "was hardly more than a
reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his castle' " "--an interpretation
that strips the case of all first amendment content and leaves it a bare
privacy decision.
Although Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Stanle,,
claimed that his opinion was not intended to disturb the holding of
117 394 US. 557 (1969).
118 Stanley was not the first case to combine the two concepts with this result.

A talifornia court had held that a statute prohibiting possession or preparation of
obscene matter was a violation of an individual right to personal expression and
enjoyment. In re Klor, 64 Cal. 2d 816, 820-21, 415 P.2d 791, 794, 51 Cal. Rptr.
903, 906 (1966).

119 See Laughlin, supra note 70, at 1391.
120 In the lower courts, the issue had turned on the validity of the search

under the fourth amendment. Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309 (1968),
rev'd, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). By neglecting this alternative and carving out a new

ground for decision, the Court gave Stanley a significance it would otherwise not
have had.
121 United States v. Orito, 413 US. 139 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft.
Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 US. 15 (1973); United States
v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); United States v. Reidel,
402 US. 351 (1971).
122

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973).
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Roth v. United States 23 that obscenity is not protected by the first

amendment,2 4 the opinion derived substantial content from notions of
freedom of expression and thought. "If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books be may read or what films he may
watch."' 25 The individual retains the right "to receive information and
ideas, regardless of their social worth,"120 to determine "the moral content of [his] thoughts ' 127 and "to satisfy his intellectual and emotional
needs' 128 even if the materials he uses to do so are obscene. Although
the decision could have been read as extending first amendment protection to obscene materials in some circumstances, 12 9 in retrospect it
appears that the Court was more concerned with other first amendment values: to ensure an individual's access to protected ideas and
expression, state regulation of unprotected ideas and expression would
be limited. 130
The other major constitutional source of Stanley's right was the
privacy of the home. Initially, this interest overlaps with the first
amendment concerns: the image of the police weeding through a personal library for potentially obscene books was probably as offensive
to the Court as the image of police in the marital bedroom. But notions
of privacy also had independent force. The fact that Stanley's activities
took place in the privacy of his home gave the case an "added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy."'131 The added dimension was present not only because the home
is a particularly intimate locus of activity, 132 but also because the activ123
124
125
126
127

354 U.S. 476 (1957).
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 560-63, 567 (1969),
Id. at 565.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 565-66.
128 Id. at 565.
129 See Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602, 606 (N.D. Tex. 1969) (three-

judge court), vacated and remanded per curiam sub nom. Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S.
200 (1971); Engdahl, supra note 7, at 200-01. See also United States v. B & H
Distrib. Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1231, 1232, 1235 (W.D. Wis. 1970), vacated and re-

manded, 403 U.S. 927, judgment reinstated, 347 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. Wis. 1972),
vacated and remanded, 413 U.S. 909 (1973) ; United States v. Lethe, 312 F. Supp. 421,

423 (ED. Cal. 1970).

130 See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1971); id. at 359-60

(liarIan, J., concurring). Even this relatively limited view of the first amendment
interest in Stanley may no longer be viable after Chief Justice Burger's decision In
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-68 (1973). See text accompanying note 147 infra.
131 394 U.S. at 564.
132 One commentator has analyzed Stanley as being grounded in a fourth

amendment penumbra derived from Douglas' opinion in Griswold:
If a particular mode of criminal conduct cannot be discovered except by
the invasion of a "sanctuary" in order to seize some particularly private

item-like birth control devices-the procedural bar operates to invalidate
the substantive crime in the absence of a sufficiently strong governmental
interest for invasion of the sanctuary. This seems to be the meaning of
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ities involved implicate individuals' "beliefs, their thoughts, their emo-

tions and their sensations," focal values of the "right to be let alone."133

The Court posited that an infringement upon one's right to be let
alone cannot be justified simply by the state's desire to confiscate ob-

scene material, thus implying that regulation of obscenity must be justified, and that it must be justified on grounds other than a concern
for the morality of the actor himself.' 34 The Court also rejected the
notion that the state may limit the ideas a person receives in order to

protect society from unlikely but possible resulting deviant behavior,

suggesting that such behavior could be punished directly.135 However,
the state may validly regulate obscene materials in order to prevent

their potential exposure to children or intrusion upon the sensibilities
of persons who do not wish to view them.13o Such dangers are not inherent-in private possession of obscene matter; and, since other per-

missible justification had not been demonstrated, the state's action in
confiscating Stanley's obscene films was found unconstitutional.

The considerations which the Court viewed as sufficient to justify
regulation of public distribution of obscenity seemed indirectly to en-

dorse the Model Penal Code 3 7 and Wolfenden Report

38

position that

private behavior of consenting adults, having no substantial significance

except as to the morality of the actor, is beyond governmental regulation. Under that view, regulation is legitimate only if the activity
is forced upon-an unwilling person or if a minor is involved33 Thus,
Justice Marshall's opinion in Standey might have been interpreted as
requiring a justification for state regulation of immorality in terms of
direct or potential impact on society.' 40
[Griswold] that the Court had in mind in Stanley. If the criminal conduct
(possession of obscene material) requires for its enforcement governmental
inquiry into the contents of one's library, a particularly private res by
definition, the criminal statute is itself unconstitutional because of the
absence of a sufficiently strong countervailing state interest.
Katz, Privacy and Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 203, 20S.
133 394 U.S. at 564, quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
134 "If the State can protect the body of a citizen, may it not, argues Georgia,
protect his mind?" 394 U.S. at 560. The Court answered the question in the negafive. Id. at 565-66; see Katz, supra note 132, at 209.
135 394 U.S. at 566-67.

136 Id. at 567; see Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967) (per curiam)
(citing the same justifications for state regulation of obscenity).
137 Model Penal Code § 207.1, Comment at 207 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).

138 Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution, Report, Cmd. No.

247 (1957) [hereinafter Wolfenden Report].
139 See Model Penal Code § 213 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Model Penal
Code § 207, Comments at 204-65 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Wolfenden Report,
supra note 138.
140 Marshall's subsequent obscenity opinions indicate that he did intend to
require such justification from the state. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 132
n.1O (1972) (dissenting opinion); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 360 (1971)
(concurring opinion) ("[Staney] fully canvassed the range of state interests that
might possibly justify regulation of obscenity."). See also Paris Adult Theatre I v.
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In subsequent decisions, however, the Court has, on the one hand,
explicitly rejected the "consenting adults" theory in its most extenuated form and on the other, been willing to hypothesize an adverse impact on society caused by the very presence of obscene materials in the
of
streams of commerce. Although reserving decision on the question 141
direct governmental regulation of purely private, consensual behavior,
Justice Burger's recent majority opinion in Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton'4 made clear that the state retains an interest in the moral content of its citizens' thoughts 148 and can restrict that content to protect
the general moral climate of society and to prevent antisocial conduct,
however unlikely to result. 4 4 Furthermore, although the individual
may retain the right to view obscene materials in his home, the Court's
decisions have so stringently limited his ability to acquire the materials
from outside the home 45 that he can exercise his right only if he
"writes salacious books in his attic, prints them in his basement, and
46
reads them in his living room.'
Paris Adult Theatre and other recent decisions have not only reduced Stanley to its facts; they have also erased all of its first amendment content and transformed it into a pure privacy case. Throughout
these opinions, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, rarely
mentioned Stanley and the first amendment in the same breath. When
he did discuss them, the "privacy of the home protected by Stanley"
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 105-08 (1973)

(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall,

.).

141 The Court rejected the idea that "conduct involving consenting adults only
is always beyond state regulation," Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
68 (1973) (emphasis added), and found that in this instance, the public and
commercial nature of the activity made the judgment that it was harmful to society
"morally neutral." Although the opinion referred in a footnote to some other, less
public forms of consenting behavior, id. at 68 n.15, the Court refrained from
explicit discussion of what it might do if faced with a decision concerning "wrong"
or "sinful" private activity.
142 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (consenting adults have no right to watch an obscene
film in a public theatre from which minors and unwilling adults have been excluded).
143 The Court denied that the state was trying to control the moral content
of individual thought, reasoning that since obscenity by definition lacks communicaive value, denial of access to it would have little effect on "reason" and "Intellect."
Id. at 67. Nevertheless, by allowing the state to limit access in order to prevent
potential antisocial conduct, the Court does imply an interest in individual thought
which has not been manifested in conduct. In addition, concern with the moral
"tone" of urban commerce, id. at 58-59, may be rooted in part in the notion that
continued exposure to advertisement of the obscene may adversely affect the moral
content of many minds.
144 Id. at 60-63; see Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 120 (1973).
145 United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (no right to transport obscene materials intended for personal use in interstate commerce) ; United States v.
12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (no right to import
for personal use) ; United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (no right to receive
obscene materials through the mail).
146 United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 382 (1971)
(Black, J., dissenting).
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was juxtaposed against the first amendment as a separate limitation on
the state's power to regulate human thoughts and utterances in pursuit
of legitimate state interests.147
The nature of the privacy protected under Stanley is definitely
tied by Chief Justice Burger to the home as a physical locus of activity.1 48 Simply by virtue of being at home, one acquires the right to do
things that one cannot do elsewhere. One of these things is to possess
and view obscenity. But no penumbra of privacy surrounds either the
obscene materials when they leave the home149 or the individual when
he goes to his local theater to watch an obscene film with other consenting adults. 50 If he can get the same film over his threshold without
being caught, Burger implied, he is home free. But any place else, he
is vulnerable to prosecution.' 5 '
If this notion of privacy of the home is carried to its logical ex-

treme, it becomes somewhat startling. Burger stated: "It is hardly
necessary to catalog the myriad activities that may be lawfully engaged in within the privacy and confines of the home, but may be prohibited in public."' 5 2 In spite of this disclaimer, such a catalog would
be informative. One can assume that some of those activities would be
protected by the privacy of relationship he described. 1 3 But what activ147 Where communication of ideas, protected by the First

Amendment, is not

involved, or the particular privacy of the home protected by Stanley,
or any of the other "areas or zones" of constitutionally protected privacy,
the mere fact that, as a consequence, some human "utterances" or
"thoughts" may be incidentally affected does not bar the State from acting
to protect legitimate state interests....

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973); see United States v. 12
200-FL Reels of Super 8M,. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126-27 (1973) (Stanley did not rest
on first amendment rights).
148 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 US. 49, 66 & n.13 (1973).
149 See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139,143 (1973).
150 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973).
151 Burger consistently draws a distinction between the home on the one hand
and the streams of commerce or places of public accommodation on the other. See
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142-43 (1973); United States v. 12 200-FL
Reels of Super 8MMS.Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126-27 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57, 66, 67, 69 (1973). As Justice Douglas points out in

dissent, this rigid distinction means that a person who moves or takes a trip cannot
take with him books that he would be allowed to read at home. Or/lo, supra at
146.

United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142-43 (1973).
153 Burger separated "privacy of the home" from privacy derived from a
"protected intimate relationship;" he included in the latter category rights pro152

tected in Grisoold and Roe. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66
n.13 (1973). Although it may scarcely be fair to criticize this brief, tantalizing
reference, one questions whether the "relationship" concept is consistent with the
holdings in Roe and Eisenstadt that the right of privacy is an individual right.

Furthermore, it is not at all clear whether the "relationship" he perceived in Roe
is that between a woman and her doctor or between a woman and her lover. See
iL The Roe opinion assigned the right to the woman alone. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973) ; see note 197 infra. The putative father may have a separate interest. See Roe v. Wade, supra at 165 n.67; text accompanying notes 239-S6 infra.
Burger's inventive dictum on the subject of privacy probably does not represent
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ities might be protected by the privacy of the home itself? Smoking
marijuana? Gambling? Fornication?' 1 4
This "privacy of the home" seems significantly different from other
forms of privacy which are currently given constitutional protection.
For example, until recently, fourth amendment case law drew distinctions based largely on property law notions of governmental trespass
upon personal sanctuaries. 1' But the Court has now rejected the idea
that the privacy secured by the fourth amendment depends for its viability on the place where an illegal search is made.
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 156
Furthermore, the rights secured by Griswold, seen through the prism

of later decisions in Eisenstadt v. Baird'"5 and Roe v. Wade,158 inhere
in individual people, not places. Perhaps all that Burger meant was that
certain activities, which are not inherently damaging to society but
which are eccentric or intimate, would be unacceptable conduct if performed in public but are perfectly legitimate if performed in one's home

where no one can observe them. 15 9 But Stanley was a rather large ve-

hicle for such a small idea. Indeed, it would be difficult to interpret
Stanley as standing for this proposition. The recent obscenity decisions
indicate that the promulgation and observation of obscene materials is
inherently damaging to society in some vaguely articulated way. An individual's possession of such materials cannot now be viewed as inherently harmless; mere possession outside the home, even if unwilling
persons are not exposed to the materials, can be prohibited. On the other
the views of a majority of the Court and should be handled with care. Judging by
his dissent in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 465-72 (1972), and his tepid concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade, supra at 207-08, the Chief Justice is noticeably
unenthusiastic about the right of privacy.
14 Burger implied that such activities would not be protected simply because
"consenting adults" engaged in them. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 68 n.15 (1973). However, be did not discuss how they might be affected by
privacy of the home.
155 See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 467 (1928). By 1961, the Court no longer relied
on notions of trespass, but nevertheless spoke in terms of a "constitutionally protected area." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) ; see Note, From
Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 968, 971-78 (1968).
156 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (citations omitted);
see Katz, supra note 132, at 206.
157 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see text accompanying notes 171-84 infra.
158 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see text accompanying notes 185-207 infra.
159 Burger may well have wished to restrict Stanley to its least possible content. He was clearly dismayed at the uses to which the case had been put and
stated that had it meant anything more than that the privacy of the home was protected, "Stanley would not be the law today." United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of
Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127 (1973).
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hand, possession in the home is not viewed as an evil that justifies intrusion by state officials. Thus, Stanley suggests that there is a certain
type of activity which, while socially disapproved, is not so damaging
to society as to justify state disruption of the seclusion of the home.
If Stanley bears any significant content outside of the obscenity context-if it protects a range of activities of a similar nature-the "privacy of the home" may prove to be a potent constitutional right.
2. Eisenstadt v. Baird: Privacy and the Individual
While Stanley and Paris Adult Theatre focused on the home as a
place where protected activity may occur, Eisenstadt v. Bairdco and
Roe v. Wade161 developed another of Griswold's primary themes, the
right of personal autonomy. In each case, the Court was asked to decide whether the Constitution protected the individual's ability to make
a decision crucial to his or her personal life and whether or how the
state could limit that ability.
When Griswold was decided in 1965, Connecticut was the only
state to prohibit use of contraceptives. 10 2 Strictly speaking, therefore,
the decision had little direct impact on existing statutes, which prohibited or regulated distribution of contraceptives to a greater or lesser
degree depending on legislative concern with health or morality.20 In
fact, however, whether moved by a broad reading of the holding, by
acknowledgement of changing morality or by acceptance of new policy
considerations, several states took their cue from Griswold and revised
their statutes.16 4
Nevertheless, the laws of many states, even after revision, contained severe restrictions on the availability of contraceptives. Some
160 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

161 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
162 See Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The
statement was still valid in 1965.
163 See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. §§ 39-801 to -810 (1961) (mostly concerned
with health); W'is. Stat. Ann. § 151.15 (1957) (now § 450.11 (Supp. 1973)) (mostly
concerned with morality).
164 See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. fit. 17, § 53 (Supp. 1972); Blass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 272, §§ 21-21A (1970); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 617.25 (Supp. 1973); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 542.380 (Supp. 1973); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2905.32, 2933.21(D) (Page 1972);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4525 (Supp. 1973). A few states undertook positive programs to provide their residents with comprehensive family planning advie. Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-32-1, 66-32-2 (Supp. 1971) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.382 (1973) ;
Ga. Code Ann. §§ 99-3101 to -3109 (Supp. 1972); Mich. Comp. Laws § 325.7a
(1967); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 422.235, 442.080(7) (1967); Okla. Stat. Ann. fit. 63,
§§ 2071-75 (1973); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 435.205 (1971); W. Va. Code Ann. § 16-233-1
(1972). Some of these states included the caveat that the state would not coerce
acceptance of the advice, since family planning decisions were fundamental personal
rights reserved to the individual. Ga. Code Ann. § 99-3105 (Supp. 1972); Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 435.215 (1971) ; W. Va. Code Ann. § 16-2B-1 (Supp. 1972).
In 1971, the federal government revised its laws on importation and mailing of
obscene or immoral articles to omit materials relating to contraception. Act of Jan.
8, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-622, 84 Stat. 1973, amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-62 (1970)
and 19 U.S.C. § 1309(a) (1970).
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states had complex regulatory schemes allowing distribution only by
doctors or by licensed pharmacies, 105 and occasionally providing access
to married persons only.166 Often these regulations were accompanied
by statutes prohibiting the advertisement or display of contraceptives; 167 in some instances, such statutes clearly suggested that the legislature believed that any public reference to contrdiception was somehow obscene.168 Many states prohibited distribution of contraceptives
by vending machine.10 9
These statutes raised a question as to how extensively a state could
limit access to contraceptives if the right to use them was constitutionally protected. If the right was derived from the notion of a locus of
privacy centered about the home, then statutes regulating distribution
would seem less intrusive than one prohibiting use. If the right was
grounded in the view that the marital association was constitutionally
protected, then a prohibition of distribution to unmarried persons might
survive. But if the right was derived from the concept of autonomous
decision about one's personal life, any restriction on distribution would
burden it, perhaps to an unconstitutional degree.
In practice, few persons were actually concerned with this problem; either they were willing to use existing channels of distribution or
were able to circumvent them. One who was concerned, however, was
birth control advocate William Baird. 170 In Eisenstadt, Baird challenged a Massachusetts statute which prohibited the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons, but which granted married persons access to contraceptives through the medium of a doctor's prescription, without limitation as to reasons for use. 7 1 In April 1967, in
165 E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 82-944 to -954 (1960); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §9
2501-03 (1953); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 94-3620 to -3623 (Supp. 1973); Ore.
Rev. Stat. §§ 435.010-.130 (1971).
100 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, §§ 21-21A (1970); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 151.15
(1957) (noi" § 450.11 (Supp. 1973)).
167 E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-950 (1960); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2502
(1953) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 435.110 (1971) (advertisement must be "discreet and
tasteful").
168 E.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 725.5 (1946); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann, § 750.40
(1968).
169 E.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 321-112 to -114 (Supp. 1972); Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 214.240 (1972); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 41 (1971) (no vending machine
distribution except where alcohol sold for consumption on premises); Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 435.040 (1971).
170 Prior to Eisenstadt, Baird had attacked laws which regulated the distribution of contraceptives in New York and New Jersey. In New York, he was convicted under a statute that had been amended extensively during the litigation and
did not pursue an appeal. See People v. Baird, 47 Misc. 2d 478, 262 N.Y.S.2d 947
(Dist. Ct. 1965). The statute was N.Y. Penal Law § 1142 (McKinney 1944), as
amended, N.Y. Penal Law § 1142 (McKinney 1967). In New Jersey, where exposing and discussing contraceptives in public "without just cause" is disorderly conduct, N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:170-76 (1971), the constitutional issues Baird had

raised were mooted when the New Jersey Supreme Court was able to find him
innocent by construing the statute narrowly. See State v. Baird, 50 N.J. 376, 235

A.2d 673 (1967).
171 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch; 272, §§ 21-21A (1970). The exception in the
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violation of this law, Baird exhibited contraceptives to a large audience
at Boston University and gave a package of contraceptive foam to a
member of the audience. In upholding Baird's conviction, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the state had a valid health
purpose in allowing only doctors to dispense contraceptives.' -2 Shortly
after this decision, the court shifted its ground a bit, finding that the
statute also served a "more compelling" moral purpose in that it reinforced laws controlling the private sex lives of the unmarried."3 Thus,
applied to married persons, the statute was construed as a health measure and, applied to the unmarried, as a morality measure.
Soon after his conviction and appeal, Baird petitioned for habeas
corpus in federal court, alleging among other charges that the statute
invaded the privacy of unmarried persons and denied them equal protection. The district court, however, construed Griswold narrowly,
finding that the right of privacy barred only statutes regulating ue of
contraceptives by married persons. 7 4 The court accepted the reasoning
of the Supreme Judicial Court as to the purposes and validity of the
statute and found it rationally related to state goals2 75 The court of
appeals reversed, finding that the statutory purpose was to bar as immoral the use of contraceptives by unmarried persons and that such a
goal was "beyond the competency of the state" under Griswold.'" The
Supreme Court upheld the reversal, but avoided deciding whether the
statute impinged upon the right of privacy.
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion held that the statutory distinction between married and unmarried persons violated equal protection. 7 7 As observers have noted,' 78 the opinion applied a more strincase of a doctor prescribing contraceptives for married persons was created by the
Massachusetts legislature in the aftermath of Griswold in an effort to salvage what
it could of the state's long-standing prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives. See Commonwealth v. Baird, 35 Mass. 746, 748, 247 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1969).
172 See Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 753, 247 N.E.2d 574, 578

(1969).

-73 Sturgis v. Attorney General, 358 Mass. 37, 40-41, 260 N.E.2d 6S7, 690
(1970). The case was brought by physicians challenging the statute's distinction
between married and unmarried persons.
174 Baird v. Eisenstadt, 310 F. Supp. 951, 956 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 429 F.2d
1398 (1st Cir. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The district court also denied
Baird's standing to raise the privacy issue on behalf of his distributee. Id. at

957.
175
176

Id. at 953-54.

Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1402 (1st Cir. 1970), aft'd, 40S US.

438 (1972).
177 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972).

Justice Brennan was
joined by Justices Douglas, Stewart and Marshall; Justice Douglas also wrote
a concurring opinion based on the first amendment; Justice White concurred, joined
by Justice Blackmun; Chief Justice Burger dissented; and Justices Powell and
Rehnquist did not participate.
178 See Gunther, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 18-20 (1972); Note, Public Access to Beaches, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 369, 39091 (1973); Note, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal
Protection, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 807, 818-21 (1973).
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gent "rational relationship" test than the Court had used in the past,
following a few prior decisions and implying development of a middle
ground between the "compelling state interest" test and the uncritical
"rational relationship" test.170 The use of this intermediate standard
allowed the Court to examine the statute closely without having to
determine whether the statute invaded rights that were constitutionally
protected under Griswold.180 Thus, the Court followed the court of appeals in holding that the alleged health purpose was illusory, or, if not,
that the statute bore no rational relation to such a goal. Health needs
of citizens do not vary by marital status. Not all contraceptives are
dangerous to health
and those that are would be subject to federal and
181
state drug laws.
The Court also followed the court of appeals in holding that the
alleged morals purpose was not treated rationally in the statute. The
statute was "riddled with exceptions" by case law, allowing certain unmarried persons access to contraceptives. More important, fornication
was a misdemeanor carrying a 90-day jail term; violation of the distribution statute carried a five-year sentence. Thus, the aider and abettor of a misdemeanor received 20 times the punishment of the perpetrator; and the perpetrator was faced with the exorbitant
unwritten
18 2
penalty of possible pregnancy and an illegitimate child.
Finally, the Supreme Court mentioned the court of appeals' holding that the real and impermissible purpose of the statute was to prevent contraception itself as an immoral act. The Court reserved
decision on whether this was impermissible under Griswold and held
that, whatever its purpose, the statute violated equal protection by
treating married and unmarried persons differently. Thus the Court intimated that the holding in Griswold, despite its extensive reliance on
the concept of the sanctity of the marital relationship,183 could not be
limited to a right of "marital privacy."
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons
cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would
be equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy
in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple Is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
179 Compare Eisenstadt and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (stringent
rational relationship test), with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (compelling state interest test), and Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
(uncritical rational relationship test).
180 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972). The Court did say that
if Griswold rights had been invaded, a compelling state interest test would have
been used. Id.
181 Id. at 450-52; see Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1400-01 (1st Cir.
1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
182 405 U.S. at 448-50; see Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1401-02 (1st
Cir. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
183 See, e.g., 381 U.S. at 495-96, 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ; Id. at 502-03
(White, J., concurring). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
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makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.184

The Court's language suggests that Griswold should not be read
too narrowly, reaffirms the Court's support for unspecified rights, and
suggests that a decision as to when a state must bear the extraordinary
burden of justification for intruding into a personal decision must refer

to how fundamentally the activity in question affects the individual.

3. Roe v. Wade: Privacy and Autonomy
The most significant exposition of the right of privacy to date is
the Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade, 85 declaring that the decision to
have an abortion is within the protected zone of privacy. Although not
overly concerned with the doctrinal origin of the right, the Court, speaking through Justice Blackmun, did express a doctrinal preference.
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state

action, as w8 feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth

Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to

encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy....ss
This passage seems to indicate that, in spite of the traditional exorcism
of Lochner found at the beginning of the opinion,187 the present Court is
inclined to adopt the substantive due process views 18 espoused by Justice Harlan in Griswold, Poe and earlier cases,1s 9 at least insofar as
personal rights are concerned. 90 This view is reinforced by Blackmun's
184 405 U.S. at 453 (citations omitted).
185 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
386 Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
187 Id. at 117.
188 In his concurring opinion in Roe, Justice Stewart noted that4 in his mind,
Griswold had been a disguised substantive due process decision. Although he had
opposed Griswold because of its doctrinal uncertainty, see note 71 supra, he bowed
to stare decisis in Roe and accepted substantive due process with some enthusiasm.
See 410 U.S. at 167-71.
On the other hand, Justice Douglas continued in Roe to reject the notion that
Griswold had anything to do with substantive due process. See id. at 212 n.4
(concurring opinion).
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 65-66 (1973), confirmed the view that the doctrinal source of the right of
privacy is the due process clause.
189 See text accompanying notes 67-100 supra.
190 The distinction between "personal" and "economic" rights has been
endorsed with varying degrees of explicitness by certain members of the Court. In
Roe, neither Blackmun nor Stewart made specific reference to the use of a double
standard in this area, although such a distinction is implicit in the way each
limited the right of privacy to personal liberties. 410 US. at 152-53; id. at 168-71
(Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist criticized the resurrection of substantive
due process, yet his mention of "economic and social welfare legislation" suggests
that he may acknowledge a difference between such legislation and that affecting
personal rights. Id. at 174; see id. at 172-73 (dissenting opinion). Justice White,
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use of one of the benchmarks of Harlan's school of thought in setting
standards by which rights within the perimeters of privacy may be
known: "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'.., are included in this guarantee of personal privacy."' 191
In spite of a mild preference for fourteenth amendment 'liberty,'
Blackmun seemed unwilling to jettison any doctrinal theory that might
help to anchor the right of privacy to the Constitution. He mentioned
that the "roots of that right" had also been found in the first, fourth,
fifth and ninth amendments, and in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights
as a whole. 192 While apparently not an endorsement of Justice Douglas'
peripheral rights theory, this passage suggests that the Court is willing
to use the concepts underlying certain of the first nine amendments as
one standard by which to judge whether a given personal interest is to
be afforded constitutional protection.
Blackmun's opinion also suggests two other criteria for making this
same determination. First, the Court looked to its earlier decisions,
both those concerned with specific Bill of Rights guarantees and the
series of substantive due process cases, beginning with Meyer v.
Nebraska, which evinced a concern with protecting rights pertaining to
marriage, family and procreation. 19 3 Blackmun was as willing as Douglas had been in Griswold to view such previous decisions expansively. 10 4
who dissented in Roe, made it clear in his opinion in Griswold that he perceived a
difference between economic and personal rights. 381 U.S. at 502-03. Finally, tie
Court as a whole has implicitly accepted the distinction by, on the one hand,
deciding Roe and, on the other, reversing summarily a decision that attempted to
resuscitate the old notion of economic due process rights. Dean v. Gadsen Times
Publishing Corp., 412 U.S. 543 (1973) (per curiam). For the argument that the
Court now gives constitutional substance to property rights through procedural
safeguards, see generally Note, The Growth of Procedural Due Process Into a
New Substance, 66 Nw. U.L. Rev. 502 (1971).
191 410 U.S. at 152 (citation omitted).
192 Id.
193 Id. at 152-53.
194 Id. at 152-53. Blackmun cited Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
for example, as a case endorsing the right to marry. Some dictum in Loving spoke of
the fundamental nature of the right to marry. Id. at 12. But, the actual holding of
the case simply struck down anti-miscegenation statutes on equal protection grounds,
because of their inherent racism. Id. Similarly, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942), was cited as endorsing the right to procreate. The actual holding In
Skinner was that a state statute authorizing sterilization of certain convicted felons
denied equal protection. Id. at 541. Again, some dictum spoke of marriage and
procreation as "basic civil
rights of man." Id. at 536, 541.
The Court cited Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), for the proposition that family relationships may be deemed "fundamental." In Prince, the Court
held that the state's interest in protecting children outweighed parental and religious
interests so as to justify the application of a child labor law to convict Prince, a
Jehovah's Witness who allowed her nine-year old ward, also a Jehovah's Witness,
to fulfill what both saw as a religious duty to sell the sect's religious tracts on the
streets of Boston. Despite the one sentence of dictum, id. at 166, to which the
Court referred, Prince cuts against the fundamentality of parental control of family
relationships.
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The Court also considered the personal cost to a woman if the state
were allowed to prevent her from having an abortion.10 5 This consideration seems derived from the idea in Eisenstadt that one test of a right
is how fundamentally state action abridging that right would affect the
individual.19 On a related point, Roe implicitly confirmed the dictum
in Eisenstadt that privacy rights belong to the individual and bear no
1 7
relation to marital status. 0
The Court held that when a "fundamental" right, protected as an
aspect of fourteenth amendment liberty, is involved, the state must
have a "compelling interest" in order to limit the right, and the statute
"must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests
at stake" 9 8 Justice Blackmun rejected several interests asserted on
behalf of the state. First, reasoning from the language and history of
the Constitution and the history of abortion statutes, the Court held
that the fetus was not a "person" to be protected by the terms of the
fourteenth amendment.j9 9 Second, like several lower courts, the Court
referred only briefly to the notion that abortion statutes could be
viewed as attempts to control extramarital sexual behavior.200 In addi195 410 U.S. at 153. The detriments mentioned by the Court were £[slpedfic
and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy;" the fact that
"[mjaternity or additional offspring may force upon the woman a distressful life
and future;" the possibility of imminent psychological harm; the fact that the
woman's "[m]ental and physical health might be taxed by child care;" "the
distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child;" "Itihe problem of
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to
care for it;" and "the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood."
196 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
197 The named plaintiff in Roe was an unmarried, pregnant woman. 410 U.S.
at 120. Although a woman's right to have an abortion is predicated on her consultation with a doctor, see id. at 153, 156; id. at 203 (Burger, C.J., concurring),
the "privacy" involved is dearly the woman's. Id. at 153 ("This right of privacy
... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy?').
198 Id. at 155. As Justice Rehnquist aptly noted, this test is a transplant from
equal protection analysis. Id. at 173 (dissenting opinion).
199 Id. at 156-59. For a lower court opinion holding the contrary, see Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 745-46 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (three-judge court).
See also Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 815 (D. Conn. 1972) (three-judge
court) (dissenting opinion), vacated and remanded, 410 US. 951 (1973); Byrn v.
New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 App. Div. 2d 316, 329 N.Y.S.2d 722
(2d Dep't), aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 336 N.YS.2d 390 (1972), appeal
dismissed, 410 US. 949 (1973). Senator James Buckley of New York has proposed
a constitutional amendment that would make an embryo or fetus a person under
the fourteenth amendment. See 13 Crim. L. Rptr. 2546 (Sept. 19, 1973).
200 410 U.S. at 148. This argument was never seriously advanced in abortion
cases and those courts that mentioned it generally did so only to reject it. See,
e.g., Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 802 n.10 (D. Conn. 1972) (three-judge
court), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F.
Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (three-judge court), appeal dismissed per curiam,
400 U.S. 1 (1970). But see Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical F..aminers,
318 F. Supp. 1217, 1228 (E.D. La. 1970) (three-judge court), vacated and
remanded, 412 U.S. 902 (1973).
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tion, the Court declined to hold that the question of abortion was the
exclusive province of the legislature, beyond the competence of the
courts, simply because of the insoluble moral and philosophical issues
involved. 20 1 Instead, the Court determined that the individual had a
fundamental right under the Constitution to resolve these difficult issues
herself in consultation with her physician. The Court did, however,
recognize two state interests which limit the right of a woman to have
an abortion.
The first of these limitations is the interest in protecting "potential life," which becomes compelling at viability, 24 to 28 weeks after
conception.2 0 2 The state may prohibit abortions after that point, except
when the woman's life or health is imperiled.2 0 3 Second, the state's interest in the mother's health is "important and legitimate" and enables
the state to protect her against her own lack of care. This interest becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester of pregnancy and, to
further it, 2the
state may regulate where and by whom an abortion is
04
performed.
The right recognized by the Court protects an individual's ability
to make fundamental personal decisions that will have a major impact
on his or her life. This fact may explain the Court's preference for
fourteenth amendment liberty as a source of the right, as opposed to the
penumbral theory, which, in its emphasis upon the first, third and
fourth amendments, suggests more of a notion of a place of activity,
such as the home, that is normally beyond the scope of government
concern. This idea of an intimate locus of activity is present in Roe,
but the elements of Griswold which could have been viewed as limiting
the decision to a simple matter of the physical privacy of the home
are missing. Abortions do not generally take place within the home;
armies of state troopers invading the marital bedroom play no part in
the decision that state regulation of abortion is repulsive; the issue of
nondisclosure is not so prominent in Roe as it was in Griswold. Roe is
a straightforward endorsement of the individual's right to make certain decisions regarding the conduct of his or her personal life. 20 5
On the other hand, the Court gave short shrift to a concept of
physical autonomy derived from the individual's interest in controlling
his or her body.
[I]t is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amid that one
has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close
201 410 U.S. at 156-59. For lower court opinions holding the contrary, see
Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248, 1253-54 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (three-judge
court), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Rosen v. Louisiana State lid.
of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1229-30 (ED. La. 1970) (three-judge
court), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 902 (1973).
202 410 U.S. at 160, 163-64.
203 Id. at 163-64.
204 Id. at 163.

205

Id. at 153.
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relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's
decisions. 206
Although the Court has recognized in other decisions that the individual
does have a strong interest in his or her physical integrityi-0 7 the Court
obviously believes that this interest is distinct from interests protected
by the right of privacy.
mi
THm M

ODOLOGY OF PRIVACY

The group of cases comprised of Griswold, Stanley, Eisenstadt and
Roe is obviously meaningful to persons who wish to use contraceptives,
obtain abortions or view obscenity in their homes. Few other things
about these decisions are clear. The opinions could engender endless
scholarly debates on the adequacy and whereabouts of the constitutional
underpinnings of the newly declared rights, the logical force and consistency of the opinions, and so on. But the question courts will be called
upon to answer concerns not the origin of the right of privacy, but its
application. To decide what other personal liberties the right of privacy
may protect, the courts must undertake the task the Supreme Court has
not yet faced: locating the boundaries of the right of privacy.
Several assumptions are necessary at the outset of this inquiry.
First, it must be assumed that the right of privacy is a viable constitutional doctrine rather than a disingenuous excuse for legislative decisions by the Court. 08 Second, the Supreme Court privacy cases must be
viewed as consistent with one another.20 9 Finally, it must be assumed
that there is some rational way to fashion limits to what is now an extremely amorphous right.
As discussed above, Roe v. Wade protects what is most appropriately denominated a right of autonomy. Certain concerns of Grisat 154.
207 The Constitution as interpreted by the Court does recognize an individual
206 Id.

interest in one's person, although there is disagreement as to its extent. See
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1957); Rochin v. California, 342 US.
165, 172 (1952) ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.. 11, 26 (190S); Union Pacific
R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
208 Some critics of Roe are unwilling to make this assumption. See, e.g., Ely,

supra note 4. From this perspective, there would be no privacy rights other than
the ones the Supreme Court has declared because there would be no real doctrine
of privacy.
209 Alternatively, one may argue that there is a viable constitutional right
of privacy, but that the Court has been misapplying it. See id. at 928-30. But for
the lower courts to adopt this view and to create their own independent doctrine of
privacy would seem rather quixotic.
Also, if the Court's consistency were not assumed, one would be tempted to
ignore Stanley v. Georgia on the theory that the Court has only barely refrained
from overruling that case. See text accompanying notes 141-59 supra. But taking
the Court's explanation of Stanley at face value requires viewing Stanley as a case
involving the privacy of the home, a view which can have broad implications. See
text accompanying notes 535-40, 558-60 infra.
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wold-the seclusion of the home and the sanctity of a relationship
created and nurtured by the state-receded into the background in Roe.
But the Court's focus on autonomy obviously cannot mean that all
rights of autonomy or all personal decisions are protected by the socalled right of privacy. If the state were required to demonstrate a
compelling need in order to infringe upon any personal decision, there
would be few laws, if any, left on the books. There must be some factor
separating constitutionally protectable rights of privacy from spheres
of human activity which are properly regulable by the state.
One starting point for identifying that limiting factor is the group
of rights already declared by the Court to be privacy rights. The Court
has labeled these rights as "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty," standards derived from Palko v. Connecticut.210
It is possible to view "fundamentality" as the only limiting factor and
to posit that all rights meeting the Palko standard are constitutionally
protected. Any human activity which is not deemed fundamental then
could not claim any measure of constitutional protection.
The chief problem with this approach is the ambiguity of the fundamentality test. Since few human activities are clearly fundamental or
nonfundamental, this test is conducive to subjective, result-oriented decisions. And, while the standard is vague, the classification of a right
as "fundamental" or not is virtually outcome-determinative. If a judge
calls a right fundamental, the state must demonstrate a compelling need
for any interference with that right. Only one law has ever been found
by the Supreme Court to be valid under this test.21' If, on the other
hand, the judge were to conclude that the right is not "fundamental,"
the state would only be required to have a colorably rational basis for
any law vitiating that right. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton212 shows
how lenient tests for state abridgement of nonfundamental rights may
be. The question of whether a state law will stand or fall is too critical
to hinge on the ambiguous word "fundamental."
The all-or-nothing approach to constitutional law has already been
called into question in another context. The two-tiered test was first
adopted to facilitate analysis of equal protection claims.218 Fundamental
rights were in, all others were out. The current Court seems to have
found the dichotomous approach unworkable and has been reaching for
some middle ground.214 When a state classification has impinged on
certain nonfundamental personal interests, the Court has applied the
210 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937),
(1973).

211

cited in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Court held that

the federal law in question was justified by the compelling interest in preserving

national security during time of war. But "no state law has ever satisfied this
seemingly insurmountable standard." Dunn v. Blurnstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
212 413 U.S. 49, 60-63 (1973).
213 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
214 See Gunther, supra note 178, at 17-20.
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lower-level rational basis test more rigorously, examining whether the
chssification does in fact promote a legitimate state end.21 In some
cases, the Court has found that promotion of a valid governmental purpose does not justify a classification that deprives individuals of personal rights.2 16 It would be ironic indeed if the Justices were to escape
in this manner from the rigid, two-tier equal protection model only to
find that they had built the same cage from a different constitutional
doctrine.
The magnitude of a right-whether or not that right is deemed
fundamental-should be a secondary inquiry. Fundamentality may be
a legitimate determinant of how much leeway a state should be allowed
in circumscribing certain personal activities, but it should not be the
exclusive test of whether or not that activity deserves any measure of
constitutional protection. It is not the magnitude, but the nature of a
right or activity which demands protection against wanton state intrusion. The Supreme Court has exhibited a concern with protecting activities which are "private" in nature against state interference. If the
idea of privacy has any meaning, it must reflect a concern the Court
feels for certain human values. These same values may be implicated in
rights or activities which should not properly be classified as fundamental but which should be recognized as aspects of fourteenth amendment liberty. Thus, certain rights might be viewed as commanding some
degree of constitutional protection less than the compelling state interest
standard used where fundamental rights are at stake. If there are nonfundamental privacy rights, then courts faced with privacy claims must
answer two questions: first, is the right asserted a right of privacy?
and second, is it a fundamental privacy right?
The answer to the first question depends wholly on the nature of
the right involved. The first step a court should take in analyzing the
purported right is to compare the interests involved with the interests
protected in previous Supreme Court cases. In Roe v. Wade, Justice
Blackmun took a broad view of what constitutes precedent for finding
rights of privacy. Grouping early cases such as Meyer and Pierce with
more recent decisions like Grimvold, Eisenstadt and Stanley, Blackmun sketched a sphere of constitutionally protected rights involving
contraception, home, family and the rearing of children.21 7 His approach
suggests that it is the underlying concerns rather than the specific holdings of these cases that should be consulted when a privacy argument is
advanced. In particular, does the claimed right either further or depend
on values deemed important in those cases? Does it commonly involve
the home? Does it concern values associated with the home, such as
seclusion, intimacy or the pleasures of associating with family or close
friends? Is it a right of personal autonomy? More particularly, does it
involve autonomous decisions that shape an individual's personal life,
215 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
216 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
217 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
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whether in a long-term or short-term sense? One may also consider
whether the values protected are similar to the values underlying those
Bill of Rights amendments found relevant in prior privacy cases.218 In
particular, does the interest involve the security and seclusion of the
home, protected in the third and fourth amendments? Does it bear upon
the rights of personal security and autonomy protected in the fourth
and fifth amendments? To some extent, this inquiry will overlap with
examination of precedent.
Once it has been determined that a given interest deserves protection as a privacy right, the second question should be whether or not
it is "fundamental." Here, inquiry should focus on whether the right
may be deemed "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and on its
importance to the individual asserting it. If a court determines that a
privacy right is fundamental, the state should have to show that its
infringement is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. If the right is deemed less important, the court should ask whether
the state's restriction is in fact reasonably related to promotion of a
legitimate state interest.
This latter test should not be applied with the traditional, almost
total deference normally shown to the state's judgments. One of the
most notable themes in privacy cases is the fact that the state's interest
is usually ill-defined at best and nonexistent at worst. Frequently, challenged legislation reflects an effort to impose a particular moral code on
affected individuals rather than a concern with public health, safety
or welfare. Although protection of public morals is within the traditional police power of the state, the legitimacy of this state interest may
be questioned, especially when the goal is promotion of "morality" in
the abstract, without any examination of how a particular form of conduct adversely affects the individual or society as a whole. Furthermore,
this goal may be less valid when there is a significant divergence of
opinion among the members of the public as to what constitutes "moral"
behavior.219 The abortion controversy ultimately centered upon the
morality of the decision to abort a fetus. Nevertheless, recognizing the
insoluble nature of this question, most courts, including the Supreme
Court, preferred to leave the moral judgment to the person most directly
concerned. Instead, the courts focused on the more tangible state interests in the mother's health and in potential life. 0°
218 See id. at 152; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

219 See text accompanying notes 409-10 infra.

220 The Court's decision that the state has a cognizable interest in potential
life can be seen as a limitation on the woman's ability to make a judgment that
abortion is morally justified. However, the state interest becomes compelling only
at viability, when "the fetus... presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside the mother's womb." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). Although
the Court denied that a fetus was a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment, id. at 156-59, it allowed the state to step in to protect the rights of a
potential person once live birth has become possible. Thus, the decision involves not

a moral judgment on the justifiability of abortion, but rather an effort to protect
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The essence of privacy is the notion that certain basic decisions
about how one will conduct his or her life-whether on a day-to-day
basis or in a long-term sense-are reserved to the individual. If the
state wishes to make or restrict these decisions, it should have good
reason for doing so. This does not mean that the presumption of constitutionality traditionally afforded state enactments need be discarded.
It should mean, however, that the individual who has established that
his privacy is infringed by government action will be allowed to assert
that the state has no legitimate interest in regulating his conduct or that
the enactment is not rationally related to the achievement of the state's
purpose. A court should give serious consideration to such assertions in
a privacy context. If a plaintiff or defendant can show that the statute
will not in fact promote evident and legitimate state interests, the burden should be shifted to the state to identify its legitimate interests or
to show that there is good reason to believe that the measure will in fact
achieve its intended purpose. In other words, the court should use what
has been termed a "means test" to determine whether the means chosen
by the state are rationally related in fact to realization of a legitimate
end.
If there is a direct conflict between a privacy right and governmental action that effectively promotes a legitimate goal, the court
might inquire as to whether the state can achieve its purpose by means
that do not prohibit or burden the exercise of the right. In other words,
the court should determine whether the statute is unnecessarily overbroad. Since in this context rights are by definition nonfundamental,
the court should consider the burden that a different form of regulation
would impose on the state. If this burden is excessive, or if there is
irreconcilable conflict between individual and state interests, the state
should prevail.
Against this background, this Note will now turn to a discussion of
issues in privacy litigation that have not been resolved by the Supreme
Court. The first section examines some peripheral issues that have
arisen with regard to established privacy rights in the area of family
planning. Next, we consider several types of privacy rights that have
not yet been acknowledged as such. Finally, we examine an important
interest commonly confused with constitutional privacy rights.
an entity that will have rights separate from the mothees once born. Cf. Tribe,
supra note 16, at 21-29. Tribe argues that the question of when life begins is a
"religious" one and is thus beyond the province of the state under the reasoning

of the establishment clause. Id. at 21-29. This may be true in the abortion context
because of the positions taken by organized religious groups. However, the question

is at base a moral one and a person who does not belong to an organized church
may hold strong opinions on it. Whether an individual has a right to make a
given moral decision should not turn on the fortuitous circumstance that organized
religions take or do not take an official position on the issue. Tribe also as-serts that
the abortion question changes at viability because of the presence of a being who
can exist apart from the mother. His position on this issue is similar to, but more
extensively developed than, the position assumed here. See id. at 26-29.
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IV
TiE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN THE LowEm COURTS
Griswold was a puzzle for the state and lower federal courts. Its
doctrinal origins were suspect, grounded as they were in "emanations,"
a "forgotten" amendment and substantive due process. But doctrine
did not present a serious problem, since Griswold itself could always be
cited as the source of the right of privacy. The greater problem, as just
noted, lay in defining the right itself. A "zone of privacy" existed, but
no one was sure of its dimensions.
Some courts, dismayed by the potential scope of Griswold, limited
it strictly to its holding. Others assumed that the zone of privacy contained more than the right of a married couple to use contraceptives in
their bedroom without state intrusion. The notions of home and family,
personal autonomy, sexual intimacy and the right to be let alone all
suggested paths that various courts eventually explored.
A. Family Planning
After Griswold and Roe, it is reasonably clear that the right of
privacy, whatever its ultimate limits, subsumes the right to make and
implement family planning decisions. Controversy has centered about
the issues of how far the state can regulate exercise of the right and
whether the individual can demand that the state facilitate exercise of
the right.
1. Contraception
Neither Griswold nor Eisenstadt declared a constitutional right of
access to contraceptives, 221 and the question to what extent the state
may burden the right to use them remains technically unanswered.
Nevertheless, it is clear from Griswold and Roe that the right of privacy
embraces the basic right to decide to use them if access can be secured.
Furthermore, Eisenstadt and Roe suggest that the state may restrict
that right only in order to protect the health of its citizens and that a
threat to health must be genuine. Thus, the Supreme Court's pronouncements have broad implications for future regulation.
None of the existing statutes distinguishes between contraceptives
that may be dangerous to the health of the user and those that are not.
Statutes that require an individual to secure a doctor's prescription
before he or she can obtain contraceptives from a druggist 222 may well
be invalid when applied to harmless devices. States which prohibit
vending machine distribution would have to show that the contraceptives in question present a danger to health. Since many of the vending
machine statutes clearly rest on the ground, stated or implied, that
221 Later Supreme Court citation of Eisenstadt suggests, however, that the

Court recognizes it as an implied extension of privacy rights to cover access to
contraceptives. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129, 152-53 (1973) ; id. at 213 (Douglas, J., concurring),
222 See statutes cited in note 165 supra.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

October 19731

CONSTITUTIONAL

PRIVACY

contraceptives are "indecent articles," 22 it may be difficult to justify
them as health measures. An alternative argument that public display
of contraceptives is somehow "obscene" seems foreclosed by the Supreme Court's obscenity decisions, which limit permissible regulation
to
4
communications that "depict or describe sexual conduct."22
Finally, it seems unlikely that a state statute could permissibly
restrict distribution in order to prevent immoral conduct. The effect of
any such statute, even if carefully drawn to avoid a disparity in penalties imposed by law, will always be potentially to punish fornication
with pregnancy and the birth of an illegitimate child. Although it might
be argued that such punishment is not inevitable, since a woman now
has the right to an abortion, the decision whether she should undergo
that trauma is reserved to her and not to government. More broadly,
under Roe the state cannot penalize a woman for fornication by forcing
her to make a private decision that she would otherwise not have had
to make. If "immoral" conduct is to be punished, the state must punish
it directly.
It is interesting to note that there has been very little litigation in
this area. after Eisenstadt, in spite of the vulnerability of many state
statutes. Most of those who wish to use contraceptives have access to
them. Because of population growth, state interest increasingly coincides with individual interest, so that severely restrictive laws may not
be rigorously enforced. Nevertheless, the prevalence of abortion litigation indicates that some members of society do not have adequate access
to contraceptive information and devices.2- Perhaps it is time that more
states took action to eliminate restrictions on these items -0 and to implement affirmative programs to inform and aid their citizens.
223 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. it. 16, § 2601 (1953) (implied); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 450.11 (Supp. 1973) (stated). See also authorities cited in note 169 supra.
224 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
225 One individual whose lack of access to contraceptives-and perhaps to
other rights of privacy-may raise difficult problems is the minor. Some states
supply minors with contraceptive information and devices regardless of parental
consent. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 66-32-2 (Supp. 1971); Georgia Code Ann. §
99-3103 (Supp. 1972). Some require consent. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.382(5) (a) (4)
(Supp. 1973). See also Note, Minors and Contraceptives: The Physician's Right to
Assist Unmarried Mimors in California, 23 Hastings L.J. 1486 (1972). Although
minors have constitutional rights, see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 US. 503 (1969) ; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the extent to
which these rights may be limited by the state either directly or indirectly through
statutes authorizing parental controls remains problematical. Compare Doe v.
Planned Parenthood, 29 Utah 2d 356, 510 P.2d 75 (1973), with In re P.J., 12 Crim.
L. Rptr. 2549 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 1973). Examination of the precise nature

of a minor's constitutional rights and permissible legislative limitations on them
lies beyond the scope of this Note. For an analysis of some of the relevant ises,
see R. Zuckerman, Abortion and the Constitutional Rights of Minors (A.C.L.U.
Pamphlet July 1973).
226 Although the concern with access to contraceptives is not so substantial
as it once was, the American Bar Association, at its 96th Annual Mleeting, passed
a resolution asking all states to repeal statutes restricting access to contraceptive
information, services and supplies. 13 Crim. L. Rptr. 2438 (Aug. 19, 1973).
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2. Abortion
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court made it clear that a woman's
decision to have an abortion is an aspect of the more general, constitutional right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. The
Court acknowledged, however, that the right can be restricted by the
state in pursuit of its compelling interests in the potential life of the
fetus and in the health of the mother. Although the decision was very
explicit with regard to the extent of such restrictions, it left unanswered
several questions about the doctor's role in the abortion decision, the
potential interest of the putative father, and the ability of the woman
to compel the state's cooperation in implementing her abortion decision.
During the first trimester of pregnancy, the task of protecting the
woman's health is left to her personal physician, with whom she consults
as to the advisability of abortion.2 7 The precise nature of the doctor's
role is one of the great mysteries of the Roe decision. 228 The Court
clearly stated at one point that the right of privacy encompasses "a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. '220 Yet,
other language used by the Court suggests that the decision to proceed
is almost as much the doctor's as the patient's. The state may require
that all abortions be performed by a physician. 230 The woman "will
consider" with the doctor the personal, emotional, psychological, familial and physical factors involved in the decision. 231 The doctor will
exercise his "best medical judgment" in considering these factors. 2 3 2
He may at his discretion decide to consult with other doctors. 23 3 Then,
the doctor, "in consultation with his patient, is free to determine" that
an abortion should be performed. 234 It appears from this language that
the Court considered the "responsible physician" to be a restrictive influence on the woman's ability to make a private decision. 23r Although
the doctor is to exercise his "medical" judgment, his own ethical beliefs
will no doubt contribute to his "decision. '230 In actuality, this fact may
not limit a woman's ability to obtain an abortion when she desires one,
since there will undoubtedly be doctors who will be willing to perform
227 410

U.S. at 163.

See Ely, supra note 4, at 922 & n.22; 13 Crim. L. Rptr. 2415 (Aug. 8,
1973) (report on address by Judge Harold Leventhal at the 96th Annual Meeting
of the American Bar Association).
229 410 U.S. at 153.
228

230
231
232
233
234

Id. at 165.
Id. at 153.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).

Id. at 199.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) ; see id. at 164-69.
This interpretation is strengthened by the concurring opinion of Chief
Justice Burger, which states that the Court's opinion does not sanction "abortion
on demand" because "the vast majority of physicians ... act only on the basis of
235

carefully deliberated medical judgments relating to life and health." Id. at 203.
236 The Court, however, felt that fears of the doctor's imposing his beliefs on
patients were baseless. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 196-97 (1973).
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abortions without imposing their own ethical views on their patients.P 7

Nevertheless, the central role given to the doctor by the Court's dicta
might place an unreasonable burden on the woman's right of privacy,
if the Court intended to say that she must follow his judgment about
the nonmedical aspects of the decision.2 8 In practice, it means that she
may have to consult several doctors before she finds one willing to
carry out her decision. If she is poor or lives in a rural area, this will
be a serious hardship. In theory, however, the doctor's role may be even
more insidious, for it dilutes her constitutional right: although the
"privacy" is hers, the decision is, to some undefined degree, shared.
Another limiting factor of uncertain dimension is the potential
right of the putative father. In Roe, the Court mentioned that in some
circumstances, certain states require the consent of the father of the
embryo or the parents of the woman before an abortion will be performed. The Court declined to decide the nature of the father's rights,
"if any exist in the constitutional context," since the issue had not been
raised by the parties." 9 Since Roe, at least two courts have been faced
squarely with this problem and both have found that the father's interest does not override the woman's constitutional right.
2 40
In Coe v. Gerstein,
two pregnant women, one married and the
other an unmarried minor, and two doctors challenged a Florida statute
that required a physician to obtain the husband's consent before performing an abortion on a married woman and parental consent before
performing an abortion on an unmarried minor. Failure to do so constituted a misdemeanor. ' The court reasoned that if the state cannot
interfere directly to protect potential life or the mother's health before
viability and the second trimester respectively, it cannot interfere
on behalf of the father or the parents of the mother to protect the same
interests. 42 The court also found that fathers and parents might be
independently concerned with the abortion decision. The father's interest "in seeing his procreation carried full term is, perhaps, at least equal
to that of the mother," and this interest may attach at conception. The
parents' interest in their family as a "self-governing entity" should also

be considereU 43 But since the statute did not distinguish between the
latter personal interests which the father and parents might justifiably

assert and interests in potential life and maternal health which the state
44
could not permissibly "delegate" to them, the statute was invalid2
The court added that the father and the parents could press similar
237 Two-thirds of the doctors responding to a nationwide poll early in 1973
favored the decision in Roe. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1973, § 1, at 40, col. 3.

238 Cf. Tribe, supra note 16, at 37. Tribe does not frame the issue interms of
privacy, but in terms of associational rights and his own role analysis.
239 410 U.S. at 165 n.67.
240 Civil Action No. 72-1842 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1973) (three-judge court).
241 Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 458.22(3), 458.22(6) (c)(Supp. 1973).
242 Civil Action No. 72-1842, at 4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1973)

(three-judge

court).

243 Id. at 5.
244 Id. at 5-6.
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claims 45on their own behalf but could not rely on the state to do it for
2
them.
The district court's decision seems ultimately valid, although its
reasoning may be questioned. The interests in potential life and maternal health recognized, but limited, in Roe were asserted by the state
on its own behalf through its statutes. The Florida consent statute,
which carried a criminal penalty, recognized an additional state interest
in family stability and in seeing that concerned parties are consulted in
the abortion decision. Under Roe, the question is whether this interest
is sufficiently compelling to warrant limiting a woman's right of privacy
and it seems doubtful that it is. If the state cannot restrict a woman's
right of privacy because of its direct concern for potential life itself
until almost six months after conception, it probably cannot restrict
that right throughout pregnancy because of its more peripheral concern
for the emotional health of father and family.
This is not to say that the state may not recognize the personal
interests of the father and the woman's parents and provide them with
a means of asserting their rights in the courts. The state does not "delegate" an interest in maternal health, in potential life, in family privacy or in the father's procreation, but rather acknowledges that such
interests exist independent of the state's own interests. Indeed, if the
private parties have a constitutional right of privacy to be consulted
about matters with which they are intimately and fundamentally concerned, it is at least arguable that the state must provide them with an
opportunity to assert their rights in the courts.240 The plaintiff in such
a case would have the anomalous task of arguing that the state must
intervene in a situation from which the state has otherwise been excluded because of its private and personal nature.
There are several ways in which the state might recognize the
father's interest 47 by statute. For example, the state might provide him
with a right to sue in tort for damages caused by a woman's failure to
secure his consent to her abortion.2 48 In such an action, the question
would be whether his right is sufficiently powerful to override the
woman's countervailing constitutional right to make her own decision
Id. at 6-7.
The father would have a difficult time raising such a claim, since he
would be alleging that state inaction in failing to provide him with a forum to
assert his interests had deprived him of constitutional rights. However, he might
try to bring an action in state court against the mother. If the court denied him
a cause of action, he could sue in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). For cases
suggesting that state inaction may sometimes constitute state action, see Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 309-11 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461, 473 (1953).
247 The discussion focuses on the father's interest for two reasons: first, his
interest seems more direct than that of the woman's parents; second, the question of
the constitutional rights of minors vis-A-vis their parents and others raises complex
issues that are beyond the scope of this Note. See note 225 supra.
248 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-7-307, 76-7-308 (Supp. 1973).
245
246

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

October 1973]

CONSTITUTIONAL

PRIVACY

to have an abortion. The primary interest of the father, which may be
in opposition to that of the mother, is in seeing that "his procreation"
is carried to full term. In this instance, he shares with the mother an
interest, derived from privacy concepts, in deciding whether or not to
raise and support a child. -49 Although it is difficult to balance the
father's rights against the mother's, it seems clear that her right must
predominate.- 5° If his right is deemed equal to hers, if he can force her
to choose between bearing a fetus to term or paying damages, he would
by analogy be able to force her to undergo an abortion or to forego use
of contraceptives in the same way. Since the constitutional right of
privacy is an individual, not a group, right,- ri such compulsion through
operation of a state statute is unconstitutional. In addition, as a matter
of pure balancing, it seems evident that her interest in the basic decision is stronger than his. Both share an interest in potential life. But
only she must undergo abortion or childbirth, either of which will be
emotionally, psychologically and physically debilitating if performed
against her will.
On the other hand, the state may be able to create a different kind
of statutory cause of action which would recognize the father's interest.
The Supreme Court has seen fit, at least in dictum, to suggest that a
woman should accept a doctor's advice before undergoing abortion. By
analogy, the state might require her to consult with the father of the
fetus before deciding to have an abortion, at least if he can reasonably
be assumed to be interested in the decision.2 2 Such a statute would
impinge less substantially on her right of privacy than a statute requiring consent and would also afford the father some protection. Alternatively, the state might provide a husband with a cause of action for
divorce if his 'wife refused to bear him children. In any case, a statutory
attempt to give effect to a man's right of privacy in this area must be
narrowly drawn so as to restrict a woman's right to the least possible
extent.
The difficulties a father may encounter in pressing a nonstatutory
claim are revealed in Jones v. Smith.2 3 in which a putative father
asked for injunctive relief to prevent a woman, to whom he was not
249 Cf. Stanley v. Ilinois, 405 US. 645 (1972). The father's interest in this
context might be more compelling if he were seeking to make the woman undergo
abortion. Since state statutes often place on the father, whether married or not, the
primary responsibility for child support, he arguably has a stronger interest in the
financial burden of child raising. See, e.g., N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 413-414 (McKinney Supp. 1973). But see R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 15-11-7, 33-15-1 (1969). This
interest is perhaps counterbalanced by the fact that society holds the mother
primarily responsible for the day-to-day task of raising a child.
250 Cf. Tribe, supra note 16, at 39-41.
251 See text accompanying notes 184, 197 supra.
252 Thus, if a pregnant woman is married and living with the father of the
embryo, he will presumably retain an interest. If she is unmarried or separated
from the father, her interest in termination will be greater and his will be less and,
in some cases, virtually nonexistent. Cf. Tribe, supra note 16, at 41.
253 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. App. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W.
3434 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974) (No. 73-1133).
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married, from having an abortion. Without a statutory claim, 254 the

plaintiff relied basically on contract theory. The court rejected his
claims and stated in addition that his interest as a father was less compelling than the state's interests in maternal health and in potential
life. 255 It is difficult to devise an alternative ground on which he might
have sued. 256 Indeed, it seems that unless the state provides a putative
father with a statutory cause of action, he will have a difficult time
asserting his right. And, if he is given a statutory claim, it is likely to
be subservient to a woman's more powerful privacy right.
In addition to raising interesting questions about the rights of doctors and potential fathers, the Roe decision has prompted other forms

of litigation in the lower courts. Old state abortion laws 257 and new
state abortion laws that attempted to evade the thrust of Roe 258 have
been voided. New issues have been raised. The most interesting problems now facing the courts involve the questions of whether a woman
can demand that a hospital provide facilities for her abortion 259 and
that the cost of her operation be borne by the state through medical
insurance.
The first question so far has turned on whether a hospital's refusal
to perform abortions constitutes state action. Courts so far have found

that a public hospital is a state actor required to perform abortions,200
while a private hospital is not.2 1 The second question was addressed by a
254 The court implied that the criminal statute mentioned above in con-

nection with Gerstein might provide a husband with a derivative civil action.
Since the plaintiff was not married to the defendant, the issue was not considered
in detail. Id. at 342.
255 Id. at 341.
256 Tort law seems to provide him with little relief, particularly since the

woman can assert a defense based on exercise of constitutional rights. Cf. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). If he believes his constitutional
right of privacy has been infringed, he might try suing the woman and her doctor
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). But the Supreme Court has not as yet
recognized actions against private parties under this section beyond situations
involving the thirteenth amendment and the right to travel. See Griffin v,Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 107 (1971); Comment, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 584, 585 (1972).
Furthermore, the Court has held that to come within section 1985(3), a conspiracy
must be motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus." Griffin, supra at 102.
257 See, e.g., Doe v. Woodahl, 360 F. Supp. 20 (D. Mont. 1973); Henro v.
Derrybery, 358 F. Supp. 719 (ND. Okla. 1973).
258 See Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973) (three-judge
court) ; Doe v. Israel, 358 F. Supp. 1193 (D.R.I.), motion for stay pending appeal
denied, 482 F.2d 156 (1st Cir. 1973).
259 For an argument that the state must provide access to abortion facilities
based on alternative premises, see Tribe, supra note 16, at 47-50.
260 E.g., Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 361 F. Supp. 932 (D. Minn. 1973); sea
N.Y. Times, July 2, 1973, at 11, col. 1. As of the time this Note goes to print, of
the decisions requiring public hospitals to perform abortions, only Nyberg has
been published. The Nyberg court followed the reasoning of the First Circuit in a
sterilization case, Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973),
discussed in text accompanying notes 282-85 infra.
261 Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 759-62 (7th Cir. 1973);

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

October 19731

CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY

three-judge court in Klein v. Nassau County .Medical Center.20 2 The
medical center, a public hospital, ceased performing elective abortions

for women who could not afford to pay for them when the State Commissioner of Social Services ruled in an administrative letter that such

abortions were not "medically indicated" and thus were not covered by
Medicaid payments. The court held that abortions were "necessary"
medical care within the meaning of the federal Medicaid statute in the
same sense that prenatal, obstetrical and post-partum services were
"necessary" in the case of pregnancy. 20 Since state law did not distinguish between therapeutic and elective abortions, the Commissioner
could not impose a different public policy in the administration of
Medicaid payments. His attempt to do so denied indigent women equal
protection since they alone would not have the resources to secure elective abortions.2 Since the decision was rendered prior to Roe, the
court did not base its holding on the constitutional right to have an
abortion. However, a reference by the court indicated that if such a
right were recognized, the state dearly could not burden it by providing Medicaid assistance for one type of abortion and not another. This
in effect would force an indigent woman to forego a constitutionally
sanctioned choice.265
3. Sterilization
The right to voluntary sterilization dearly falls within the bounds
of the zone of privacy. As early as 1942, the Supreme Court held that
the ability to procreate was "one of the basic civil rights of man."No
Griswold and Roe have ensured that the ability to refrain from procreation and to exercise individual control over the timing of procreaWatkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Idaho 1973); see
Allen v. Sisters of Saint Joseph, 361 F. Supp. 1212 (NJ).Tex. 1973) (sterilization);
c. S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 34-23A-14 to -15 (Supp. 1973).
262 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (three-judge court) (per curiam),
vacated and remanded "in light of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton," 412 U.S. 925
(1973).
263 Id. at 500.
264 Id.
265 Id.

266 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). In Skinner, a statute
which provided for the sterilization of "habitual criminals" was voided as a denial
of equal protection in that it discriminated arbitrarily among various ckass of
convicts. The Supreme Court's citation of the case, however, suggests that the
Court views it as establishing a right to control one's power of procreation. See
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1973); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152, 159 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965)
(White, J., concurring).
On the other hand, the Court has held that the state may decide to sterilize
"feeble minded" persons, if procedural safeguards are observed. Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927). Several states provide for this. E.g., Arss. Code Ann. §§ 41-45-1
to -19 (1972); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43A, §§ 341-44 (1973); Utah Code Ann. §§
64-10-1 to -14 (Supp. 1967). In view of the fact that such action impinges a right
now recognized as constitutionally protected, Buck may be of questionable validity
without a showing of a substantial state need.
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tion is "fundamental" and constitutionally protected. Voluntary sterilization provides the individual with one means of exerting control over
this basic aspect of his or her life.
Sterilization resembles both contraception and abortion. Yet, because it differs from each of them, it has generated a different kind of
case law since 1965. In the first place, unlike either abortion or contraception, sterilization has in the past been neither prohibited by statute nor highly regulated. 26 7 In 1965, only one state-Connecticut-prohibited sterilization, 268 and one other-North Carolina-regulated it,
by imposing a waiting period on the individual requesting sterilization
and by requiring the consent of a spouse or parents in some circumstances and the concurrence of three doctors. 269 Second, like contraception, sterilization by and large prevents conception. Thus, it has not
stirred the same type of controversy over potential life that has surrounded abortion. Finally, like abortion, sterilization is achieved through
a medical procedure that is not normally performed in the home. Under
Roe, this fact does not make the right to choose to be sterilized less an
aspect of privacy, but it does mean that to enjoy the right, the individual must enlist the services of others. Litigation in this area has
centered around the nature and extent of these services.
Although voluntary sterilization has been legal in virtually every
state, the right to choose it as a method of birth control was not unburdened prior to Griswold. A person who wished to be sterilized did
not have to risk criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, since public policy
did not favor any restrictions on procreation, one who contracted to be
sterilized found himself or herself subject to a lesser penalty: if the
operation failed, he or she did not have the usual recourse in damages
against the doctor who had performed it. Case law had established that
there was no general policy against voluntary sterilization performed
for reasons of health 270 or family planning. 27 ' However, when the operation failed and a child was conceived and born, courts refused on
policy grounds to award damages for "the normal birth of a normal
child.1 272 They challenged the motives of plaintiffs in such suits and
refused to acknowledge that there is no necessary conflict between lovfinancially and emotionally
ing an unplanned child and being damaged
2 a
by the overexpansion of a family unit.
267 It has been suggested that the operation's legality, for whatever reasons,
was assumed in most jurisdictions. Note, Sterilization and Family Planning, 56
Geo. L.J. 976, 977 n.8 (1968) [hereinafter Note, Family Planning].
2068 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-33 (1953) (repealed 1969). Conn, Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 19-66(b) (Supp. 1973) now requires that the patient consent and that a
doctor perform the operation.
269 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-271 (Supp. 1965).
270 See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 125, 255 N.W. 620, 621
(1934).
271 See, e.g., Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 43 (1957).
272 See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622
(1934); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45 (1957).
273 See Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45-46 (1957). But cf. Note,
Elective Sterilization, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 415, 435 (1965).
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Although there were signs of a shift in attitude before GriswoldiF 4
the decision had a major impact on this form of litigation. In Custodio
v. Bauer,275 the court suggested that Griswold had made decisions like
sterilization a matter of individual conscience, beyond state control.
The court refused to set artificial limits upon the damages that plaintiffs might claim when a doctor did not perform his service adequately.
They could seek the costs of the operation, the costs of pregnancy and
birth, compensation for mental anguish, pain and suffering, and compensation for the loss of the mother's attention by other members of
the family.27 6 Other courts have followed the lead of Custodio, refining
the theories of liability -77 and damages.2 7 8 They have recognized Griswold as a source of a "constitutionally protected right not to have
279
children."

The other major issue in sterilization litigation concerns the extent
to which the state may be compelled to aid its citizens in exercising this
constitutionally protected right. Two recent cases suggest that persons
who wish to be sterilized may in some circumstances compel the state,
acting through public hospitals, to provide facilities for the operation.
In McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Centeri 80 a female plaintiff was
denied a tubal ligation by a public hospital because hospital regulations
required that a woman of her age have five children before such an
operation would be performed. She alleged that the regulation invaded
her marital privacy, imposed the religious beliefs of others upon her
and denied her equal protection, and she sued for injunctive relief and
damages. The hospital eventually withdrew its objection, performed
the operation, and then moved to dismiss the complaint. Reversing the
lower court's dismissal, the Second Circuit held that the issue was not
moot, since plaintiff had stated a colorable claim for damages under
section 1983.81
The second decision actually established a plaintiff's right to compel performance of the operation. In Hathaway v. Worcester City
Hospital,282 the First Circuit held that a public hospital which has
undertaken to provide short-term medical care, including operations
274 See Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
275 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
276 Id. at 323-26, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476-78.
277 See Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. App. 1970). For a discussion of the various forms such actions can take, see Note, Family Planning,
supra note 267, at 985-90; Annotation-Mklalpractice-Sterilization, 27 A.L.R.3d
906, 911-16 (1967).
278 See Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616, 617-19 (Del. Super. 1971);
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mlich. App. 240, 250-62, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518-21 (1971) (involving negligent failure to 0il birth control pill prescription correctly). The
damage issue in this area can become even more complex. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove,
49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (denial-of cause of action for doctor's negligent
failure to warn before birth of defective child).
279 Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616, 618 (Del. Super. 1971). See also
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 :Nich. App. 240, 246, 254, 187 N.W.2d 511, 513, 517 (1971).
280 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971).
281 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
282 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973).
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comparable to sterilization in terms of the facilities and skill required
for performance, "may not constitutionally draw the line at medically
indistinguishable surgical procedures that impinge on fundamental
rights. '28 3 The court found that under state law, the trustees of the
hospital would normally have the discretion to decide whether or not
to perform a given operation that came within the bounds of their enabling statute 8 4 However, citing Eisenstadt and Roe, the court held
that the right to choose to be sterilized was a fundamental interest of
the individual, which had to be protected from undue state restrictions. 15 Although the state had a valid interest in the individual's
health, that interest was not greater than its interest when comparable
operations were performed and certainly was not so great as the state
interest asserted in Roe. The hospital could not refuse to perform the
operation if it performed similar procedures, such as appendectomies.
The Hathaway decision is of great importance in that it assures
the individual that his or her fundamental personal decision not to procreate will be effected. In this way, it is similar to an action that would
compel a state to provide reasonable access to contraceptives. It may
also have broader ramifications. In states that have established public
health facilities to provide family planning services at little or no cost
or insurance programs to cover medical procedures, individuals may
justifiably assert that the state must not only provide them with facilities, but also pay for the procedure.28s This would be of particular
importance to indigent persons, who derive little benefit from making
the decision to use contraceptives, to be sterilized or to have an abortion if they cannot afford to implement their choice.
If such facilities are provided and paid for, however, procedures
must be carefully administered so as not to impinge upon constitutional
rights by imposing services that are not desired. A few states have
written into their statutes provisions designed to insure that no person
will be coerced into accepting advice or services he does not wish to
receive.287 Such strictures should be observed in order to avoid the type
of incident that recently occurred in Alabama, where officials of a
family planning clinic ordered two girls, aged 12 and 14, sterilized because "boys were hanging around" them.2 88 A class action suit was
filed by the girls, based in part on a claim of invasion of constitutional
283

Id. at 706.

284 Id. at 704.
285 Id. at 705-06.
286 Cf. Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (three-judge court) (per curiam), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 925
(1973) ; Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 73, 79 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1969);
text accompanying notes 262-65 supra.
287 Ga. Code Ann. § 99-3105 (Supp. 1972); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 435.215 (Supp.
1971). Other states protect the right of an advisor or hospital to refuse for various
reasons to provide such advice or services. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.382 (1973) ; N.J.
Rev. Stat. § 30:11-19 (1971) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 435.225 (1971).
288 N.Y. Times, June 28, 1973, at 14, col. 2.
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privacy and failure to provide adequate procedural safeguards to prevent such inddents2 8 9
Sterilization cases reveal the degree to which Griswold has had an
effect as cause, catalyst or reflection of a decided shift in public policy.
Contraception and other forms of family planning are no longer viewed
as immoral or unhealthy. Instead, the right to make family planning
decisions is constitutionally protected, to the extent that it must be
fostered by the state. The next section will deal with a related, but
slightly different, issue: the extent to which the state can burden one's
right to become pregnant and bear a child.
4. Pregnancy
It seems evident that if the right to choose not to bear a child is
constitutionally protected as an aspect of privacy, the right to choose
to bear a child is similarly protected. Encouragement of childbirth is
rooted in our history. Nevertheless, the decision to exercise this right
has not been unburdened. Society imposes many disabilities upon
women who are pregnant or who have the capacity to become pregnant.290 A prominent example of such disabilities is the fact that a
woman who becomes pregnant commonly has been required to leave her
job at a point early in pregnancy and often has not been assured of
reemployment after the birth of her child. In a few recent cases, women
so deprived by the state as an employer have asserted that the state
cannot deny them a benefit simply because they are exercising a constitutional right of privacy 2 91
The claims have been made in two contexts: by women discharged
from the military and by women fired or forced to take leaves of absence
from teaching school. Aside from the fact that the courts seem to show
somewhat more deference to the military than to school boards, the
decisions are very similar. One court, in a decision rendered prior to
Roe, refused to recognize that any privacy right was involved in the
matter. 92 The more common approach was to state simply that a
woman had a right to bear a child but not a right to be a teacher or
20 3
an Air Force officer at the same time.
289 Complaint at 16-17, Relf v. Weinberger, Civil Action No. 1557-73 (D.D.C.,
filed July 31, 1973).
290 See Cary, Pregnancy Without Penalty, 1 Civil Liberties Rev. 31 (1973).
291 In this area, a more commonly raised claim is that the state has made an

impermissible, sex-based classification that does not bear a rational rdationship

to a permissible state goal. See, e.g., Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d
629 (2d Cir. 1973); LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465S F.2d 1184 (6th Cir.

1972), cert. granted, 411 U. 947 (1973).

292 Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1972),
vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 409 US. 1071 (1973).
293 Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 349 F. Supp. 687, 691-92 (D. Conn.

1972), rev'd, 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973) (teacher); Gutierrez v. Laird, 346 F.

Supp. 289, 293 (D.D.C. 1972) (Air Force officer). See also Houston v. Pro_ er, 361

F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Ga. 1973). The court in Houston held that a school board could
require a student who had borne an illegitimate child to attend school at night
rather than during the day. The court recognized a privacy interest, but found it

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:670

Only one court made a serious attempt to separate out the relevant
aspects of the issue. In Robinson v. Rand,294 a pregnant WAF cmallenged a mandatory discharge regulation. The court reasoned that a
woman, like a man, may have a basic interest in having both a family
life and a career. This individual interest was strong enough to compel
the court to examine the Air Force's reasons for discharge carefully.
The service's interest in a simplified procedure that would be efficient
and would save money was not sufficient to override a woman's rights.
On the other hand, the Air Force was validly concerned with the pregnant woman's inability to perform her job adequately in a combat zone.
The court found that a less onerous means of achieving its goals was
available to the Air Force: it could transfer the woman from hazardous
assignments during her pregnancy, but could not discharge her. 9 6
The Robinson court's analysis seems preferable to the analysis of
other courts in that it attempts to isolate the important interests at
stake. There is no doubt that by firing a woman for pregnancy, the
state impinges on her right of privacy. If it imposes a mandatory
maternity leave, it impinges less seriously, but does so nonetheless. The
question is whether the state is justified in imposing such restrictions
in pursuit of legitimate goals like protection of the woman's health and
that of her child and assuring her efficient performance of her job,
whether military or educational. Such interests do not become "compelling" until the woman's health and efficiency are truly impaired.
Since this impairment will vary from individual to individual, the effect
is to require the state to proceed on a case-by-case basis.
Equal protection analysis may produce the same result, on the
rationale that there is no valid reason for distinguishing between pregnant women and others, male or female, who may suffer temporary
medical disabilities.2 96 The advantage of a privacy claim is that in this
context-where family planning is involved-the individual's right is
"fundamental" and the state must show a compelling interest to override it. Since sex is not yet a suspect classification, 2 7 courts faced with
an equal protection argument have used the "rational basis" test, which
leaves a great deal of discretion to the individual court. 208 Perhaps the
best approach is to combine the two claims, arguing that the right of
privacy, including a decision to have a child, is a fundamental, constihad not been infringed. The state's interest in protecting other students from the
"precocious" plaintiff was sufficient to justify the rule.
294 340 F. Supp. 37 (D. Colo. 1972).
295 Id. at 4041.
296 See, e.g., Green v. Waterford Ed. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
See also Note, Pregnancy Discharges in the Military: The Air Force Experience, 86
Harv. L. Rev. 568, 588-93 (1973).
297 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (four of nine justices
held sex a suspect classification) ; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
298 Compare Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th
Cir.), cert. granted, 411 U.S. 947 (1973), with Green v. Waterford Ed. of Educ.,
473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973), and LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d
1184 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 411 U.S. 947 (1973).
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tutionally protected interest, so that a state classification impinging
upon that right must promote a compelling state interest to be valid.-^ 0
This argument was successful in Buckley v. Coyl Public School

System,300 where a court held that mandatory termination of employment after six months of pregnancy violated a woman's right of privacy
by requiring her to choose between employment and pregnancy, "curtailing her interest in having a child." 30 ' She might not have a right to
public employment, but did have a right to be free of unconstitutional
conditions on her employment. The state had to have a compelling

interest to burden her right of privacy

02

The rights discussed in these sections-to bear a child, to prevent

conception, to have an abortion-are aspects of the constitutional right
of privacy. They derive much of their content from that part of Griswold
which protected the individual's ability to make fundamental, autonomous decisions about his or her personal life. In the following sections,
we will discuss rights which have not as yet received protection as
aspects of privacy.
B. Private Sexual Behavior
Anglo-American tradition, grounded in the Bible303 and various
early English laws, 3° 4 has long viewed deviate and extramarital sexual
behavior as proper subjects for governmental regulation. Nearly every
state retains laws prohibiting forms of private, consensual sexual behavior, including fornication, adultery, sodomy, perversion and cohab-

itation.30 5 The validity of these laws, once unquestioned, has become a

299 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29, 31-32, 3334 (1973) (only rights protected by the Constitution are fundamental interests requiring strict scrutiny).
300 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973).
301 Id. at 96.
302 Id.
303 See Leviticus 18:21-23, 20:13; Deuteronomy 23:18 (Rev. Standard
Version).
304 E.g., 5 Eliz. 1, c. 17 (1562); 25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1533); see 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries ** 215-16.
305 Fornication statutes proscribe heterosexual intercourse between unmarried
individuals. E.g., Idaho Code § 18-6603 (1948) ; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:110-1 (1969).
Adultery statutes generally forbid sexual intercourse between individuals at least one
of whom is married. E.g., S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 22-22-17 to -18 (1969). Some
states only prohibit adultery and fornication if the illicit relationship is continuous
-a single act is not criminal. E.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-86 (1959); see Kennedy v.
State, 470 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971). Sodomy
statutes, by their terms or by interpretation, often cover a broad range of activities:
heterosexual or homosexual anal intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus and bestiality.
E.g., NAI. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-6 (1972). Most state statutes do not distinguish
between consensual and forcible sodomy. E.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 705.1-.2 (1950)
(defining sodomy as "carnal copulation in any opening of the body except sexual
parts"); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-10-1 (1970) (defining sodomy as the "abominable and detestable crime against nature," punishable by seven to 20 years); ee
State v. line, 95 RI. 315, 187 A.2d 136 (1962), appeal dismissed, 373 US. S42
(1963) (construes Rhode Island statute as covering consensual fellatio). The Rhode
Island statute's failure to discriminate between consensual sodomy and bomosexual
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prime subject for judicial concern. Courts have been entertaining contentions that state sex laws are vague,800 prescribe cruel and unusual
punishmentS80 7 and violate the establishment clause.808 But the primary
tactical weapon in the new war against state sex laws is the right of
privacy.
1. Challenges to CriminalStatutes
After Griswold, many commentators and litigants assumed that the
rationale of the right of privacy would protect private sexual behavior
and require the state to demonstrate overriding justifications for all
laws criminalizing such behavior. 00 But the numerous adjudications
testing this assumption-mostly challenges to state laws proscribing
sodomy and fornication-have left few tangible results in their wake.
Only a very few decisions have led to the invalidation or narrowing of
state laws. And, since most courts managed to circumvent the issue, only
rape means that anyone who is prosecuted for any homosexual act is subjected to a
seven-year minimum penalty. Some states deal with "perversions" or "unnatural or
lascivious acts" in separate statutes with lighter penalties than the sodomy statutes.
Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-651 (Supp. 1972) (sodomy, punishable by five
to 20 years imprisonment), with id. § 13-652 ("lewd or lascivious acts," punishable
by one to five years). Several states have recently redrafted their statutes to
decriminalize consensual sodomy, e.g., [1971] Oregon Laws c. 743, § 432, or to
provide lighter penalties where the participation of both parties was voluntary, e.g.,
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.293(5) (Supp. 1973); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 3124 (1972).
Because legislators have generally approached sex crimes with exceeding
delicacy, many state statutes are amazingly vague and could be interpreted as
overlapping a great deal. For example, most adultery statutes do not specify that
adultery can only be committed between members of the opposite sexes. E.g., Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 101 (1965). Thus, homosexual adultery might be punishable under both the adultery and the sodomy statutes. For an extensive discussion
of the problem of vagueness in sodomy statutes, see W. Barnett, Sexual Freedom
and the Constitution 21-39 (1973).
306 See, e.g., Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alas. 1969); State v. Jones, 8
Ariz. App. 381, 446 P.2d 487 (1968); Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971);
People v. Haggerty, 27 Mich. App. 594, 183 N.W.2d 862 (1970) ; State v. Crawford,
478 S.W.2d 314 (Mo.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 811 (1972); Hogan v. State, 84
Nev. 372, 441 P.2d 620 (1968); Jones v. State, $5 Wis. 2d 742, 200 N.W.2d 587
(1972).
307 See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 102 Ariz. 377, 430 P.2d 139 (1967); People v.
Roberts, 266 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967) ; People v. Stevenson, 28
Mich. App. 538, 184 N.W.2d 541 (1970); State v. Stubbs, 266 N.C. 295, 145 S.E.2d
899 (1966).
808 See, e.g., State v. Trejo, 83 N.M. 511, 512, 494 P.2d 173, 176 (1972)
(dissenting opinion); State v. Rhinehart, 70 Wash. 2d 649, 424 P.2d 906, cort.
denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967); Note, Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Roy.
581, 600-01 (1967).
809 See Barnett, supra note 305, at 52-69; Doss & Doss, On Morals, Privacy,
and the Constitution, 25 U. Miami L. Rev. 395, 401-03 (1971); Emerson, supra
note 32, at 231-33; Note, The Bedroom Should Not Be Within the Province of the
Law, 4 Calif. W.L. Rev. 115, 123 (1968) [hereinafter Note, Bedroom]; Project,
The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 643, 647 n.3
(1966) [hereinafter U.C.L.A. Project].
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a few decisions provide any guidance in analyzing whether or not private
sexual behavior is protected by the right of privacy.
One reason for the stunted growth of the right of privacy in this
area is that the courts are seldom faced with proper litigants to raise
privacy arguments. Under the doctrine of ripeness, as enunciated in
Poe v. Ullnan,3 10 a constitutional challenge to a state criminal law may
generally be brought only by persons who have been prosecuted under
that law. Private, consensual, adult sexual behavior is only rarely prosecuted. 311 Conversely, the courts have held that those most often
prosecuted-persons who have committed acts involving force, children
or public exposure-have no standing to raise an overbreadth argument
premised on the privacy rights of others3 12
Litigants with justiciable claims have had to overcome other threshold problems before a court would seriously entertain a privacy argument. The authors of the three concurring opinions in Griswold stated
explictly that the decision was not meant to interfere with the state's
"proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct 313 A number
of courts viewed these dicta as dispositive and refused to engage in any
independent analysis 14 Some courts insisted that Griswold and the
right of privacy were simply inapposite to a claim of sexual privacy.31 5
Others viewed Griswold as a case protecting marriage because it is a
noble activity and announced that sodomy is not noble but repulsive.Plo
Still others thought that the privacy argument being urged upon them
sounded suspiciously like the Model Penal Code recommendations,317
310 367 U.S. 497, 501-09 (1961).
311 See Note, Bedroom, supra note 309, at 126; Note, The Crimes Against
Nature, 16 J. Pub. L. 159, 171-75 (1967); Note, Sodomy Statutes-A Need for
Change, 13 S.D.L. Rev. 384, 395-96 (1968).
312 See United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 605, 608-10 (M.D. Pa. 1973);
Polk v. Ellington, 309 F. Supp. 1349, 1351-52 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); Rapbael v.
Hogan, 305 F. Supp. 749, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp.
581, 582-83 (Wi). Va. 1969); Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 648 (Alas. 1969);
Dixon v. State, 256 Ind. 266, 269-70, 268 N.E2d 84, 86 (1971); Hughes v. State,
14 Md. App. 497,503,287 A.2d 299, 304, cert. denied, 409 US. 1025 (1972); Jones v.
State, 85 Nev. 411, 414, 456 P.2d 429, 430 (1969); State v. Kasakoff, 84 N.M. 404,
503 P.2d 1182 (Ct. App. 1972); Washington v. Rodriguez, 82 NX. 428, 431, 483
P.2d 309, 312 (CL App. 1971); Warner v. State, 489 P.2d 526, $28 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1971).
313 381 US. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring, joined by Warren, C.. &
Brennan, J.) ; see id. at 505 (White, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
546, 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
314 People v. Droet, 30 Cal. App. 3d 207, 212, 105 Cal. Rptr. 824, 826-27
(1973) ; Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 505 & n.7, 287 A.2d 299, 304 & n.7, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); State v. Lutz, 57 N.J. 314, 315, 272 A.2d 753 (1971).
315 People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 495, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70, 74 (1967);
State v. Barr, 110 N.J. Super. 365, 367-68, 265 A.2d 817, 818-19 (1970).
316 People v. Frazier, 256 Cal. App. 2d 630, 631, 64 Cal. Rptr. 447 (196S);
d,
Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), appeal disr
402 US. 902 (1971).
317 See Model Penal Code § 207.1, Comment at 207 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:670

and 31
declined
to consider what they thought to be a legislative ques8
tion.
Many litigants were stymied by the language of Griswold itself.
Most courts were understandably prone to interpret Griswold as a case
involving only marital privacy. These courts were unwilling to entertain
arguments by unmarried plaintiffs that statutes were overbroad for
infringing marital privacy, and unwilling to extend the protection of
the right of privacy to unmarried persons.3 19 While this now questionable limitation320 led to many facile rejections of the claim that the
right of privacy encompasses all private sexual behavior, it did prompt
an extension of Griswold's protection. In Cotner v. Henry,821 a court
was confronted for the first time with a marital privacy argument in a
justiciable context; Charles Cotner had actually been prosecuted for an
act of sodomy with his wife. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit declared that "[t]he import of the Griswold decision is that
private, consensual, marital relations are protected from regulation by
the state through the use of a criminal penalty. '322 The court thus held
that a state could not constitutionally prosecute a married person for a
consensual act of sodomy involving his spouse.323
The court apparently found the decision an easy one and did not
articulate any analysis of the right involved. Rather, the opinion relied
upon the superficial resemblance of the Griswold and Cotner situations.
The language in Griswold exalting the marital bedroom 324 as sacred
and inviolable was directly applicable. Yet the Seventh Circuit did work
a theoretical expansion of the right of privacy by holding that a new
type of behavior-the private, consensual, deviate sexual activities of
married adults-is protected by the right of privacy. The court did not
strike the state sodomy law as overbroad, but rather gave the state
courts a chance to construe the statute so as to exempt married couples
from its prohibition. 325 Thus, the court limited the effect of the decision,
as well as its rationale, to married couples.
318 State v. Barr, 110 N.J. Super. 365, 369, 265 A.2d 817, 819 (1970).
819 See Polk v. Ellington, 309 F. Supp. 1349, 1353 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); Dixon

v. State, 256 Ind. 266, 269-70, 268 N.E.2d 84, 86 (1971) ; Hughes v. State, 14 Md.
App. 497, 503-05, 287 A.2d 299, 304, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); Jones v.
State, 85 Nev. 411, 414, 456 P.2d 429, 430 (1969); Washington v. Rodriguez, 82
N.M. 428, 431, 483 P.2d 309, 312 (Ct. App. 1971) ; Warner v. State, 489 P.2d 526, 528
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
320 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453-54 (1972) ; text accompanying notes 183-84, 197 supra.
321 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
322 Id. at 875 (footnote omitted).
323 Id. at 876.
324 381 U.S. at 485.
325 Under Griswold Indiana courts could not interpret the statute constitutionally as making private consensual physical relations between married
persons a crime absent a clear showing that the state had an interest in
preventing such relations, which outweighed the constitutional right to
marital privacy.
394 F.2d at 875.
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The decision in Cotner was met with critical approval - and was
tentatively accepted as a valid but distinguishable precedent by a
number of courts0 7 Some courts seemed to accept the idea that the
state cannot proscribe such behavior for married couples, but continued
to reject overbreadth arguments and declined to take any action to

narrow or invalidate existing statutes when the petitioners before them
One exception to this
were, as was most usual, not married couples
conservative trend was the activist three-judge court in Buchanan v.
Batchelor,32 9 which allowed a married couple to intervene in the sodomy
prosecution of a homosexual,3 0 and then struck the entire Texas sodomy
law as overbroad for potentially infringing the intervenors' constitutional
rights. The court insisted that such a course of action "in no way interfere[d] with a State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct." 33 ' The court also seemed attracted to a broader rationale
than that of the Cotner court: "Absent some demonstrable necessity,
matters of (good or bad) taste are to be protected from state regulation.' 332 By invalidating the entire sodomy law, the Buchanan court
protected the good or bad taste of everyone who engaged in deviate
sexual behavior-not just married persons-at least until the Texas
legislature could pass a new, narrower statute.8 33 Thus, the practical

implications of the Buchanan decision reached beyond the holding.
326 See, e.g., Note, The Coter Case: Indiana Witch Hunt, 2 Ind. Legal F.
336 (1969); Comment, 23 U. Ain-, L. Rev. 231, 233 (1968).
327 See Raphael v. Hogan, 305 F. Supp. 749, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Towler v.
Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581, 582-83 (W.D.Va. 1969) ; Jones v. State, 85 Nev. 411, 414,
456 Pid 429, 430 (1969).
(E.D. Va.
328 See, e.g., Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 628-29
1973); Polk v. Ellington, 309 F. Supp. 1349, 1353 (WMD. Tenn. 1970); Dixon
v. State, 256 Ind. 266, 269-71, 268 N.E.2d 84, 86 (1971). But see State v. Lair, 62
N.J. 38i, 396-97, 301 A.2d 748, 753 (1973), where the New Jersey Supreme Court
declared that the state sodomy law could not constitutionally be applied to married
couples, while refusing relief to the unmarried defendant who had raised the overbreadth argument.
329 308 F. Supp. 729 (NJD. Tex. 1970) (three-judge court), vacated and
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 US. 989 (1971).
330 The state argued that the married couple failed to satisfy the requirements of standing and ripeness, since no married couple had been prosecuted under
the state statute. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 US. 497, 501-09 (1961). The Buchanan
court thought the married couple's fear of prosecution sufficient to confer standing.
308 F. Supp. at 735.
331 308 F. Supp. at 733.

332

Id.

333 Vehement opposition to this creative, interventionist approach was
evidenced by a Texas state court in Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191, 193, 197
(Te. Crim. App. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902 (1971). The state court
refused to follow Buchanan and upheld the sodomy conviction of an unmarried
defendant under the law the Buchanan court had declared void. The court disagreed with the conclusion that the zone of privacy could be extended to cover such
"offensive" practices. Since no married couple bad ever been prosecuted under the
Texas sodomy law, and since such prosecutions seemed unlikely, the court did not
find it necessary to reach the issue of whether or not such a prosecution would be
constitutional Id. at 193-94; accord, Hughes v. State, 14 Ald. App. 497, 504-OS, 287
A.2d 299,304, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972).
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There has not been much disagreement about the "marital privacy"
premise of Cotner. The only open question about marital privacy was
whether that rationale could support an overbreadth argument. That
issue now seems to be settled, since every court but Buchanan has rejected the idea that an entire statute can be struck if it potentially
applies to married couples. Thus, the only real effect of the Cotner
line of reasoning has been to protect a class of persons who, since they
are virtually never prosecuted, scarcely need the benefit of a constitutional ruling.
More troublesome for the courts has been the claim that the right
of privacy also protects the private sexual behavior of unmarried persons. While justiciability was in this context too a substantial obstacle
to a determination on the merits, more courts were approached by
litigants who were being prosecuted on the basis of the very activities
for which they claimed constitutional protection. Usually these courts
were content to distinguish Griswold privacy in one of the facile ways
discussed above,83 4 and thus upheld challenged statutes. A handful of
judges, almost always in dissent, concluded that the right of privacy
should protect the right of all adults to engage in private, consensual
8 5
sexual behavior, and thus would have invalidated state sex laws. 3
These judges generally were no more helpful in framing an analysis of
the issue than those who cavalierly dismissed the argument. Virtually
all of them focused on what they viewed as the state's lack of interest
in preventing private sexual behavior, rather than on the nature of the
activity involved.338 The state's interest, or lack of interest, should not
compel any conclusions about whether or not an affirmative constitutional right is at stake.
One judge on the District of Columbia Superior Court has offered
a series of reasons for affording constitutional protection to private
sexual behavior: the right to control the use and function of one's own
body,837 the intimate nature of sexual activity, 8 8 and the idea that the
The Supreme Court vacated Buchanan for reconsideration in light of its recent
decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), that a federal court may not
enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
834 See text accompanying notes 314-19 supra.
35 Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (EfD. Va. 1973) (Merhige, J.);
United States v. Doe, 12 Crim. L. Rptr. 2531 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 1973)
(Halleck, J.); United States v. Moses, 12 Crim. L. Rptr. 2198 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Nov. 3, 1972) (Halleck, J.); State v. Silva, 53 Hawaii 232, 242, 491 P.2d
1216, 1222 (1971) (Levinson, J., dissenting in part) ; Miller v. State, 256 Ind. 296,
302, 268 N.E.2d 299, 303 (1971) (DeBruler & Prentice, JJ., dissenting); DLxon v.
State, 256 Ind. 266, 272, 268 N.E.2d 84, 87 (1971) (DeBruler & Prentice, JJ.,
dissenting) ; State v. Trejo, 83 N.M. 511, 513, 494 P.2d 173, 175 (1972) (Sutin, J.,
dissenting) ; cf. Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 648 (Alas. 1969).
336 State v. Silva, 53 Hawaii 232, 242, 491 P.2d 1216, 1222 (1971) (dissenting
opinion); State v. Trejo, 83 N.M. 511, 513, 515, 494 P.2d 173, 177 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
387 United States v. Doe, 12 Crim. L. Rptr. 2531, 2532 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb.
21, 1973); United States v. Moses, 12 Crim. L. Rptr. 2198, 2199 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Nov. 3, 1972).
838 United States v. Doe, 12 Crim. L. Rptr. 2531, 2532 (D.C. Super Ct. Feb.
21, 1973).
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right of privacy shields a consenting individual's unorthodox activity
from governmental scrutiny.33 9 In discussing what interests the state
might have to justify sodomy and solicitation laws, he noted first that
the behavior is harmless,3 second that according to the Kinsey Report,
homosexual behavior is not even distasteful to a majority of persons,3'
and third that the government's failure to prosecute sodomy laws against
consensual, private homosexual acts is sure proof that there is no compelling governmental interest in criminalizing such behavior. 34 Thus, he
invalidated a District of Columbia solicitation statute,343 and narrowly
construed the sodomy statute so as to exempt private, consensual behavior 44
The most perceptive discussion to date of the right of privacy as
applied to private sexual behavior took place in one of the most recent
cases. The court in Lovisi v. Slaytoytn was faced with a habeas corpus
challenge to a conviction for sodomy under Virginia law. A husband
and wife had engaged in private, consensual acts of sodomy with a third
party. Prosecution was precipitated when the couple's children found
photographs of these activities which the parents had taken and left
lying around the house. The district judge accepted Roe v. Wade's "candid approach" to substantive due process and declared that the due
process clause protects fundamental human values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 346 His conclusion that the private sexual behavior of husband and wife is a fundamental right was based directly
on Griswold's proclamation of the sanctity of the marital relationship.
Thus, the broad Virginia sodomy law "doubtless threatens an invasion
of the right of privacy" because it would apply to private, marital
acts. 47 The court also concluded that the marital-nonmarital distinction was no longer viable after Eisenstadt v. Baird, and therefore
thought that the sodomy law could not constitutionally be applied to
any private, consensual, adult sexual behavior.3 48 In drawing this conclusion, he avoided the facile assumption that such activity is protected
because it only involves consenting adults. He focused rather on the in339 Id.

340 Id. at 2933.
341 Id.
342 Id.

343 United States v. Moses, 12 Crim. L. Rptr. 2198 (D.C. Super. CL Nov. 3,
1972).
344 United States v. Doe, 12 Crim. L. Rptr. 2531 (D.C. Super. CL Feb. 21,

1973). This decision was rather quixotic in light of a stipulation entered in a federal
court case several months earlier where the District of Columbia agreed that the
sodomy statute would not be, and probably could not constitutionally be, applied
against private, consensual sexual acts involving adults. Scbaefers v. Wilson, 11 Crim.
L. Rptr. 2252 (D.D.C. May 24, 1972).
345 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973).
346 Id. at 624.

347 Id. at 625.

848 Id. But see People v. Drolet, 30 Cal. App. 2d 207, 212, 10 Cal. Rptr. 824,
826-27 (1973); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, SOS-06, 287 A.2d 299, 30S, cet

denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 397, 301 A-2d 748, 7S3
(1973). These cases rejected the argument that Eisenstadt dictates this resulL
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tensely personal and intimate nature of sexuality itself.349 Thus, the
of a compelling state interest to
court would have required a showing
350
justify a challenged sodomy law.
The judge in Lovisi did not have to engage in such a balance, however, because he decided that the petitioners' conduct could not be characterized as private. He astutely pointed out that privacy has a double
meaning-it may refer to seclusion or to personal acts and decisions.851
While the constitutional right of privacy is generally concerned with
acts and decisions, regardless of whether or not they are seclusive, he
thought seclusion to be a prerequisite to constitutional protection for
sexual behavior.8 52 Public sexual activity lacks the very characteristic
that makes private sex protectable-it is not private. Since petitioners
had publicized their activities through careless treatment of the photographs, they forfeited constitutional protection, and therefore were held
not to have standing to challenge the sodomy law on privacy grounds.3 8
The court's ultimate holding seems sound. More importantly, the
privacy analysis, although embedded in dicta, is a paragon. In fairness
to the courts which distinguished away Griswold and the right of privacy, it should be noted that earlier courts lacked the clarification supplied by Eisenstadt and Roe. Since these cases have removed several of
the crutches courts used to hobble around the issue of private sexual
behavior-notably the insistence that the right of privacy belongs only
to married couples-more courts may be forced to engage in serious
analysis of the individual rights and state interests involved.
2. Challengesto NoncriminalPenalties
In addition to the battery of laws directly prohibiting sexual behavior, the state and federal governments have indirect means of penalizing those who engage in deviate or extramarital sex. Homosexuality,
cohabitation and adultery often provide a basis for denials of public
employment, 35 security clearances, 35r, naturalized citizenship,8 50 liquor
849 363 F. Supp. at 625.
35o Id.
351 Id.

352 Id. at 626.
353 Id. at 629.
354 See, e.g., Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); McConnell v.
Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); Norton
v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Richardson v. Hampton, 345 F. Supp.
600 (D.D.C. 1972); Mindel v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485
(N.D. Cal. 1970); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82

Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969) ; Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the
Homosexual, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1738 (1969).
355 See, e.g., Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1039 (1970); Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. CI. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970); Wentworth v. Laird, 348 F. Supp. 1193 (D.D.C.
1972); Gayer v. Laird, 332 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1971).
358 See, e.g., Velez-Lozano v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 463 F.2d
1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972); In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Note,

Naturalization and the Adjudication of Good Moral Character: An Exercise in
Judicial Uncertainty, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 545, 560-62, 565-70 (1972).
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licenses, 357 admission to a state bar association,3" approval of a group's
incorporation certificate, 35 9 and honorable discharges from the armed
forces,3 10 all on the ground of immorality. Not surprisingly, the brunt
of the government's concern with immorality has fallen upon homosexuals.
If private sexual behavior is constitutionally protected by the right
of privacy, then denying various governmental benefits to homosexuals
or others on the basis of their private sexual behavior could be viewed
as conditioning the receipt of a governmental benefit upon the relinquishment of a constitutional right.30 ' Government then would be
required to justify all actions disfavoring homosexuals, since such discriminations would act as penalties imposed for the exercise of a constitutional right.362 Thus, the numerous challenges to government
practices involving employment, security clearances, etc., brought by
homosexuals and others provided another context in which courts could
examine the argument that private sexual behavior is protected by the
right of privacy.
Conclusions about the constitutionality of laws criminalizing private sexual behavior do not necessarily dictate results in this area. A
court deciding that private sexual behavior is constitutionally protected
might hold a sex law unconstitutional but condone discriminatory hiring
practices, or vice versa, because different ranges of governmental interests are involved. The court might find, for example, that there is a
legitimate and sufficient state interest in promoting marriage or discouraging immorality to justify a law criminalizing private sexual behavior.
But if that court viewed a refusal to hire a homosexual as nothing but
a punishment for the same behavior, the court might conclude that the
civil disability was not sufficiently related to the state's goal, since
that goal is adequately and more directly served by the criminal law.
Conversely, the court might hold the criminal law unconstitutional as
not sufficiently related to any legitimate state interest but condone a
refusal to hire a homosexual as a teacher, since the state's interest in
the latter context could be viewed as permissible and more substantial.
As with challenges to criminal sex laws, however, most courts
never confronted the privacy argument. Rather, they attempted to analyze the nature of the state's interest first. The catchword for this
approach has been "nexus," denoting the courts' efforts to find some
357 See, e.g., Inman v. City of Mami, 197 So. Zd 50 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1048 (1968); One Eleven W. &L., Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Bevcrage

Control, 50 N.J. 329, 235 A.2d 12 (1967).
358 See, e.g., In re Kimball, 33 N.Y.2d 586, 301 N.E2d 436, 347 N.Y.2d 453
(1973); In re Fleckenstein, 27 App. Div. 2d 184, 277 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1st Dep't 1967).
359 See Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E2d 255,
341 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1973).
360 Weir v. United States, 474 F.2d 617 (CL CL 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. CL
574 (1973); see Note, Homosexuals in the Mlitary, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 465

(1969).
361 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 60S-05 (1967).
362 See Mindel v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485, 488
(N.D. Cal. 1970).
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rational connection between a legitimate governmental interest and the
contested civil disability. Thus, where a homosexual had been denied
public employment because of his homosexuality, the courts would
require government to show that the applicant's homosexuality would
have had some ascertainable deleterious effect on the conduct of the
job. 63 Where a homosexual had been denied a security clearance, the
courts would ask whether there was any reason to suspect that homo04
sexuals would be security risks and endanger national security.0
Where the court found the requisite nexus lacking, it could hold the
government action arbitrary and a denial of due process or equal protection without reaching any broader privacy issues; where it found the
applicant to be unfit in some tangible way, it could view the government action as not constituting a discrimination against homosexuals
or a penalty imposed for engaging in private sexual behavior, and again
circumvent the privacy analysis. No court finding a rational nexus then
went on to inquire whether there was an important personal right involved which outweighed the governmental interest.
If denial of a government position or a security clearance to an individual who is "immoral" can be classified as arbitrary, then government must not have a legitimate interest in deterring immorality per se
in these contexts. The search for nexus implies that most courts were
not willing to concede that the state may punish or deter immorality by
indirect, noncriminal sanctions. Yet the nexus approach often proved
not to be an adequate alternative to a privacy analysis. Although many
courts undertook the task of examining asserted connections seriously,
others were willing to assume that homosexuals are likely to be unfit
employees or poor security risks. Courts sometimes mouthed the conventional wisdoms that homosexuals are susceptible to blackmail and
likely to be unstable personalities,80 and sometimes simply perceived a
direct, implicit nexus between immorality and inefficiency. 810 The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in McConnell v. Anderson"o?
went so far as to proclaim a legitimate governmental interest-in not
having homosexual employees---that is not even connected with unfit363 Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Scott v. Macy,
349 F.2d 182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Mindel v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
312 F. Supp. 485, 487-88 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Brass v. Hoberman, 295 F. Supp. 398,
362-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); cf. Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1973).
304 McKeand v. Laird, No. 71-2169 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1973); Wentworth v.
Laird, 348 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (D.D.C. 1972); Gayer v. Laird, 332 F. Supp. 169,
171 (D.D.C. 1971).
365 Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.

1039 (1970).

836 Any schoolboy knows that a homosexual act is immoral, indecent, lewd
and obscene. Adult persons are even more conscious that this is true. If
activities of this kind are allowed to be practiced in a government department, it is inevitable that the efficiency of the service will in time be adversely affected.

Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Ct. CI. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.

1039 (1970).
867 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
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ness. Plaintiff was a self-professed, activist homosexual who had been
fired from his position as librarian at a state university. The court
reasoned that the dismissal was not arbitrary or attributable to discrimination against homosexuals because plaintiff, by publicizing his homosexuality, was attempting to "foist tacit approval of this socially repugnant concept upon his employer." 3 s Thus, the state's desire to avoid
being seen as condoning homosexuality was held to furnish another
legitimate ground on which at least acknowledged homosexuals could be
dismissed.
While few courts attempted to confront the privacy issue directly,
the right of privacy did insinuate itself into some decisions in various
guises. First, several courts thought that the requirements of procedural
due process escalated where personal liberties, such as engaging in private sexual behavior, were implicated. 30 9 Several courts also focused on
the nondisclosure aspects of privacy. "In normal circumstances, there
is a right under the First Amendment for an individual to keep private
the details of his sex life, and this applies to homosexuals, professed or
otherwise." 370 These courts required the government to show some need
for asking questions about the sex life of an applicant for a government
position or a security clearance, in order to protect the applicant's right
to keep such information to himself. 371 Protecting against forced disclosure and thus against potential consequences of engaging in private
sexual behavior of course has the incidental effect of protecting the
behavior itself.
Privacy issues also lurked in the background of decisions which
dealt charily with "immorality" provisions of state civil law in order
to avoid potential constitutional problems. In Morrikon v. State Board
of Education,372 the California Supreme Court, suggesting that "an
unqualified proscription against immoral conduct would raise serious
constitutional problems," 37 3 held that a teacher could be dismissed for
immoral and unprofessional conduct only if such conduct were shown
to render him unfit to teach. 74 Two judges, dissenting from a New
York Appellate Division's decision that an individual could be denied
admission to the state bar because he was a homosexual, suggested that
even the fact that consensual homosexual practices are criminal under
New York law could not be a ground for the denial, since they thought
368 Id. at 196.
369 Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Mindel v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485, 487 (N.D. Cal. 1970); see Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972) (requirements of procedural due process held
to be more stringent where the right of an unwed father to the custody of his child

was at stake).
370 Gayer v. Laird, 332 F. Supp. 169, 171 (D.D.C. 1971); accord, Wentworth
v. Laird, 348 F. Supp. 1153, 1156 (DD.C. 1972).
371 Richardson v. Hampton, 345 F. Supp. 600, 608-09 (D.D.C. 1972).

372 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
373 Id. at 233, 461 P.2d at 390, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
374 Id. at 229, 461 P.2d at 386,82 CaL Rptr. at 186.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[
[Vol.
48:670

the consensual sodomy law was probably unconstitutional.3 7 6 One federal district court went so far as to hold that a provision of Oregon
law authorizing376dismissal of teachers for "immorality" was unconstitutionally vague.
Several relatively daring courts did attack the privacy issue directly. Plaintiff in Mindel v. United States Civil Service Commission7 7
was fired from his position in the post office when investigators discovered that he had lived with a woman who was not his wife. The
court held that such "immoral" conduct bore no relationship to the
responsibilities of Mindel's position. 378 It also held that private sexual
behavior is constitutionally protected, so the Government could not invade the sanctity of Mindel's home without a compelling justification.379 Since immorality would not have provided even a rational basis
for firing an employee, the Government could not show any legitimate
"
reason "to require Mindel to live according to its special moral code. a3o
The Mindel court did not specify why it thought Griswold required a compelling justification for the government's actions-whether

it was the nature of the private sexual behavior involved, the fact that
the activity took place in Mindel's home, or the fact that the Government could not discover the immorality without intrusive snooping. The
holding is clear, however: government may not condition employment
on a waiver of the right to engage in private sexual behavior, because
this behavior is protected by the Constitution. This holding would logically require a compelling justification for any law penalizing private
sexual behavior. Thus, the Mindel court took the step that most courts
confronted with direct challenges to state sex laws were unwilling to
take. Under this approach, the court would have to examine the state's
interests in controlling extramarital or deviate sexual behavior in any
context to see if these interests are compelling enough to justify the
state's intrusion.
Several other courts have arrived at the conclusion that even a
teacher's private sexual behavior is protected by the zone of privacy. In
Fisher v. Snyder,381 a Nebraska district court ordered the reinstatement of a teacher who had been fired for "conduct unbecoming a
teacher." She had had a male guest stay overnight at her apartment. The
court held that her right to have an overnight guest was protected by
the right of privacy and freedom of association, 882 without worrying
375 In re Kimball, 40 App. Div. 2d 252, 259, 339 N.Y.S.2d 302, 309 (2d Dep't)
(dissenting opinion), rev'd per curiam, 33 N.Y.2d 586, 301 N.E.2d 436, 347 N.Y.S.2d
453 (1973).
876 Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. S, 353 F. Supp. 254,
255 (D.Ore. 1973).
377 312 F. Supp. 485 (NJD. Cal. 1970).
378 Id. at 487-88.
379 Id. at 488.
880 Id.
381 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), afi'd on other grounds, 476 F.2d 375
(8th Cir. 1973).
382 Id. at 398-400.
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about whether sexual conduct had been involved. Because Fisher had
exercised a constitutional right, the state had to show a compelling interest to justify termination of her contract. Because the case was set
in the context of a public school, the court applied the standard used
by the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
Distrit3 8 3 to judge when a school's abridgement of a teacher's first
amendment rights is justifiable: did the conduct "materially and substantially" disrupt the school? The court found that Fisher's extracurricular activities had no effect upon her teaching or her students.3s"
The court in Acanfora v. Board of EducationP8 concluded in majestic style that "the time has come today for private, consenting, adult
homosexuality to enter the sphere of constitutionally protected interests." Plaintiff was a homosexual who had been transferred from his
teaching position when the school board learned of his homosexuality.
The court's opinion traced the growth of the due process clause's protection of "individual pursuits, no matter how unorthodox or repulsive
to the majority'3 8 6 In concluding that homosexual behavior should be
protected by the due process clause, the court noted that homosexuals
are not dangerous, incapable of successful job performance, or threats
to the survival of the species 8 7 Additionally, the court held that homosexuality is a suspect classification for the purposes of equal protection
analysis, because homosexuality is often a basis for imposition of disabilities but frequently bears no relation to an individual's ability to
perform or contribute to society. 88 Thus, the court said that a school
could not refuse to hire, and could not fire or transfer, an individual
simply because he or she is a homosexual, since there is no compelling
interest in excluding private homosexuals from teaching positionsP
The court in In re LabadP90 examined another area where the Government has traditionally asserted an interest in morality-naturalization.
Petitioner had been denied naturalization on the ground that, as a homosexual, he lacked the requisite "good moral character." 30
' In ruling that
petitioner was of good moral character, Judge Mansfield combined a
broad view of the zone of privacy with the nexus approach discussed
383
384
385
386

393 US. 503, 509 (1969).
346 F. Supp. at 401.
359 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D.Md. 1973).
Id.

387 Id.
388 Id. at 852-53. The court was relying on the reasoning of Frontiero v.

Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
389 359 F. Supp. at 853. The court ultimately reversed the burden of proof
it had established and, stating that plaintiff's publication of his homosexuality was
not protectable, held that his transfer had not been arbitrary and was therefore

permissible. Id. at 857. Acanfora is a peculiar amalgam of first
amendment rights
and privacy rights viewed in the unique context of the role of a public school
teacher, and a complete discussion of the court's complicated reasoning would not
be relevant here.
390 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

391 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (3)(1970).
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above. He stated that the most important factor to be considered was
whether the challenged conduct was public or private in nature:
If it is public or if it involves a large number of other persons, it may
pose a threat to the community. If, on the other hand, it is entirely private, the likelihood of harm to others is minimal and any effort to regulate or penalize the conduct may lead to an unjustified invasion of the
individual's constitutional rights.892
Taken alone, Mansfield's concern about whether or not petitioner's
behavior posed a threat to the community might be viewed as merely
an attempt to limit the Government's power to deny citizenship to
what the court viewed as the policy behind the good moral character
requirement: to protect the community from harm. Immorality per se
is no danger and thus may not be a basis for exclusion unless it causes
harm or affects the "public morality."3 93 But in stating that "it is now
established that official inquiry into a person's private sexual habits
does violence to his constitutionally protected zone of privacy,' 'sD4
Mansfield adopted a broader privacy rationale. He implied that the
Government may not exclude homosexual aliens because investigation
and intrusion into a petitioner's private sexual life must be justified by
a strong governmental interest. The Government's interest in protecting
the community from potentially dangerous persons, or persons who
might offend the public morality, could supply a sufficient justification
for abridging the alien's constitutionally protected right. But the Government's interest in protecting the community from simply having a
homosexual in its midst is not sufficient.
Under the approach in Labady, as in Mindel, Fisher and Acanfora,
private sexual behavior is viewed as falling within the perimeters of the
zone of privacy. The courts must then determine when government's
interests justify an inquiry into a person's private sexual habits. Because such inquiry is identified as an abridgement of the right of privacy, the state must present a substantial justification for its inquiries
and intrusions. Labady implies that a concern with the morality of the
actor, or with the reaction homosexual conduct might engender in a
community if it were discovered, is not sufficient.
3. Is the Right to Engage in Private Sexual Behavior a Constitutionally
ProtectedRight of Privacy?
As has just been seen, most courts have been reluctant to confront
this question, while others have foundered in the attempt. Yet the question must be faced. The overview of Supreme Court privacy doctrine
provided in Parts II and IlI of this Note furnishes some basis for answering first, the question of whether or not private sexual behavior
is eligible for any measure of constitutional protection and, second,
whether it is a fundamental right and thus entitled to stringent pro392
893
394

326 F. Supp. at 927.

Id. at 927-28.
Id. at 927.
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tection. The first of these inquiries focuses on points of nexus between
private sexual behavior and the rights endorsed in Griswold, Roo and
earlier cases: rights pertaining to family, marriage, home, procreation
and child-rearing. If the values the Court found worthy of protection in
those cases inhere in the activity considered here, then private sexual
behavior is a right of privacy, even if it is not later deemed to be fundamental, and thus would command some degree of constitutional
protection.
Private sexual behavior does have much in common with the right
protected in Griswold. First, the locus of such behavior is generally the
home. Consensual sexual acts can only be discovered by invading the
home. Justice Douglas' picture of the police invading the marital bedroom to search for contraceptives is no more repulsive than a picture
of the police ferreting out acts of sodomy or fornication. Stanley v.
Georgia reinforced the notion that the home is a sanctuary which may
not be invaded unless the state has some justification more compelling
than the desire to prevent immorality. The recent obscenity decisions
reemphasize Stanley's holding that activities within the home are
uniquely private and therefore are to be protected.
According to Justice Douglas, the home became a protected area
because of certain profound concerns underlying the third and fourth
amendments. If these Bill of Rights provisions were implicated in Griswold, then they are also relevant where sexual activities in the home
are under consideration. Similarly, if the first amendment penumbra
protected the right of a man and a woman to form and maintain an
intimate relationship in Griswold, then the relationship of consenting
adults who associate to fulfill their sexual needs may also implicate
first amendment values.
Further, natural notions of privacy adhere to sexual behavior, one
of the most intimate of all human activities. The Griswold opinions
relied on the expectation of our society that what happens within a
marriage is not the laws business; the view that sexual activity is also
00
One
"not the law's business1 395 is gaining increasing acceptance.O
commentator has even suggested that Griswold itself must ultimately
be viewed as protecting not a right to decide when to have children,
but the right of the married couple to engage in sexual intercoursePOT
The Connecticut anti-contraceptive law did not force a couple to have
children-it merely forced them to abstain from sex if they did not
wish to have children. At least one Justice has stated that Griswold
may protect sexual activity of consenting adults.
395 Wolfenden Report, supra note 138.
396 For an extensive compilation of public opinion polls dealing with public

views on homosexuality and other forms of consensual sexual behavior, ewBarnett,
supra note 306, at 124-28 n.46. See also A. Kinsey, W. Pomeroy & C. fartin, Sexual
Behavior in the Human Male 392 (1948).
397 Barnett, supra note 305, at 97.
398 California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 132 n.10 (1972) (MarshaH, J., dissent-
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On the basis of these factors alone, it is possible to conclude that
the right to engage in private sexual behavior is a privacy right. The
more difficult question is whether that right is "fundamental" and thus
entitled to the greater measure of constitutional protection afforded by
Roe v. Wade. The first question to be asked in judging fundamentality
centers on the importance of the right involved to the individual. The
effect state regulation of sexual behavior has on an individual's life
will vary according to the precise nature of the activity involved. Laws
prohibiting all forms of sexual expression available to homosexuals or
laws prohibiting cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex involve particularly serious intrusions because they criminalize a major
choice of lifestyle. As H. L. A. Hart has pointed out, laws requiring complete repression of sexual impulses outside of marriage may affect the
development or balance of the individual's emotional life, happiness and
personality.3 99 Sexual fulfillment is a basic human need. The arsenal of
prohibitory state sex laws forces all who would fulfill that need to
choose heterosexual marriage, despite the psychological anguish that
choice might cause for homosexuals, 40 0 for persons who do not wish to
be monogamous, or for the spouses of these persons. Thus, while some
courts unquestionably would denigrate the importance of sexual expression, state regulation of sexual behavior involves prohibition of entire
modes of life and thus may profoundly affect the individual. This factor
may indeed constitute the primary distinction between sexual behavior
and viewing obscenity, which the Court obviously does not regard as a
fundamental right.40 1
The more general standard for judging the fundamentality of a
right is derived from Palko v. Connecticut:402 is the right "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty?" Another way to frame this inquiry is
to ask whether allowing the state to regulate certain aspects of life
seems totalitarian. 40 3 Such questions obviously do not engender objective, unanimous answers. The answer will often depend on how the
question is approached.
The approach the Court seems to have selected to judge fundamentality relies on a somewhat objective referent-the traditions and
collective conscience of Anglo-American society,40 4 a test derived from
Snyder v. Massachusetts.405 Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in
ing) ("I have serious doubts whether the State may constitutionally assert an
interest in regulating any sexual act between consenting adults. [citing Griswold]").
399 H. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 22 (1963).
400 See A. Karlen, Sexuality and the Homosexual-A New View 408 (1971)
(interview with W. Money); cf. State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 398, 301 A.2d 748, 754
(1973) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring).
401 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
402 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
403 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con.
curring) ; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
404 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con-

curring).
405

291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
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Roe v. Wade went to great lengths to show that state regulation of
abortion is a fairly recent phenomenon 0 6 Implicitly, therefore, regulation of abortion was not traditional and could be disallowed. By contrast, sodomy and other forms of sexual behavior have been forbidden
by religious and secular authorities since biblical times. Thus, if tradidition is to be the yardstick, it may be "rooted in our collective conscience" that the state may regulate deviate and extramarital sex. Justice Harlan took the view that tradition alone may provide a sufficient
07
basis for refusing to accord protection to certain forms of behavior
He suggested that laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual
practices "form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our
social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon
that basis." 408
Answering the difficult question of fundamentality by resorting to
tradition does provide a clear and simple answer to the question of
whether sexual behavior is a fundamental right. But so literal a reading
of the Snyder standard may not give sufficient consideration and flexibility to general constitutional principles. First, to say that the state
may regulate sexual behavior because it has consistently done so in the
past begs the question of whether it is constitutional for a majority to
impose its moral code on the community. Even if there has always been
a consensus that traditional marriage is a more moral lifestyle than
homosexuality, such a consensus may not be sufficient excuse for depriving the homosexual minority of the right to make an unorthodox choice.
The essence of constitutional democracy is that it protects minorities
whose rights would be ignored by a ruling majority in a pure democracy.
Second, a tradition-bound standard does not allow for changing
mores. It may be, as Justice Harlan said, that if a society holds unanimous views on a certain aspect of morality, constitutional doctrines
should not attempt to challenge that consensus. Perhaps, as Lord Devlin has argued, certain shared moral precepts are necessary to any stable
°
society 409
Yet once a substantial minority begins to question a formerly
unassailable moral premise, both the consensus and the reason for honoring the consensus are destroyed. A simple majority view of morality,
as opposed to a universal belief, may not provide a sufficient excuse for
refusing to extend constitutional protection to the activities of a minor4 10

ity.

Tradition is inadequate as a standard for judging fundamentality
because it ultimately relies on the traditional majority view of morality.
406 410 US. at 129-41.
407 Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
408 Id. at 546. In Harlan's view, marital intimacies are protected because the
state has acknowledged, fostered and condoned the institution of marriage. Id. at
553. Thus, constitutional protection is derived from a notion of estoppel.
409 P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 9-13 (1965).
410 See Barnett, supra note 305, at 107; Hughes, Morals and the Criminal Law,
71 Yale L.J. 662, 673 (1962) ; Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code,
63 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 672 (1963).
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Griswold, Eisenstadt and Roe all stand for the proposition that a majority view that a certain practice is immoral does not dispose of the
issue of whether state regulation of that practice is constitutional. Thus,
if the Snyder standard is to be used to judge the extent to which private
sexual behavior may command constitutional protection, it should be
read more broadly. Perhaps most rooted in the traditions and collective
conscience of our society are certain general constitutional principles:
the principle of protection for minority rights, the principle that the
sphere of government should be limited and the sphere of personal liberty relatively unlimited. Judged by these standards, the right to engage in private sexual behavior could be found fundamental, especially
if the often profound human relationship involved were the focus of the
inquiry.
By implication, a court could also reasonably conclude that the
right to engage in private sexual behavior is not fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The ambiguity of this fundamentality standard, and the room it leaves for subjective judgments,
would pose a grave dilemma under the rigid two-tier test, for a court's
decision about the fundamentality of a right would be totally outcomedeterminative. The knowledge that calling a right fundamental would
implicate a compelling state interest test and thus almost automatically
divest the states of a great body of law must color a judge's decision
and deter serious consideration of the right involved. Calling a right
nonfundamental, on the other hand, would obviate any examination
of the state interests involved. An asserted state interest, however
vague, in fostering and encouraging the institution of marriage, or
even, according to Justice Harlan, a desire to promote "moral soundness" among the populace, 411 could be held to justify all state sex laws.
The middle-level test, discussed above,412 is particularly appropriate for application in this context, and necessary to encourage fair consideration of both the right and the state interests involved. Fundamental or not, sexual behavior is certainly a private sphere of activity
and of substantial significance to the actor. Adopting a middle ground
of analysis would open a range of options to a court judging the constitutionality of a state sex law. The court might demand a "fair and
substantial relation" 413 between a state law limiting personal freedom
and a legitimate state goal. Under this test, the court would first look at
the interests the state proffers to justify its sex laws. The state might
assert, for example, that these laws encourage marriage and the formation of traditional family units. The state might more bluntly assert an
interest in morality. Such state interests might be difficult to balance
against personal liberties, but the court could avoid that task. The
court could determine whether, in light of general constitutional principles, the state's alleged interests are legitimate. Encouraging marriage
411
412
413

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See text accompanying note 219 supra.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (citation omitted).
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may be- inimical to the Supreme Court's concusion" 14 that marriage is
a fundamental civil right, or choice. A right to marry may include an
antithetical right not to marry. Thus it might not be permissible for the
state to place burdens and incentives so as to load a constitutionally
protected choice. An asserted interest in morality per se might be found
too vague and potentially sweeping. Each statute might present a different range of state interests. Adultery statutes implicate the same interests as do fornication statutes, but with the additional concern for
protecting the spouse of the adulterer. Open and notorious cohabitation
may impinge upon public sensibilities in a way in which private, sporadic sexual acts do not. At least the interests would be identified and
considered, even if the court were not willing to engage in the difficult
process of balancing.
The second prong of the suggested test focuses on the relation between the asserted interests and the challenged laws. The fact that state
sex laws are rarely enforced415 suggests that, whatever the state's interests in these laws might be, the laws do not play a crucial role in
promoting those interests. The court might question the means the
state has chosen to implement its goals. Thus, if the state asserted that
its interest in sodomy laws is simply to curtail extramarital sexual behavior, the court might find a sodomy statute overbroad if it prohibited
the deviate sexual behavior of a married couple. 4 10 Alternatively, if that
state had no law prohibiting fornication, the court might find that the
sodomy law discriminated against homosexuals, 41 7 or that it was not
sufficiently related to the state's goal. 418 These inquiries would remove
challenges to sex laws from the plane of vague, subliminally considered
justifications while avoiding the task of weighing the state's interests.
4. Conclusion
If the right to engage in private sexual behavior is found to be
within the zone of privacy, some substantial governmental interest must
414 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
415 See text accompanying note 311 supra.
416 See Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847
(1968); Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (NJ). Tex. 1970) (three-judge
court), vacated and remanded sub noma. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 US. 989 (1971).
417 Cf. State v. Fields, 13 Crim. L. Rptr. 2376 (D. Alas. June 27, 1973) (holding state prostitution statute discriminates against women); State v. Kueny, 12
Crim. L. Rptr. 2401 (Iowa Mun. Ct 1972) (holding that state cohabitation statute
not punishing homosexual cohabitation discriminates against heterosexuals).
418 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 40S U.S. 438, 449-50 (1972), the Court found that
the Massachusetts law forbidding distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals was not sufficiently related to the goal of deterring extramarital sex, since
fornication was a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum sentence of $30 or three
months in prison, while violating the contraception statute was a felony, punishable
by up to five years imprisonment. Such disparities in penalties are commonplace in

the realm of state regulation of sexual behavior. In Rhode Island, for example,
consensual sodomy is punishable by imprisonment of seven to 20 year s, R. L Gen.
Laws Ann. § 11-10-1 (1970), while fornication is punisbable by a maximum of a
$10 fine, id. § 11-6-3.
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be shown to justify state laws or governmental actions abridging or
burdening that right. The knowledge that recognizing sexual behavior as
an aspect of privacy would trigger a compelling state interest test and
thus virtually necessitate extirpating all state sex laws seems to have
inhibited most courts from engaging in any sort of meaningful analysis.
Declaring that sexual behavior is not within the zone of privacy obviated the need for a serious examination of the state's interest in private sexual behavior. Yet, as some courts recognized, private sexual
behavior certainly is an intimate and often important phase of human
activity. Some less stringent, more realistic level of scrutiny might encourage serious consideration of the grave intrusions engendered by state
regulation of sex.
It would be disingenuous to claim that the courts may comfortably
divest the states of the large body of law which has grown around the
regulation of immorality. While many sex laws are rarely enforced, it
cannot be said that they are vestigial. The fact that a vast majority of
the states has fiercely resisted abandoning or even liberalizing laws relating to sodomy, adultery and fornication, and the fact that stringent
penalties for sodomy are the rule rather than the exception indicate
that these laws reflect some deeply felt notions of morality. Griswold
did not, as one prominent observer suggested, "eliminat[e] some of the
last vestiges of Comstockery" 419 in our laws. It merely laid a foundation for doing so.
C. The Family
In constructing the zone of privacy, the Supreme Court has relied
heavily on cases suggesting that family life is a uniquely private enclave
to be scrupulously protected against governmental intrusion. 420 A number of the Court's conclusions about the nature of constitutional privacy
may be traced to the concern with protecting family life. Decisions
about procreation are traditionally within the province of the family, as
are decisions about the rearing and education of children. The Court has
referred to marriage as a "basic civil right of man." 421 Justice Harlan
suggested that the home "derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family
422
life," and is jealously guarded for that reason.
Many lower courts have welcomed the idea that family rights are
protected by the zone of privacy, and have rendered decisions making
these rights more secure.4 3 A more difficult question, on which the
419 Mosk, Foreword, U.C.LA. Project, supra note 309, at 645.
420 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965); id. at 488, 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id.at 502
(White, J., concurring). These cases include: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(marriage) ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child-rearing) ; Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (educating children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)

(educating children).
421
422
423

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
See text accompanying notes 427-52, 510-25 infra.
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lower courts have split, is what this category of family rights includes.
Would it, for example, guarantee a right not to marry, or a right to adopt
a nontraditional lifestyle, such as communal living, homosexual marriage, heterosexual or homosexual cohabitation without marriage? Alternative lifestyles, in many cases, have all of the characteristics that
can be presumed to make the traditional family unit constitutionally
protectable: they involve basic decisions which determine the character
of a person's life; they are of the same uniquely personal nature; they
often implicate profound human relationships; they generally center
around the home. From the perspective of participants, the only difference may be expressed in one word: tradition. In this key word lies
the point at which the logic of the zone of privacy may diverge from
the personal beliefs of judges.
The privacy rights Justice Blackmun lists in Roe v. Wade4-4 give
content to the American Dream. From a traditional, conservative viewpoint, the unimpeded right to marry, establish a home and raise children is essential to the pursuit of happiness. Perhaps this is the true,
underlying reason for the special status the Court has afforded these
rights. To decide that alternative lifestyles are not protected by the
right of privacy would be to decide that no one has a right to pursue
happiness in a way that is alien to our traditions and thus to the Justices
of the Supreme Court.
For purposes of constitutional adjudication, the only difference between traditional and nontraditional "families" is a difference in the
state interests in fostering the one and discouraging the other. That is
the plane on which the inquiry should take place. If the right of privacy protects traditional families and lifestyles, it must also require the
courts to give fairly strict scrutiny to state laws and actions foreclosing nontraditional lifestyles. If these rights are fundamental, the state
would have to show a compelling interest to justify any intrusion. A
lesser standard of review, requiring some substantial relationship between the state's regulations and goals, should be applied to nonfundamental lifestyle rights.
The state's interest in fostering marriage as a device for recordkeeping and for establishing and enforcing domestic and financial
responsibilities is not insignificant. The interest in preserving the traditional family unit as the basic functioning unit of our society has also
been lauded,
although the legitimacy of this goal may be ques424 410 U.S. at 152-53.
425 The institution of marriage "is the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress:' Maynard v. Hill,

125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888). "[T]he power to make rules to establisb, protect, and
strengthen family life.., is committed.., to the... State." Labine v. 1rnent, 401
U.S. 532, 538 (1971). "Society-American society, indeed American constitutional

society-is commited to the existence of some institutions, the stability of which is
deemed essential for a healthy existence as a nation. The home-family is such an
institution.' Murphy v. Houma Well Serv., 413 F.2d 509, 512 (Sth Cir. 1969) ; see P.
Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 9-13 (1965).
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tioned. 6 It may be that certain methods the state adopts to accomplish these goals are overbroad or impermissible. Only by seriously
examining the state's interest in specific contexts can such determinations
be made.
1. The TraditionalFamily
While most courts examining claims of family privacy have only
used Griswold as a tool to protect the traditional marital relationship,
there have been extensions wrought in the protection offered by the right
of privacy. Recent cases have protected primarily two categories of
persons from state interference with their marital relations-high school
students and welfare recipients.
The court in Holt v. Shelton4

27

held that a high school's action in

temporarily suspending a student and permanently curtailing her right
to participate in extracurricular activities because she had married was
unconstitutional in that it infringed upon her fundamental right to
marry 4 8 by limiting her right to an education. 2 9 Because the court
thought that both of these rights were protected by the Constitution,
it applied a compelling state interest test, but claimed to be unable to
find any legitimate state interest in the suspension.480 The court's
opinion was regrettably brief in arriving at these potentially sweeping
conclusions.
The court in Davis v. Meek, 431 on the other hand, did not think
that there is a fundamental right to marry. The court explained that
marriage is a local matter which the state may regulate as it sees W
fit.4 02
However, once a person has married without violating any state law,
the penumbral right of marital privacy, derived from Griswold, attaches. " Thus, the state may not put "what may be an unendurable
strain" 434 upon a marriage, because causing dissension in and possible
dissolution of a marriage is a violation of the right of marital privacy.
The strain to which the court referred in this case was the school's
ruling that plaintiff could not engage in extracurricular activities because
he had gotten married. 4 The school board claimed that the purpose of
428

The Second Circuit has held that
the interest of the local community in the protection and maintenance of
the prevailing traditional family pattern .. fails to fall within the proper
exercise of state police power.... Such social preferences ... have no rele-

vance to public health, safety or welfare.
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 819 (2d Cir. 1973), prob. Jurls. noted,
42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1973) (No. 73-191).
427 341 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
428 Id. at 822-23, citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
429 341 F. Supp. at 822-23 &n.3, citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
430 341 F. Supp. at 823.
431 344 F. Supp. 298, 299-301 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
432 Id.
433 Id.
434
435

at 300.

Id. at 302.
Perhaps Albert Davis would have abandoned his marriage to play on the
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this regulation was to discourage students from marrying so that they
would not drop out of school. Unlike the court in Holt, Judge Young
I 3
thought this purpose legitimate and commendable.
However, since the
school's action infringed a constitutionally protected right, a rational,
commendable purpose was not sufficient, and plaintiff was held to have a
constitutional right to play on the baseball team.
Despite their differences as to when the right of marital privacy
begins, both Holt and Davis turn on an idea of marital autonomy, rather
than privacy in a nondisclosure sense. In neither case was there any
question of prying into the marital bedroom-the school regulations
took effect simply because the plaintiffs were married. The message of
the cases is that the state may not undermine a lawful marriage, even
for a laudable and permissible purpose, because the decision to marry
37
or at least to stay married is fundamental to the individua.
Given the states' predilection for the institution of marriage, such
subversion of marital relationships is rare. One of the few other contexts in which the state does attempt to insinuate itself into a marriage
in potentially destructive ways is in setting up rules for the receipt of
welfare. Wisconsin, for example, established eligibility rules for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)4 38 which required a mother
to take steps to terminate her marriage or to prosecute her husband
V 3 9 The court in
for nonsupport in order to receive aid.
Doe v. Schmidt440
ruled that plaintiff's claim that these regulations violated her right of
privacy was not insubstantial, but did not rule on the merits.
Although courts may differ as to its precise constitutional contours, it is clear that one of the fundamental freedoms protected and
secured by the constitution is the right of privacy, and, more specifically,
after [Griswold], it is clear that vwrital privacy is a right enjoying constitutional protection ... In our view, one need not go beyond the realm
of common human experience to take cognizance of the fact that the conbaseball team, but it seems that the court was exaggerating in claiming that the
school's action might have destroyed the plaintiff's marriage. Id. It would further
seem that any potentially disruptive governmental interference with a marriage
would be a sufficiently "unendurable strain" to invoke constitutional protection
under the Davis approach.
436 Id. at 300, 302.
437 In Moran v. School Dist. No. 7, 360 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972), the
court enjoined the enforcement of a school regulation prohibiting married students
from participating in extradirricular activities on the basis of a right to marry and
a right to education derived from state law. The court did not reach any constitu-

tional issues. On the subject of married students' rights in general, see Commeat, 22
Buffalo L. Rev. 634 (1972).
438 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970).
439 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 49.19(4) (d) (1957). Any mother or stepmother who
had a husband could qualify only if: (1) she had been divorced or legally separated
and was unable to compel her husband to support the children through provisions of
law, or (2) she had commenced an action for divorce or separation and had obtained
a temporary support order that was insufficient or unenforceable, or (3) she had
obtained a civil order to compel support that was insufficient or unenforceable, or
(4) she had legally charged her husband with failure to support or abandonment.
440 330 F. Supp. 159 (ED. Wis. 1971) (three-judge court).
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ditioning of the receipt of public assistance upon a mother commencing
divorce, separation, or other legal action against her husband44is likely to
involve serious intrusions upon the right of marital privacy. 1
The Wisconsin rule was a flagrant example of state action tending to
destroy a marriage. The court in Doe recognized this state action as
infringing the right of marital privacy, again interpreted as a right of
autonomy-a right to stay married.
When Griswold has been viewed as creating a limitation on disclosure of personal information rather than a right of autonomy, constitutional protection has been less extensive. In one unusual situation
where government shielded individuals from investigation, nondisclosure
aspects of privacy provided an additional basis for sustaining the
state's action. Murphy v. Houma Well ServicC442 held Louisiana's
presumption of paternity to be justifiable as protective of family stability. In the context of a Jones Act 443 death action, plaintiff was attempting to show that a claimant born to decedent's wife was not
decedent's child. The court upheld the presumption on the ground that
the state "undoubtedly has an interest in protecting the intimate family
relationship from divisive and destructive attacks by those seeking to
challenge the legitimacy of children born during wedlock."4 44 The court
viewed the legitimacy of children born during wedlock as an area "so
private as to command constitutional protection, see Griswvold."446 As
in Davis and Doe, the underlying concern was with protecting the stability of traditional marital and family relationships.
When an inquiry into paternity involved a nontraditional family
and cast the state into an inquisitorial rather than a protective role, the
balance of interests shifted. The plaintiff in Saiz v. Goodwn 440 challenged the requirement that applicants for AFDC furnish information
on which the state could base an evaluation of the paternity of allegedly
illegitimate children. The district judge hearing the case refused to
convene a three-judge court, finding plaintiff's equal protection and
privacy claims insubstantial. He thought Griswold inapposite4 47 and
declared that under Wyman v. James448 a reasonable administrative
tool that serves a valid and proper administrative purpose in dispensing
AFDC is not an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.440
Nondisclosure aspects of privacy substantially overlap autonomy
441 Id. at 163.

442
443
death of
444

413 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1969).
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The act gives a right of action for the injury or
a seaman in the course of his employment.
413 F.2d at 512.

445 Id.

446 325 F. Supp. 23 (D.NI.), vacated and remanded, 450 F.2d 788 (10th Cir.
1971).
447 Id. at 26.

448 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (search warrants held not required for home visits to
welfare recipients).
449 325 F. Supp. at 25; see Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 69, 77-78 (D. Conn.
1973).
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interests where forced disclosure is an integral element of a governmental scheme which threatens family stability. In such a context, a
court's choice to frame an issue as one of nondisclosure privacy may
prevent analysis of the more significant autonomy right at stake. Lewis
v. Stark,450 for example, involved a challenge to California's "man-inthe-house" rule which obligates a man assuming the role of spouse to
support the children in his home. The court agreed that under Griswold
the marital relationship is protected from "certain intrusions," but explained that "plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the practices of
the state would be shown at trial to resemble the methods necessary to
prove use of contraceptives, which methods were firmly rejected as
'repulsive' by the Supreme Court." 451 Because proving that an intimate
relationship existed in this case would not require repulsive investigative
techniques, the court thought that Griswold was distinguishable, thus
ignoring the underlying autonomy issue.
On the whole, most courts examining claims involving married
couples and traditional families have interpreted Griswold as guaranteeing a right of autonomy, usually in the context of a right to stay
married. The most difficult questions about the right to marry have not
yet been laid before the courts. For example, if there is a right to marry,
must and can the state show compelling justifications for such infringements on that right as age requirements, blood test requirements, etc.?
Does the right to establish a marriage imply a concomitant right to
dissolve that marriage? If so, the general view that the state is a party
to all divorces and must consent to the dissolution of a marriage"r2
would be highly questionable. If the right to marry is fundamental, is
the right not to marry equally fundamental? If it is, the state might
be prevented from favoring married persons in such a way as to exert
pressure on an individual's fundamental, personal decision whether to
marry.
There are still many grave and difficult questions left open in this
area; but, because of the courts' genuine solicitude for traditional family
relationships, the right of privacy may play a prominent role in limiting
the state's ability to intrude upon this phase of personal life.
2. The NontraditionalFamily
The state and federal governments have numerous tools for preventing and discouraging alternate lifestyles: procedures for obtaining
divorces; laws prohibiting cohabitation, sodomy and fornication; 4 5
laws governing custody of children; 45 laws and practices disadvantaging
450 312 F. Supp. 197 (NJ). Cal. 1968) (three-judge court), rev'd sub nom.
Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
451 Id. at 206.
452 See H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations 302-03 (1968).

453 See text accompanying note 305 supra.
454 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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illegitimate children; 455 laws governing the distribution of welfare, 450
public housing 457 and food stamps; 45 8 and zoning ordinances. 469 If the
individual has a fundamental right to structure his own home life and
decide with whom he wishes to live, such laws and practices can only
be justified if they are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
Only one court has adopted this analysis, in a decision which was subsequently limited by the Supreme Court. 400 The approaches of other
courts have been highly disparate, ranging from thinly disguised distheoretical framework in
gust with pariahs 46 1 to a creative stab at a new
4 2
the context of an equal protection challenge.
a. Homosexual Marriage-The court in Baker v. Nelson 403

thought that the tradition behind the conventional marriage relationship
was ample justification for a state's denial of a marriage license to two
persons of the same sex. Two homosexuals sought a mandamus to compel the issuance of a marriage license, claiming that they were being
denied due process and equal protection and that the state statute, as
construed, violated the first, eighth and ninth amendments. The court
disposed of most of these claims in a footnote. 404 The only claim examined was that the plaintiffs were being prevented from exercising a
fundamental right. Since the court did not feel that the right to marry
was constitutionally protected, only a rational basis for the statute's
discrimination was required. 40 5 Tradition supplied this rational basis.
The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as old
as the book of Genesis .... This historic institution manifestly is more
deeply founded than the asserted contemporary400concept of marriage and
societal interests for which petitioners contend.
455 See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). Louisiana even has a law
making it a crime for a man or woman to have two or more illegitimate children.
La. Rev. Stat. § 14:79.2 (Supp. 1973).
456 See. e.g., Doe v. Schmidt, 330 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (three-judge
court).
457 See Federal Low Rent Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-02 (1970), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-02 (Supp. 1972).
458 See Moreno v. Department of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C. 1972)
(three-judge court), aff'd, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
459 Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), prob. juris,
noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1973) (No. 73-191); Palo Alto Tenants
Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curlam, 487 F.2d
883 (9th Cir. 1973).
460 Moreno v. Department of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972)
(three-judge court), aff'd on other grounds, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
461 See, e.g., McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972) ; Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Ct.
Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970).
462 Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), prob. jurs.
noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1973) (No. 73-191).
463 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972).
464 Id. at 312 n.2, 191 N.W.2d at 186 n.2.
465 Id. at 312-15, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87.
466 Id. at 312, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
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The court relied on the language in Griswold describing marriage
as an old and fundamental institution, and on Justice Rarlan's view that
it was only because the state had sanctioned the marriage relationship
with its concomitant
intimacies that it could not then intrude upon
46 7
that relationship.
Perhaps the state's refusal to grant a marriage license does not in
itself abridge personal liberty. Marriage is a legal relationship created
by the state and subject to local regulation. 0 s If the two homosexuals
were allowed to live together as a couple and structure their relationships
as they wished, perhaps there would be no abridgement of liberty in
their being denied the state's blessing. It is the possibility of prosecution
under sodomy laws46 9 that interferes with the plaintiffs' decision about
the conduct of their lives. Their desire to be legally married might only
be cognizable in the context of an equal protection challenge, since the
state has foreclosed all legal avenues of homosexual sexual expression. 70
b. The Commune: Blood, Marriage or Adoption -It is difficult
to guess whether the average community would be more appalled by the
prospect of a homosexual marriage or by the prospect of being overrun
by communes. Most states provide criminal laws which communities
can use to rid themselves of cohabiting homosexuals or heterosexuas.471
The most typical self-protective device adopted by communities to weed
out other unorthodox family units is the zoning ordinance. The municipal
entity can zone itself,4 7 2 or some specific area within it, for one-family
housing and then can define a family as consisting of persons related
by blood, marriage or adoption.473 In seeking to preserve the residential,
familial character of the neighborhood, these communities zone out not
only communes, student groups and boarding houses, but also any other
group of unrelated individuals, including a family with a foster child.47 5
These ordinances sometimes proliferate throughout entire regions,
creating large enclaves of traditional families.
When these ordinances have been challenged, communities have
proffered all conceivable justifications, claiming that such ordinances
Id; see text accompanying notes 407-03 supra.
See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971).
469 The issuance of a marriage license might have brought plaintiffs within
the holding of Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847
(1968) (sodomy statutes may not constitutionally be enforced against married
couples).
470 See State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 398, 301 A.2d 748, 754 (1973) (concurring
opinion).
471 See text accompanying notes 303-94 supra.
472 The zoning power is delegated to municipalities. E.g., N.Y. Village Law §
467

468

7-700 (McKinney 1973).
473 Typical ordinances are set out in Boras v. 'Village of Belle Terre, 476
F.2d 805, 809 (2d Cir. 1973), prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. IS,
1973) (No. 73-191), and in Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp.

908, 909 (ND. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973).
474 Newark v. Johnson, 70 N.J. Super. 381, 175 Aid S00 (County CL 1961).
475 See Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 818 n.9 (2d Cir. 1973),
prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1973) (No. 73-191).
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control population density, 470 prevent noise and disturbance, 477 prevent
traffic and parking problems, 478 and preserve the rent structure of the
community. 470 Unless a court found that the ordinances abridged a
constitutionally protected right, these excuses could pass constitutional
muster and the ordinances would survive without any attention being
given to their real purpose and effect. The two main constitutional
grounds for challenging the ordinances, privacy and equal protection,
both reduce to the same question. Under the now faltering dichotomy
the Supreme Court constructed for viewing equal protection claims, the
ordinance would only receive serious scrutiny if it were premised on a
suspect classification, or if it infringed a fundamental or constitutional
right. The argument that it is suspect to discriminate against unrelated persons did not receive much serious judicial attention. 480 Thus,
the threshold question in a privacy or an equal protection claim is the
same: is there a constitutional right to live with persons to whom one
is not related? The first two federal courts to consider the constitutionality of these ordinances managed to avoid that question, and held
the ordinances valid.
The plaintiffs in Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan48 1 were
members of a commune living in an area of the city that was zoned
for single-family housing. A family was defined by the ordinance as
consisting of no more than four persons unrelated by blood, marriage
476 Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Col.
1970), aff'd per curiam, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973). The argument is that

the traditional family is "self-limiting" in size, while a "voluntary family" might
consist of any number of persons.
477 Id.; Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 245, 281
A.2d 513, 515 (1971).
478 Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Cal.
1970), aff'd per curiam, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973).
479 Id. at 912-13.
480 See, e.g., Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 814 (2d Cir. 1973),
prob. juris noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1973) (No. 73-191). The only

sign of judicial acceptance of the idea that such classifications might be suspect wag
in Parr v. Municipal Court, 3 Cal. 3d 861, 479 P.2d 353, 92 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1972). The California Supreme Court gave strict scrutiny
to a city ordinance prohibiting sitting or lying on the grass in public parks, on the
ground that the ordinance discriminated against hippies. In ruling that the ordinance,
while not discriminatory on its face, denied equal protection to hippies, the court
said:
Wie cannot be oblivious to the transparent, indeed the avowed, purposo
and the inevitable effect of the ordinance in question: to discriminate
against an ill-defined social caste whose members are deemed pariahs by
the city fathers. This court has been consistently vigilant to protect racial
groups from the effects of official prejudice, and we can be no less concerned
because the human beings currently in disfavor are identifiable by dress and
attitudes rather than by color.
Id. at 870, 479 P.2d at 360, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 160; see Note, All in the "Family:"
Legal Problems of Communes, 7 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 393, 396-400
(1972) [hereinafter Note, Communes].
481 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 487 F.2d 883
1973).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

October 19733

CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY

or adoption. 48 2 An affirmative suit was brought to enjoin defendant city
officials from harassing the commune under the guise of enforcing the
ordinance, and to obtain a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was
unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. The court accepted the
dual-level equal protection model and agreed that the state would have
to demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify the ordinance if a
constitutional right had been abridged. 48 3 The court stated that although
the right to form a group or commune might be protected by first
amendment freedom of association, that right (accepted arguendo) had
not been abridged. Plaintiffs were not being denied the right to live
together-they were only being denied the right to live together as a
group in certain sections of the city.4 4 The court was careful to point
out that there were other sections of the city where plaintiffs could live
together legally. Once it was determined that no constitutional or
fundamental right had been abridged, the court found it easy to hold
that the state interests noted above provided a sufficient rational basis
for the ordinance.:48
The finding that the right had not been sufficiently abridged to
present a case of unconstitutional state action is certainly subject to
criticism. First, the state need not totally vitiate a right to run afoul
of the Constitution. Imposing a penalty on the exercise of a constitutional right, or forcing a choice between two constitutional rights, is also
unconstitutional.48 6 The Palo Alto court's standard is also difficult to
apply. How many communities, or how many square feet, must be closed
to communes before the members' rights have been abridged?
In a more recent challenge, the district court in Boraas v. Village
of Belk Terre4S 7 also accepted the proposition that the decision of a
group of unrelated individuals to live together is constitutionally protected, and also upheld the constitutionality of a more stringent ordinance. Plaintiffs were a group of six college students and their landlords. The Village of Belle Terre had zoned itself as one single-family
residential zone and defined a family as a group of persons functioning
as a single housekeeping unit not comprising more than two persons
unrelated by blood, marriage or adoption. Thus, the situation Palo Alto
distinguished existed here--a group was zoned out of an entire community.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 910-11.
484 The ordinance only affected two zones of the city. "The right to form
[communal living groups] may be constitutionally protected, but the right to insist
that these groups live under the same roof, in any part of the city they choose, is
not." Id. at 911-12.
485 Id. at 912.
482
483

486 Dunn v. Blumstein, 409 U.S. 330, 339-42 (1972) ; Cole v. Housing Author-

ity, 435 F.2d 807, 810-11 (Ist Cir. 1970).
487 Civil No. 72C-1030 (ED.N.Y. Sept, 20, 1972), rev'd and remanded, 476
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1973)
(No. 73-191).
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Like the court in Palo Alto, the district judge concluded that if
plaintiff students had been denied their "unquestionable right" to live
together, the case would present no problem. 488 However, rather than
concluding that the recognized constitutional right had not been abridged
and that the ordinance could therefore be upheld on the rational basis
of the state's interest in controlling population density, etc., the court
seemed to conclude that the right had been partially abridged and thus
required a more substantial justification for the ordinance. 80 Analogizing the desire of families to live in a community with other families
to the desire of plaintiff students to live together, the court found what
amounted to a countervailing right of privacy and freedom of association.49 This right was held to justify the ordinance, although it would
not have justified a total abrogation of the plaintiffs' right to live together. 491 Thus, while the opinion did manage to extricate analysis from
the spurious grounds of decision in Palo Alto and face the real issue,
the district court's holding was essentially the same as that of the Palo
Alto court: the plaintiffs' rights had not been sufficiently abridged to
render the ordinance unconstitutional. The most significant aspect of
the district court's opinion was its holding that the state has a substantial, legitimate interest in creating and protecting enclaves for traditional family units. 492
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 40 3 Even
more significant than the result, however, is the creative approach
adopted by the court in analyzing the equal protection issues raised.
The usual equal protection double standard had been presented to the
court but, following the more and more noticeable striving of the
Supreme Court for a middle ground, Judge Mansfield, writing the opinion
of the court,
rejected the two-tiered framework as outmoded and overly
94
rigid. 4
The court articulated a new set of standards and a new test to be
used in what it viewed as a more equitable and flexible approach.
Factors relevant to the decision include evidence as to the nature of
the unequal classification under attack, the nature of the rights adversely affected, and the governmental interests urged in support of the
classification. 495 The classification must be shown to have a substantial
relationship to a lawful objective. Additionally, the classification must
488 Id. at 25.
489 Id. at 30, 38.
490 Id. at 24-25, 27.
491
492

Id. at 35.
A one-family dwelling zoning district.. needs no apologia. Such zoning
is simply another of countless statutes of bounty and protection with which
the states, and all of them, and the Federal government alike aggressively

surround the traditional family ....
Id. at 31.
493 Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1973),
prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1973) (No. 73-191).
494 Id. at 814.

495 Id.
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not be void for other reasons such as overbreadth or vagueness.4 °o Mansfield explained that this new test looks more to the effect of a law than
497
to hypothetical justifications.
In the case at bar, the court found that the effect of the challenged
ordinance was to exclude unrelated groups from the community, with no
rational basis. The rights claimed by plaintiff were described as "important" and "certainly more personal and basic than those of commerdal interests." Mansfield gave short shrift to the justification for
infringing these rights that the district court had found persuasive.
Creating enclaves for traditional families was held not to be a proper
zoning objective, because fostering traditional families was declared to
be irrelevant to the public health, safety and welfare.4°8 As to the more
conventional state interests purportedly served, the court felt constrained to adhere to the district court's observation that "Such a restricted zoning district might well be all but impossible to justify if it
had to be strictly justified by its service of... familiar zoning objectives."49 9 Further, Mansfield stated that even if the ordinance could be
held to bear some relationship to these goals, the classification could
still be found overbroad. 0 Less onerous alternatives would have been
required: if the community's worry was rent inflation, a rent control law
would be a more appropriate solution; if the worry was increased demand for parking, a regulation of the number of cars allowed per
dwelling could solve the problem more directly.
The Second Circuit did not give much credence to the theory that
no right had been abridged because the plaintiffs could have gone elsewhere. The fact that plaintiff students might have lived in the university dormitory, or in another community, was held to be no defense to
the charge that the ordinance was not substantially related to legitimate
governmental ends. 1
As Judge Mansfield pointed out, this new approach allows judicial
intervention in cases which could not have been seriously scrutinized
under the outmoded "new" equal protection, which reached only the
most egregious inequities. 02 A similar approach could be adopted in
privacy challenges brought in a substantive due process context as well.
The two-tiered structure created by Roe v. Wade is likely to be as
stultifying as the equal protection dichotomy. The Second Circuit had
little trouble recognizing the right to live in a group as a phase of personal liberty, and admitted relief at not having to confront the question
of whether or not that right is a fundamental right of privacyP0 3 In
496 Id. at 814-15, 817.
497 Id. at 815.
498 Id. at 815.

499 Id. at 816.
500 Id. at 817.

5o1 Id. at 817-1g. The court recognized the problems inherent in the theory
that no right has been abridged as long as there is somewhere else a group may
live. Id.
502 Id. at 815.
503 Id. at 814.
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this way, obviating the necessity for a strict test could form a basis for
greater protection of personal liberty.
While the Second Circuit's renovated equal protection model is
helpful in protecting rights, it is not a sine qua non. Rights may still
be found to be fundamental, in which case the compelling state interest
test would still be applicable. Viewing the same right to live in groups
which was the center of the Belle Terre controversy, the three-judge
court in Moreno v. Department of Agriculture50 4 made exactly the decision the Second Circuit eschewed: the right to live in a group is protected by a fundamental right of privacy and freedom of association.
The case involved a challenge to an amendment of the Federal Food
Stamp Act605 which limited distribution of food stamps to households
comprised of related persons506 Since the regulation was nationwide,
the Palo Alto rationale was unavailing-plaintiffs could not go elsewhere, so the right had clearly been abridged. In concluding that the
classification denied equal protection, the court relied on the two-tiered
equal protection model.U0 7 Since the right abridged was found to be
guaranteed by the Constitution, the Government had to demonstrate a
compelling interest in the classification. The court concluded that the
classification was not even distantly related to any purpose of the Food
Stamp Act, and that the only conceivable governmental interest was
an attempt to regulate morality by discouraging unconventional living
styles 08 Judge McGowan, writing for a unanimous court, held that
even if Congress might sometimes have the power to legislate in the
name of morality, it could not do so where the right of privacy and free,
dor of association in the home was involved. The decision thus seems
to follow the idea gleaned from Stanley v. Georgia that certain activities
within the home are constitutionally protected, and that the government's interest in fostering morality per se is not a sufficient justification
for intruding into the conduct of an individual's home life. On the whole,
however, the opinion does seem to endorse a right of autonomy. The
greatest deficiency of the Moreno opinion is its almost total lack of
explanation or justification for the conclusion that the right alleged was
a fundamental right of privacy. 09 Explicit standards are needed to test
other purported rights, and also to prevent such adventurous decisions
from seeming groundless.
504

345 F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court), aff'd, 413 U.S. 528

(1973).

505 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1971).

506 7 C.F.R. §§ 270.2(jj), 271.3(a) (1971). The amendment was clearly almea
at hippie communes and student groups. See 116 Cong. Rec. 43,325-27, 44,430-32
(1970).
6o7 345 F. Supp. at 314.
508 Id.

509 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the regulation was not rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective and thus did not reach the privacy
issue. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). Only Justice Douglas was willing to declare that a

fundamental constitutional right-freedom of association-was involved. Id. at
541-45 (concurring opinion).
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3. The Right to Raise and Educate Children
Also included in Roe v. Wade's general sketch of the zone of privacy 510 were rights derived from Meyer v. Nebraska3l ' and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters:5 12 the right to raise and educate one's children. These
parental rights should apply to traditional mothers and fathers as well
as to parents who have chosen nontraditional lifestyles.
While these rights have not been a great source of contention
recently, they have played a role in several contexts. School parietal
rules, for example, involve state incursion upon two distinct ranges of
privacy interests. Like the zoning ordinances and food stamp regulation
discussed above, parietals implicate government in the individual's
choice of where and with whom to live. Moreover, since the individuals
concerned are frequently minors, the issue of parental rights to supervise children's education is also raised.
One recent decision, reminiscent of Princev. Massachusetts,13 held
that the state's interest in children's education may outweigh a parent's
right. In Pratz v. Louisiana Polytechnic Institute,11 4 plaintiff students
and parents challenged the school's parietal regulation which required
all students, except married students living with their spouses, to live
and eat in university facilities. The court was not sympathetic to the
students' claim that the regulation infringed their right of privacy and
freedom of association5 15 To the parents' claim of a right to decide
where their children should live, the court responded that when students
were away from home and not living with their families, "the family
must defer to the wisdom of the educators at the particular institution
the child is attending."' 5 6 It is not clear whether the court meant to
imply that the parents' rights had not been abridged, or that the state's
justifications for abridging the parents' rights were sufficient. Judge
Ainsworth, dissenting, thought that the right of privacy and freedom of
association of those students over 21, and the rights of the parents of
those students under 21, had been unjustifiably abridged. 17 He suggested that the decision as to whether to live on or off campus should
belong to the student or the parent, not to the state.'1 8
In a subsequent challenge to a similar regulation, Cooper v. Nix r lo
the same court adopted at least part of Ainsworth's conclusion. A
Southeastern Louisiana University regulation required students to live
in dormitories, but exempted students over 23. Judge Dawkins, the
53- 410 U.S. at 152-53.
511 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
512 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
513 321 U.S. 158 (1944) ; see note 194 supra.
514 316 F. Supp. 872 (Wi). La. 1970) (three-judge court), appeal dismissed,
401 U.S. 951, aff'd, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971).
515 Id. at 884, 886.
516 Id. at 885.
517 Id. at 888.
518 Id. at 889.
519 343 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D. La. 1972).
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author of the opinion in Pratz, found this to be a denial of equal protection, and not reasonably related to the state's alleged interest in its
"living and learning" program. Distinguishing Pratz on the ground that
none of the plaintiffs there had been over 21, he concluded that the
20
regulation was unreasonable as applied to persons of legal majority,5"
but did not relent in his determination that the rights of students under
21 and of their parents had not been contravened. Dawkins even suggested that the right of persons of legal majority to choose their own
places of residence might be a fundamental right and thus subject to
21
the compelling state interest test, but did not need to reach that issue.6
The parent's right to control children's education has also been
asserted in challenges to school sex education programs, 2 2 Whether the
sex education was compulsory or whether the parents could have their
children excused was often the determinative factor in the court's decision as to whether a constitutional right was abridged.523 In another
case, parents and the Unitarian Church claimed the right to run a sex
education program. 24 The court found that the parents bad a constitutional right to shape their children's education,625 and thus enjoined the
defendant district attorney from prosecuting the parents and the church
under a state obscenity law.
D. Home and Autonomy
After Roe's implicit rejection of the notion that privacy rights are
limited to the marital association, the nature of Griswold privacy can
be separated into two overlapping components: a right to engage in
certain activities within the confines of one's home; and a right to personal liberty, in particular to autonomous decisionmaking. Issues arising
from state interference with family planning decisions, consensual sexual
conduct and the activities of nonconventional family groupings may be
seen as having a fairly direct and obvious connection with both strands
of Griswold.
On the other hand, in some lower court cases, individuals attempting to anchor an interest to the Constitution through Griswold tended
to rely primarily on one strand or the other of the decision. Thus, parties
who saw Griswold as mainly concerned with the home or another private
place have argued that Griswold augments the fourth amendment5 26 or
52o Id. at 1110-11.
521 Id. at 1110.
522 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 289 A.2d
914 (1971).
523 See Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Hawaii 436, 440, 478 P.2d 314, 317 (1970).
524 Unitarian Church W. v. McConnell, 337 F. Supp. 1252 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
aff'd, 474 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1973).
525 Id. at 1258.
526 See United States v. Baker, 262 F. Supp. 657, 666 (D.D.C. 1966); United
States v. Kahn, 251 F. Supp. 702, 707 (S.D.N.Y.), aftd, 366 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 948 (1966) ; State v. Schaffel, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 234, 246, 229
A.2d 552, 561 (1966). See also State v. Kabayama, 94 N.J. Super. 78, 82, 226 A.2d
760, 763, aff'd, 98 N.J. Super. 85, 236 A.2d 164 (1967), aff'd per curiam, 52 N.J. 507,
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reinforces the right to peace and quiet recognized in Breard v. City of
Alexandria,52 7 which acts as a counterpoise to freedom of speech.2
Parties viewing Griswold as primarily concerned with autonomy or
liberty in a broad sense raised a variety of claims that bore no relation
to the home-seclusion-repose aspect of the case. Generally, these litigants protested against some sort of governmental restraint on their
physical activities. For example, arguments based on Griswold were
made by draftees, 529 drivers of motorcycles who did not want to wear
helmets- 30 and persons who wanted to "be present" at a cockfightZ0l
One plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that a no fault insurance law deprived him of the opportunity to have his constitutional right to "per32
sonal security and bodily integrity" protected by negligence law.
Another argued that state unfair trade practice statutes prohibiting certain business structures violated his constitutional right to invest his
money as he pleased, a claim the court termed "breathtakingly imaginative" before turning it down. 33 This case represents the only attempt
to use Griswold to establish constitutional protection for Lochner-type
34
economic rights.
In few of these miscellaneous cases was a privacy claim successfully
advanced. In each instance, some element was missing, although the
courts could not always determine what that element was. One is drawn
to the conclusion that a persuasive privacy argument must derive some
content from both of the themes of Griswold. Nevertheless, there are
interests that rely predominantly on one theme or the other, which seem
to compel attention. This Note will now consider two such interests, the
"right" to smoke marijuana in one's home and the "right" to wear one's
hair as one pleases.
1. Marijuana
The right to possess and use marijuana in one's home is not in
itself comparable to the rights protected in some privacy decisions. It
246 A.2d 714 (1968); In re Kauffman, 215 Pa. Super. 110, 112, 257 A.2d 313, 314
(1969) (per curiam).
527 341 US. 622 (1951).
528 See People v. Doorley, 338 F. Supp. 574, 577 (D.R.I.), rev'd on other
grounds, 468 F.2d 1143 (1st Cir. 1972); Dlietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925,
929 (C.D. CaL 1968), aff'd, 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
529 See, e.g., United States v. Dorris, 319 F. Supp. 1306, 1307 (W.D.Pa. 1970);
United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618, 619-20 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Katz v. United
States, 287 F. Supp. 29,32-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
530 See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. State Police, 11 Mich. App. 351,
359, 158 N.W.2d 72, 76 (1968); State v. Fetterly, 254 Ore. 47, 50, 456 P.2d 996,
999 (1969) ; Note, Motorcycle Helmets and the Constitutionality of Self-Protective
Legislation, 30 Ohio St. L.J. 35S, 361-63 (1969).
531 See State v. Abellano, 50 Hawaii 384, 386-96, 441 P.2d 333, 335-40 (196S)
(concurring opinion).
532 See Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass. 1971).
533 See HM Distrib. of Milwaukee, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 55
Wis. 2d 261, 272, 198 N.W.2d 598, 604 (1972).
534 See note 70 supra.
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does not affect one's life as fundamentally as the decision to bear a
child. Furthermore, the ability to get high viewed as a primary right
can scarcely be said to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 68
or "rooted in our collective conscience." Nevertheless, it resembles protected privacy rights in several particulars.
If an individual uses marijuana in his own home, his activity closely
resembles the conduct protected in Stanley v. Georgia.530 Although he
cannot be said to be informing himself in the same way that a viewer
of obscenity informs himself, the Supreme Court has asserted that
Stanley had nothing to do with the first amendment.637 Stanley must
now be viewed as a supplement to the fourth amendment, giving added
protection to the values of seclusion and repose centered about the home.
Like a viewer of obscenity, a marijuana smoker has no right of access
to the object of his indulgence through public channels. Nevertheless,
if Stanley now protects a limited right to engage legally in one's home
in conduct that would be illegal if performed elsewhere,3 88 the right to
use marijuana would be one candidate for protection.r 39 If an individual
can write salacious books in his attic and read them in his living room, 040
perhaps he can grow marijuana in his window box and smoke it in his
den.
This conclusion is made more persuasive because of other similarities to privacy rights. While marijuana use does not seem on its face
to be connected to notions of family planning and home life, it is intimately connected-albeit in a minor way-with the ability to set one's
own lifestyle. Furthermore, when a "consenting adult" uses marijuana
535 At least one court has distinguished the issue of marijuana use from that
of privacy on these grounds. See Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 195, 243
N.E.2d 898, 903-04 (1969).
536

394 U.S. 557 (1969).

See United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123,
126 (1973) ; text accompanying note 148 supra.
538 See text accompanying notes 148-59 supra.
589 In Stanley, the Court stated that its decision was not to be taken as a
limitation on the state's ability to make possession of "narcotics, firearms, or
stolen goods" a crime. 394 U.S. at 568 n.l (1969). A few courts have relied on
this footnote to distinguish away claims that marijuana possession isprotected
under Stanley. E.g., United States v. Drotar, 416 F.2d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1969).
However, the classification of marijuana as a "narcotic" is questionable. The federal
government classifies marijuana and narcotics separately. Controlled Substances Act
of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(15)-(16) (1970). Only two states continue to classify
marijuana as a narcotic. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 48-5-1 (14) (a) (1963); R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 21-28-2(15) (1968); see National Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws, The Criminal Penalties Under the Current Marijuana Laws 2-3
(1973). Furthermore, the President's National Commission on Marihuana and
Drug Use (the National Commission) recently reported its findings that the drug
had none of the harmful properties of narcotic drugs. National Commission on
Marihuana and Drug Abuse, Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding 104-10
(New Am. Lib. ed. 1972) [hereinafter Marihuana Comm'n Rep.]. This would
suggest that the reasons for controlling marijuana use should differ from the
reasons for controlling narcotics.
540 See United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 382
(1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
537
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only to alter his own consciousness and does not engage in antisocial
behavior, he indulges in autonomous conduct that does not affect others.
In such a situation, attention should at least be paid to the state's
interest in interfering with his conduct, to see if it is rationally related
in fact to a valid public purpose. 4 '
To date, detailed inquiry into the state's interest has not been
made in the courts. The presumption of constitutionality given to state
enactments has enabled courts to avoid consideration of the underlying
rationality of legislative restrictions on marijuana use."- Courts have
held that the legislature could validly assume that these restrictions
promote public safety by preventing antisocial conduct 543 and protect
public health by preventing the actor from harming himself either directy5 or indirectly by predisposing himself to use of more dangerous
drugs . 5 No factual support for these contentions has been asked of
the state and factual refutation by defendants has been unavailing.W0
In an attempt to overcome this presumption, defendants have argued unsuccessfully that marijuana legislation violates the first amendment right of free exercise of religionZ' 7 and the eighth amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.548 They have also argued
that the classification of marijuana as a narcotic is irrational and violates
the equal protection dause. 549 Privacy claims have been equally un541 See text accompanying and following notes 219-20 supra.
542 Bonnie & Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge:
An Inquiry Into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 Va. L.
Rev. 971, 1126-27 (1970).
543 See, e.g., People v. Aguiar, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 602-03, 65 Cal. Rptr.
171, 174-75, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 970 (1968); Commonwealth v. Lels, 355 Mass.
189, 193-95, 243 N.E.2d 898, 902-03 (1969); Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note
542, at 1131-32.
544 See, e.g., People v. Agular, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 602-03, 65 Cal. Rptr.
171, 174-75, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 970 (1968) ; Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass.
189, 193-94, 243 N.E.2d 898, 902-03 (1969).
545 See, e.g., People v. Aguiar, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 602-03, 65 Cal. Rptr.
171, 174-75, cert. denied, 393 US. 970 (1968); Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass.
189, 193-94, 243 N.E.2d 898, 902-03 (1969).
546 See, e.g., United States v. Drotar, 416 F.2d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1969),
vacated on other grounds, 402 US. 939 (1970) ; People v. Agular, 257 Cal. App. 2d
597, 602-03, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174-75, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 970 (1968) ; Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 193-94, 243 N.E.2d 898, 902-03 (1969).
54T E.g., United States v. Ruch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968); Gaskin v.
Stater-Tenn.--, 490 S.W.2d 521, 523-24 (1973), appeal dismissed, 94 S. Ct. 221
(1973); Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 542, at 1142-4S. Commentators have
suggested that a first amendment claim based on symbolic self-expression might also
be raised by marijuana users. Weiss & Wimzer, Pot, Prayer, Politics and Privacy:
The Right to Cut Your Own Throat in Your Own Way, 54 Ia. L. Rev. 709, 718-23
(1969); Note, The California Marijuana Possession Statute, 19 IHastings L. J. 758,
770 (1968) [hereinafter Note, Marijuana Possession].
548 E.g., United States v. Drotar, 416 F.2d 914, 915-17 (5th Cir, 1969),
vacated on other grounds, 402 U.S. 939 (1970); United States v. Ward, 387 F2d
843, 845 (8th Cir. 1967); Gaskin v. State,-Tenn.-, 490 S.W.2d 521, 524 (1973),
appeal dismissed, 94 S. CL. 221 (1973); Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 542, at
1133-40.
549 E.g., English v. Virginia Probation & Parole Bd., 481 F2d 188, 191-92
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availing. Courts generally treat such arguments in a paragraph or less,
distinguishing Griswold, for example, as concerned with "regulation of
birth control activities," a "personal" rather than a "public health"
matter.5 50

Only one court has come close to giving the issue thoughtful treatment. In State v. Kantner,"1' the Hawaii Supreme Court held that a
legislative classification of marijuana as a "narcotic" was rational and
did not violate equal protection standards.r 52 Two justices, however,
wrote lengthy opinions which implied that a privacy claim might have
been more successful. Justice Abe asserted that a person does have a
right to smoke marijuana, derived from the "fundamental right of

liberty to make a fool of himself." Accepting the pure autonomy theory,
he conceded that marijuana might be harmful to the user but concluded
that the state could not prohibit its use without showing harm to the
general publicY53 Justice Levinson maintained that enjoyment of marijuana was an aspect of the "right to be let alone," 554 protected under
both federal and state constitutions. 55 The right partook of both
autonomy and locus-of-privacy concepts, 56 He did not directly challenge the state's interest in the health of its citizens, but stated that,
under prior case law, such an interest had to be both compelling and
demonstrated.5 7There had been no showing of actual harm to the user
or to societyP
The autonomy rationale used by two judges in Kantner presents
(4th Cir. 1973) ; Scott v. United States, 395 F.2d 619, 620 (D.C. Cir.), (per curiam),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 986 (1968); Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 542, 1128-33.
55o State ex. reL Scott v. Conaty,-W.Va. -, 187 S.E.2d 119, 123 (1972);
see People v. Aguiar, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 605, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171, 176, cert. denied,
393 U.S. 970 (1968); Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 195, 243 N.E.2d 898,
903-04 (1969) ; Gaskin v. State,-Tenn. -, 490 S.W.2d 521, 524 (1973), appeal dismissed, 94 S. Ct. 221 (1973); Miller v. State, 458 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex. Crim. App.
1970).
551 53 Hawaii 327, 493 P.2d 306, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
552 Id. at 330-33, 493 P.2d at 303-10. The court distinguished Griswold by
relying on Justice Douglas' penumbral theory. Since use of marijuana was not
"peripheral" in the sense of being "essential" to the exercise of an enumerated right,
it was not protected. The court did not explain to what enumerated right the use
of contraceptives had been essential.
553 Id. at 336-39, 493 P.2d at 312-13 (concurring opinion). Abe concurred
because, in his view, appellants had not raised the issue correctly on appeal. For a
point of view similar to Justice Abe's, see People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 131-34,
194 N.W.2d 878, 895-96 (1972) (Kavanagh, J., concurring).
554 53 Hawaii at 340, 493 P.2d at 313 (dissenting opinion). In quoting
Brandeis' phrase, Levinson emphasized the words "beliefs," "thoughts," "emotions"
and "sensations." He later suggested that use of marijuana affected all but the first.
Id. at 342, 493 P.2d at 315.
555 Id. at 339-47, 493 P.2d at 313-17. Hawaii amended its constitution in 1968
to include an express right to privacy. Hawaii Const. art I, § 5; see 53 Hawaii at
341 n.4, 493 P.2d at 314 n.4.
556 Levinson emphasized personal autonomy, 53 Hawaii at 340, 342, 493 P.2d
at 313-14, 315, but also separated "private" and "public" conduct, id. at 346-47,
493 P.2d at 317.
557 Id. at 343-4S, 493 P.2d at 315-16.
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one focal point for analysis. When combined with Statley and Paris
Adult Theatre, the argument becomes quite a bit stronger. If one accepts the notion expressed in those cases that activity conducted in the
home is likely to be constitutionally protected for that reason alone,5 8
one can at least demand that the state have a perceptible and demonstrable interest before intruding upon that private sphere. To measure
the individual right against the state interest in a marijuana case, a
court could use either of two tests. Since the privacy of the home has
been termed "fundamental,"55 9 the state may have to demonstrate a
compelling interest before it can enter the home to prevent marijuana
use. 609 But even if a court does not deem the right so basic, this type
of case might compel somewhat closer judicial scrutiny of legislative
means and goals than that used in traditional rational basis analysis.
The Supreme Court has used an intermediate means-oriented standard
in analyzing equal protection claims involving important personal interests.Y6 ' It may well be proper for courts to use an intermediate standard in due process litigation when personal liberties are at stake. Since
a personal liberty of some dimension is involved in marijuana cases,
such an analysis should be employed to determine whether articulated,
permissible state goals are clearly furthered by laws prohibiting private
possession of marijuana.
To be permissible, the state interest must be more substantial than
prevention of activity that would be illegal if performed elsewhere. One
has no right to view obscenity in a theatre because of a perceived danger
to the public. One does have this right in one's home because the danger
to the public is reduced, the danger to the individual is not substantial,
and the values associated with the seclusion of the home merit exclusion
of the police absent such dangers. Similarly, a state interest in invading
the home to prevent use of marijuana must be motivated by some perceptible need to protect the public at large, or to protect the individual
user against a genuine threat to his health and welfare.
If a means-related test is employed, those challenging marijuana
laws would be allowed to show5 that legislative goals are not always
furthered by restrictive laws. 3 For example, in terms of public safety,
they could challenge the dubious contention that marijuana use causes
antisocial behavior.5" In terms of public health, advocates of marijuana
See text accompanying notes 148-59 supra.
559 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US. 557, 564 (1969) ('For also fundamental is the
right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental
558

intrusions into one's privacy.').

560 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
561 See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v.

Baird, 405 US. 438 (1972) ; Reed v. Reed, 404 US. 71 (1971) ; Gunther, supra note
178.

562 If a compelling state interest test is used, the state would bear the burden

of proving that its laws in fact promote definite and important state interests. See

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156 (1973).
563 See Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 542, at 1149-53.
564 The report of the National Commission states that

"the weight of the
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use should be allowed to demonstrate that marijuana is not addictive
and does not produce a tendency to use more dangerous, addictive
drugs.565 Such a showing would tend to prove that marijuana users are
unlikely to require public assistance or become a burden on society. 00
In terms of individual health, marijuana users should be allowed to show
that marijuana is not harmful to the individual. 0 7 Although a person
may not have a privacy right to control of his body,r0 8 cases have shown
that he does have a protectable interest in his physical integrity.009 The
state may interfere with his use of his body in some circumstances to
promote viable public goals such as prevention of epidemics 700 and of
crime. ' When the state's interest is not focused on the health or safety
of the public at large, but on the health of a single individual, that
individual's interest should at least be such that the state must show a
certain and perceptible impairment derived from his conduct. 7 2
There are a few signs that courts may be willing in the future to recognize a privacy right in marijuana cases. In one recent decision, police
evidence is that marihuana does not cause violent or aggressive behavior; If anything, marihuana generally serves to inhibit the expression of such behavior."
Marihuana Comm'n Rep., supra note 539, at 91; see id. at 88-94. See also Note,
Marijuana Possession, supra note 547, at 776-78.
565 The National Commission found that marijuana was not addictive and
that use did not lead inevitably to experimentation with narcotics. Marihuana
Comm'n Rep., supra note 539, at 108-10.
566 The National Commission found that extensive use of marijuana may causo
psychological dependence in a small minority-perhaps 2%-of those who use It,
so that they cease to function as actively contributing members of society. Id. at 75,
79-81, 107-13, 184-86. The Commission found that this aspect of marijuana use
could pose a public health problem if distribution were legalized, although it does
not at present. Id. at 110-13, 184-86. The Commission thus proposed decriminalization of private possession, but continued prohibition of distribution. Id. at 188-209.
In describing the effects of psychological dependence, the Commission stressed loss
of motivation and lack of interest in job and social interaction, id. at 75, 107-03,
but it did not state whether heavy users become dependent on public economic or
health assistance. If heavy use does not result in such dependence, the state may not
have the right to prevent such use. The question would be whether society can
insist that "dropping out"--whether because of drug use or simple lack of interestis not a permissible form of behavior.
567 Aside from its conclusion that marijuana use was not addictive and did
not lead to experimentation with narcotics, the National Commission found that
marijuana use had little if any adverse effect on bodily processes and did not produce
genetic defects. Id. at 69-70, 73-77, 104-06. There was some evidence of minor
adverse psychological effect on predisposed individuals. Id. at 78-79, 105-07.
568 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
569 E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952); Union Pac, R.R.
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
57o See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-30 (1905).
571 See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435-37 (1957).
572 Some commentators have argued a personal "right to be self-destructive."
Weiss & Wizner, supra note 547, at 723-32. This Note does not adopt this extreme
position, but rather recognizes a valid state interest in the physical health of its
citizens. H1owever, the state should not be able to limit personal activity without
showing a basis in fact for its belief that certain conduct will be harmful to a
person's health. Such an interest was demonstrated, for example, in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 149-50 (1973).
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had entered a family home with a valid search warrant and had discovered the defendant's teenaged children smoking marijuana. The New
York Court of Appeals narrowly construed a statute prohibiting maintaining a place where drugs are unlawfully used, finding the defendant
innocent. 573 Although the court did not use a privacy rationale, it was
clearly concerned with the values underlying the concept of privacy of
the home.5 74 In two other recent cases, defendants charged with possession and sale of large quantities of marijuana have claimed that the
statutes under which they were charged were overbroad because they
failed to distinguish possession for private use from possession for commercial distribution. Rather than dismissing such arguments out of hand,
the courts found that although there might be a right to private possession, the defendants could not raise it since they were clearly commercial
distributors. 575 This issue will soon be raised by the proper parties:
private users have recently filed suit in the District of Columbia for
a declaratory judgment that federal laws making the private possession
and use of marijuana illegal are unconstitutional5 70
If private users succeed in persuading a court that a privacy claim
is viable and that state interests must be carefully scrutinized, some of
the underlying issues involved in the question of marijuana use may
finally be aired. As with many areas of privacy litigation, the underlying
purpose of state restrictions on marijuana use may have more to do with
controlling morality and discouraging nonconventional lifestyles than
with public health or safety. To some extent, marijuana laws may be
seen as an attempt by an established, older majority to impose lifestyle
restrictions on a sizable, younger minority. " The states have chosen
the most onerous means possible to implement these goals by imposing
harsh criminal penalties 578 on those who engage in conduct that is not
noticeably damaging to society at large. It may be that the ultimate
solution, as proposed by the National Commission on Mfarihuana and
Drug Abuse, is to decriminalize private possession and use, but also to
People v. Fiedler, 31 N.Y.2d 176, 286 NM2d 878, 335 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1972).
The court stated: "It was never contemplated that criminal taint would
attach to a family home should members of the family on one occasion smoke
marijuana or hashish there?' Id. at 180, 286 N.E.2d at 879, 339 N.Y.S2d at 379.
575 United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. C.
165 (1973); United States v. Maiden, 355 F. Supp. 743, 746-47 (D. Conn. 1973).
576 NORML v. Wilson, Civil Action No. 1897-73 (D.D.C.,filed Oct. 10, 1973).
577 The National Commission noted this aspect of the marijuana problem. Sec
Marihuana Comm'n Rep., supra note 539, at 10-11, 114-17. At least 24 million
Americans, about half of them between 16 and 25 years of age have used marijuana
573

574

at least once. Id. at 38-39. Of all those arrested for possession alone (935 of all

arrests), 88% are under 26 years old and 587 are under 21. Id. at 138-39.
578 The penalties for possession by first offenders are generally less than one
year and might not be considered harsh. See, e.g., Ala. Code it. 22, § 258(47) (a)
(Supp. 1971). Penalties for second offenders can be substantial. See, eg., id. (two
to 15 years); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1002(B) (Supp. 1973) (two to 20 years);
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 48-5-2 (1963), 48-5-20(2)(b) (Supp. 1971) (five to 20
years); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 21-28-31 (Supp. 1972) (zero to 20 years).
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attempt to control distribution of the drug.679 This course resembles the

remedy proposed by the Supreme Court for regulation of obscenity. 80
As in the case of obscenity, this solution protects the privacy of the
home but leaves broader issues unsettled. The approach is ultimately
based on a moral judgment about acceptable behavior and creates an
out-group which must employ illegal methods to obtain the means by
which to indulge in legal activity. Alternatively, a society that allows its
citizens some freedom to pursue sensual happiness with minor harm to
themselves might choose a regulatory scheme similar to that used for
control of alcohol. 581 The preferable solution is no doubt legislative and
there are some signs that reform is coming.582 But until that time, closer
judicial scrutiny of existing laws might at least afford some protection
to what many agree is a protectable interest: the right of an individual,
in the privacy of his home, to indulge in conduct that is harmful, if at
all, only to himself.s3
2. Hair

One of the most extensively litigated issues of the past few years
has concerned the state's power to restrict the ability of an individual to
determine the length of his hair.58 4 The issue has arisen in several contexts, notably in public employment, r8 5 in the military,080 in prisons,587
and in public high schools 5 s and colleges. 9 Opinions about the im579 Marihuana Coma'n Rep., supra note 539, at 190-202. The National Commission based its recommendation in part on the conclusion that marijuana might
become a public health problem if use were encouraged by legalization of distribution. See note 566 supra.
580 See text accompanying notes 141-59 supra.
581 Colorado recently considered a bill that would legalize sale of marijuana
through liquor outlets. A tax on the sale would provide revenue for the state's old
age pension fund. The Leaflet, July-Sept. 1973, at 5-6 (publication of the National
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws).
582 Oregon has recently decriminalized private possession and use of marijuana;
such conduct is now a violation, subject to a $100 fine. Id. at 1-2. The American
Bar Association recently recommended decriminalization of marijuana possession.
13 Crim. L. Rptr. 2436-38 (Aug. 15, 1973). The National Commission has recommended decriminalization of possession in the home and of less than one ounce in
public. Casual, private, nonprofit transfers would be noncriminal, but commercial
distribution would remain prohibited. Marihuana Comm'n Rep., supra note 539, at
190-202. Two members of the Commission, Senators Javits and Hughes, have
criticized the intricacy of some of the recommendations. See 118 Cong. Rec. S 4927
(daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972) (appendix to remarks of Senator Javits).
583 Although the National Commission did not endorse the view that no
private behavior can be criminalized, it did find that criminalization of private
possession of marijuana is "constitutionally suspect." Marihuana Commn Rep.,
supra note 539, at 175-79.
584 Over 100 hair length opinions have been written by federal and state court
judges.
585 E.g., Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1973).
580 E.g., Agrati v. Laird, 440 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1971).
587 E.g., Smith v. Sampson, 349 F. Supp. 268 (D.N.H. 1972).
588 E.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
589 E.g., Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659 (Sth Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
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portance of the issue have been mixed. It has aroused federal judges
to essays on liberty,590 outrage at being forced to consider such triviality,119 attempts at humor,592 opulent prose,133 and references to Albert
Einstein,5 94 George I1 95 and the Boston Bruins.590 It is not difficult to
recognize why the matter has been so controversial. Although not of
world-shaking importance in any particular instance, the issue does present in microcosmic version some venerable human themes: the relationship of citizen to state; the tension between order and liberty; the
conflict between majority and minority.
The right to wear one's hair as one pleases can best be considered
as an aspect of personal liberty analogous to a privacy right. It derives
little or no content from the notion of the home as a sphere of intimate
activity. A person does not value the seclusion of his home because it
will enable him to wear his hair long. If anything, because of an element of self-expression, hair style is more important to the individual
as he moves about in public. The right bears some similarity to the right
of personal autonomy recognized in Roe v. Wade. In part, the connection between hair length and abortion cases rests on the notion present
in each of control over one's body. Although the Supreme Court played
down this aspect in Roe, at least in terms of privacy5 97 there is no
doubt that an individual feels a strong and legitimate interest in his
person and that the state must have good reason to interfere with it.59 s
But the connection with Roe goes beyond the element of physical

integrity.
On the one hand, the decision to cut or grow one's hair is not so
fundamental as the decision to bear or not to bear a child. It does not
have a major impact on one's life. The state's interference is temporary:
hair grows back. In terms of comparability to the enumerated rights of
the first eight amendments, the right does not loom large, aside from
its status as an aspect of daily personal liberty. It is loosely tied to the
peripheries of the first amendment, because of the element of expres590 See Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 619-21 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., dis-

senting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972) ; Watson v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 394,
399-402 (E.D. Tex. 1971), vacated per curiam, 458 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1972).
591 See Stevenson v. Wheeler County Ed. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97, 98 (S.D.
Ga. 1969), afPd, 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 9S7 (1970).
592 See Cordova v. Chonko 315 F. Supp. 953, 9S4 (NDl. Ohio 1970).
593 See Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist, 310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa.

1970).
594 See Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449, 451 (D. ass. 1969), affd,
424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
595 See Watson v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 394, 401 n. (ED. Tex. 1971),
vacated per curiam, 458 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1972).
696 See Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1971) (Aldrich, J.,
concurring).
597 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
598 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) ; Jacobson v. Mnssachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-27 (1905); Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,

251 (1891).
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sion.5 99 It also bears some relation to the fourth amendment right to
security of person and, more broadly viewed, to the idea of exclusion of
government from areas of individual concern which underlies the third,
fourth and fifth amendments. One's choice of hair style is connected in
a small way to the development of a separate personality, and to a sense
of personal freedom. In this regard, concern with hair style is similar
to-although less important than-the concern with personal beliefs,
thoughts, emotions and sensations that moved Justice Brandeis to posit
a "right to be let alone." 600
There is no doubt that any particular haircut is a minor event in
one's life; yet it derives its importance in this context from that very
fact. By concerning itself with the more trivial aspects of personal life,
particularly when they are important to the individual, government may
be more intrusive than when it concerns itself with life's major events.
Should the state tell its citizens what clothes to wear, when to have
dinner, with whom to talk, what games to play and what toothpaste to
use? Such actions would seem totalitarian. This is not to say that government may not interfere with lesser liberties when it has in fact a
definite and valid public reason for doing so. But too often the reasons
advanced by governmental units to justify hair length regulations are
vague and unsupportable. In the last analysis, they have less to do with
public health, safety and welfare than with attempts to control the life'
styles, personalities and attitudes of those subject to them.101
599 This element of self-expression has not been sufficient to give rise to first
amendment protection in the vast majority of cases, even when a court reacted
favorably to other claims. See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir.
1971); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (1st Cir. 1970); Miller v. Gillis,
315 F. Supp. 94, 99-100 (N.D. Ill. 1969). But see Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior
College, 305 F. Supp. 857, 862 (S.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd, 434 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1970).
An exception has occasionally been made when the student viewed his hair length
as a form of political expression. E.g., Church v. Board of Educ., 339 F. Supp. 538,
541-42 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
00 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting
opinion).
601 This attempt is part of a long tradition. On November 3, 1675, what must
be the first hair length regulation in an American jurisdiction was promulgated:

Whereas there is manifest pride openly appearing amongst us in that

long haire, like weomens hare, is wome by some men, either their oune or

others haire made into perewigs, and by some weomens wearing borders
of haire, and theire cutting, curling, &imodest laying out theire balre, which
practise doeth prevayle and increase, especially amongst the younger sort,-

This Court doeth declare against this ill custome as offenciue to them,
and diners sober christians amongst us, and therefore doe hereby exhort and
advise all persons to vse moderation in this respect; and further, doe im-

power all grand juries to present to the County Court such persons, whither
male or female, whom they shall judge to exceede in the premisses; and

the County Courts are hereby authorized to proceed against such delinquents either by admonition, fine, or correction, according to theire good
discretion.
5 Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England
59 (N. Shurtleff ed. 1854).

A few modem courts have found that the mere offensiveness to the established

majority of long hair worn by males is sufficient reason to justify regulation. See,
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Although many courts faced with hair length questions have considered Griswold relevant to their inquiry, the right to wear one's hair
as one pleases has been treated as a right of privacy by very few of
them.0 2 Some courts have held that hair length cases present no constitutional issue, presuming the state's regulation valid if it appears to
serve a valid purpose.6° 3 Privacy cases have been distinguished as involving questions of the marital relationship,60 4 or questions of private,
not public, behavior, 60 5 or simply as different.c°0
Nevertheless, many courts have found that the two rights are
similar in nature as aspects of personal liberty and are grounded in
similar constitutional roots.607 Some courts viewed the right broadly,
finding that hair length regulations invade a "sphere of personal liberty" G 8 or the right to develop one's personality, G° 9 or a similar, generally conceived right of autonomy 0 10 Others perceived a narrower right
e.g, Brownlee v. Bradley County Ed. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (ED. Tenn.
1970). The predominant view is that administrative revulsion does not justify the
regulation. See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 1971);
Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1265 (7th Cir. 1970); Richards v. Thurston, 424
F.2d 1281, 1286 (Ist Cir. 1970).
602 See Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (W.D. Pa. 1971) ; Back v.
Cothren, 316 F. Supp. 468, 471 (D. Neb. 1970); Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732,
736 (D.Me. 1970); Crossen v. Fats, 309 F. Supp. 114, 117-18 (D. Conn. 1970).
603 E.g., Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 259, 261 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 Fad
932, 939 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971) ; Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d
213, 217-19 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
604 See Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 261 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40S
U.S. 1032 (1972); Jeffers v. Yuba City jnified School Dist., 319 F.Supp. 368, 371
(ED. Cal. 1970); Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370, 1376-77 (S.D. Ind. 1969),
rev'd, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970).
605 See, e.g., Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 261 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1032 (1972); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 938
(9th Cr.), cert. denied, 404 US. 979 (1971); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281,
1283 (1st Cir. 1970). Courts that have held for the students, however, reason that
unlike other restrictions on public behavior, such as dress codes, hair length restrictions necessarily impinge on a student's private life outside of school. See, e.g.,
Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1264 (7th Cir. 1970); Martin v. Davison, 322 F.
Supp. 318, 325 (W.D.Pa. 1971); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706, 713 (D.Minn.
1969).
606 See RumIer v. Board of School Trustees, 327 F. Supp. 729, 742-43 (D.S.C.
1971) ; cf. Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F. Supp. 185, 187 (D.N.H. 1970) (dress code).
607 See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971); Crews v.
Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1970) ; Watson v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp.
394, 399 (E.D. Tex. 1971), vacated per curiam, 458 F.2d 1361 (Sth Cir. 1972);
Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 62 (MD. Ala. 1969), modified, 425 F.2d 201
(5th Cir. 1970) ; Finot v. Pasadena City Bd.of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 197-98,
58 Cal. Rptr. 520, 526-27 (1967) (beard).
608 Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284 (1st Cir. 1970); see Breen v.
Kahil, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970) ("an
ingredient of personal freedom").
609 See Black v. Cothren, 316 F. Supp. 468, 471 (D. Neb. 1970).
610 See Stull v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339, 344-45 (3d Cir. 1972) ; Seal v. Mertz,
338 F. Supp. 945, 951 (AD. Pa. 1972); Griffn v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 62 (M.D.
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to govern one's appearance 61 ' or to present oneself to the world in a
given manner 12 or to control one's body. 13 For some courts, this right
is as fundamental as enumerated constitutional rights;0 14 for others it is
of an inferior order, but protectable nonetheless, unless the state can
show that infringement serves a valid, public purposelU Griswold has
often been used by these courts to establish the principle that unenumerated personal liberties merit constitutional protection through the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. 16
By far the largest number of the hair length cases have involved
the hair and dress codes of public high schools. In this context, much
has depended on the court's perception of the student's personal interest.6 17 Courts that found no individual liberty implicated applied a
traditional rational basis test and held the state's power to regulate
public education sufficient to justify any nondiscriminatory regulation.618 Other courts applied a slightly more inquisitive version of the
Ala. 1969), modified, 425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970) ("the right to some breathing
space for the individual").
611 See Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971); Martin v.
Davison, 322 F. Supp. 318, 322 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
612 See Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1971) (concurring
opinion) ("the freedom to caricature one's own image"); Miller v. Gills, 315 F.
Supp. 94, 101 (NJ). I11. 1969); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 706 (W.D. Wis.),
aff'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
613 See Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1973); Crews v. Clones,
432 F.2d 1259, 1264 (7th Cir. 1970); Seal v. Mertz, 338 F. Supp. 945, 951 (M.D.
Pa. 1972) ; Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
614 See, e.g., Breen v. Kal, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), ccrt denied,
398 U.S. 937 (1970); Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 Supp. 411, 418 (b . Vt. 1970) (equal
protection analysis).
615 See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-86 (1st Cir. 1970);
Parker v. Fry, 323 F. Supp. 728, 732-33 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
616 See Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971); Parker v. Fry,
323 F. Supp. 728, 731-33 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 706
(W.D. Wis.), aff'd, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937
(1970).
617 The hair length issue is complicated in the school context because those
asserting a right are minors. A few courts have denied them a constitutional right
on that basis. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 579,
587 (W.D. Pa. 1970). Others have asserted that minors have the same rights as
adults. E.g., Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94, 99 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Some have found
that the minor's rights are merely less substantial than those of adults. E.g., Gore v.
Stanley, 320 F. Supp. 852, 855 (M.D. Pa. 1970), afi'd, 453 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1971);
Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953, 959-60 (N.I). Ohio 1970). Much of the
reasoning on this point was derived from Tinker v. Des Moines Indcp. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Courts favorable to the students cite passages
asserting that mere fear of disruption does not justify limiting constitutional rights.
See, e.g., Martin v. Davison, 322 F. Supp. 318, 323-24 (W.I). Pa. 1971). Courts
favorable to the administrators quote the Supreme Court's caveat that they were,
in Tinker, considering only speech and not hair length. See, e.g., Freeman v. Flake,
448 F.2d 258, 260 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972); King v.
Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
979 (1971).
618 E.g., King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 939 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 218
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same test, asking that the state advance some reasons for the rule. Generally, a suggestion that the rule might promote discipline or reduce
disruption has been sufficient. 19 On the other hand, courts acknowledging a right of constitutional dimension-whether "fundamental'
or of lesser proportion-have subjected the state's rationale to closer
scrutiny. In some instances, they have demanded that the state show
a compelling e20 or substantial 62 1 interest before infringing the student's
right. More interestingly, several courts, notably four of the five circuits that have upheld the student's interest, have applied an intermediate test somewhat less rigorous than a substantial interest test and
more rigorous than a rational basis test. 2 2 Recognizing both a personal
liberty and the state's interest in orderly education, these courts have
demanded that the state show that a student's long hair has caused
genuine interference with the educational process.0 2-3 Since this showing
can rarely be made, these courts have ended up with the same result
reached by courts employing a substantial interest test. The result has
been that courts recognizing a constitutional right of any dimension
have taken a significantly different approach to the weighing of interests involved from the approach taken by courts that do not recognize such an interest.
For example, courts finding for school boards have argued that a
certain amount of discipline is necessary if school officials are to maintain their authority and if students are to become good members of
society.624 Countering this rationale, student-oriented courts have maintained that it is bootstrapping to charge students with bad behavior
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). See also Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d
258, 261 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972).
619 See, e.g., Brownlee v. Bradley County Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360,
1366-67 (E.). Tenn. 1970); Stevenson v. Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 305 F.
Supp. 97, 101 (S.D. Ga. 1969), afi'd, 426 F.2d 1154 (Sth Cir. 1970); Ferrell v.
Dallas Indep. School Dist, 261 F. Supp. 545, 551-52 (N.D. Tex. 1966), affd, 392
F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
620 See Watson v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 394, 403 (E.D. Tet. 1971), rev'd
per curiam, 458 F.2d 1361 (Sth Cir. 1972).
621 See, e.g., Breen v. Kal, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 US. 937 (1970); Martin v. Davison, 322 F. Supp. 318, 325 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
622 The leading case applying such a test is Richards v. Thurston, 424 Fd
1281, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1970). For other opinions either following Richards or
adopting a similar test, see, e.g., Stull v. School Ed., 459 F.2d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1972) ;
Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 782-83 (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d
1059, 1075-76 (8th Cir. 1971); Parker v. Fry, 323 F. Supp. 728, 731 (E.D. Ark.
1971) ; Miller v. Gills, 315 F. Supp. 94, 100-01 (N.D. I1. 1969). The Second Circuit
has adopted a similar test in a case involving a hair code for a police department.
Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1129-30 (2d Cir. 1973).
623 See, e.g, Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v.
Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 1971).
624 See, e.g., Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 216-17 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 850 (1970); Freeman v. Flake, 320 F. Supp. 531, 534 (D. Utah 1970),
aff'd, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1032 (1972); Bronmlee
v. Bradley County Ed. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360, 1363 (E.D. Tenn. 1970) ; Ferrell
v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545, 5S1-52 (N.D. Tex. 1966), aild, 392
F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 896 (1968).
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for failure to follow a poor and arbitrary rule; that there is no value
in discipline or conformity for its own sake;G25 or that, in fact, such a
policy might lead to disrespect for more sensible rules.0 20 Courts that
have held for school boards have tended to accept arguments that hair
02 7
length indicates bad attitude or correlates with poor performance.
Courts on the other side have noted that proof of correlation is usually
inadequate 28 and that, in any case, cutting a recalcitrant
student's hair
020
would not make him cooperative and industrious.
The main controversy has centered around the idea that the state
has an interest in preventing significant disturbance that might interfere with the educational process.6 30 Several opinions have suggested
that the fact of disturbance has been the major difference between
courts finding for the authorities and those finding for the students.031
To some extent, this evaluation is borne out: 32 in the few instances
625 See, e.g., Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1038 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 937 (1970); Parker v. Fry, 323 F. Supp. 728, 738-39 (E.D. Ark. 1971);
Turley v. Adel Community School Dist., 322 F. Supp. 402, 409-06 (S.D. Iowa 1971);
Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 415, 419 (D. Vt. 1970).
026 See Dawson v. Hilsborough County School Bd., 322 F. Supp. 286, 301
(M.D. Fla.), aff'd per curiam, 445 F.2d 308 (Sth Cir. 1971).
627 See, e.g., Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified School Dist., 319 F. Supp. 368, 373
(ED. Cal. 1970); Bishop v. Colaw, 316 F. Supp. 445, 448 (ED. Mo. 1970), rev'd,
450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971) ; Pritchard v. Spring Branch Indep. School Dist., 308
F. Supp. 570, 573 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
028 See, e.g., Berryman v. Hein, 329 F. Supp. 616, 619 (D. Idaho 1971); Turley
v. Adel Community School Dist., 322 F. Supp. 402, 406-08 (S.D. Iowa 1971);
Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248, 253 (D. Neb. 1970).
029 See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1971) (Aldrich,
J., concurring); Black v. Cothren, 316 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D. Neb. 1970).
030 This point was derived from dictum in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969), in which the Supreme Court
stated that significant disturbance would justify restriction of students' first amendment rights, approving a distinction made by the Fifth Circuit in Burnside v. Byars,
363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
031 See, e.g., Stull v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1972) ; Turley v.
Adel Community School Dist., 322 F. Supp. 402, 405 (S.D. Iowa 1971); Martin v.
Davison, 322 F. Supp. 318,324 (Wi). Pa. 1971).
032 At least three circuits have handed down decisions on both sides of the
hair length controversy, and, in one instance, the split clearly rested on the Issue of
disruption. In its initial decision, the Third Circuit held that a student whose major
disruptive act was to dip his hair in his food and fling it over his shoulder at other
students would have to abide by a hair length regulation. Gere v. Stanley, 453 F.2d
205, 209-10 (3d Cir. 1971). The Third Circuit has recently held that hair length
regulations are unconstitutional without such a showing of actual disruption. Stull
v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972).
In 1971, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a lower court's denial of plaintiff's motion
for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a hair length regulation, noting
that the record was insufficient to allow them to dispose of the constitutional Issue.
Rumler v. Board of School Trustees, 437 F.2d 953, 954 (4th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam). The circuit has recently adopted the rule that hair length regulations arc
unconstitutional without a showing of disruption. Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779,
783 (4th Cir. 1972).
The Fifth Circuit has adopted a per se rule for high school cases, upholding the
power of the school board to issue hair length regulations. Karr v. Schmidt, 460
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involving actual physical violence or extreme verbal altercation, the
courts usually found that the school board was justified in enforcing a
hair length regulation to reduce dissension.0-1 However, since violence
was generally caused by the intemperate reaction of other students to
long-haired students, courts that recognized a constitutional right often
suggested that the authorities deal with those whose lack of tolerance
caused the problem.6 4 One judge implied that even if disruption were
caused by a long-haired student's aggressive conduct, the matter could
be dealt with by less restrictive disciplinary alternatives which would
not infringe his right to personal liberty. 635 More commonly, no actual
disturbance occurred. In such an instance, the disruption issue became
a matter of judicial inclination. Courts favoring the school boards were
willing to accept opinion testimony of principals and teachers that hair
length might cause fights and distractions. 630 Courts favoring students
were not satisfied by such proof and demanded a showing of actual
637
disturbances.
F2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972). Earlier, the circuit had upheld
decisions going both ways. Compare Ferrel v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d
697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968), with Dawson v. Hillsborough
County School Bd., 322 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Fla.), afl'd per curiam, 445 Fad 303
(5th Cir. 1971). The Fifth Circuit has adopted a different rule for college students,
affirming their right to fashion their own hair style. Lansdale v. Tyler Junior
College, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 US. 986 (1973).
633 See Rumler v. Board of School Trustees, 327 F. Supp. 729, 734-35 (D.S.C.
1971); Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified School Dist., 319 F. Supp. 368, 373 (ED. Cal.
1970) ; Pritchard v. Spring Branch Indep. School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 570, 579 (S.D.
Te. 1970); Giangrecq v. Center School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776, 778-79 (W.D. Mo.
1969) ; Brick v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316, 1319 (D. Colo. 1969).
As one author has noted, minor disruptions are fairly common in schools and
courts that wish to use them as an excuse for upholding regulation can usually find
some support. But only major disturbance should lead to infringement of rights.
See Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights 118
U. Pa. L. Rev. 612, 618-19 (1970).
634 See Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972) ; Bishop v. Coaw,
450 F.2d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1971); Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1265 (7th
Cir. 1970); Turley v. Adel Community School Dist., 322 F. Supp. 402, 403, 410
(S.D. Iowa 1971).
635 See Watson v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 394, 405 (ED. Tex. 1971), vacated
per curiam, 458 F.2d 1361 (Sth Cir. 1972).
The uqess restrictive alternative" concept has been used by several courts In
response to the argument that long hair presents health and safety problems in
certain situations. See Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1971) ; Crews
v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1266 (7th Cir. 1970); Berryman v. Hein, 329 F. Supp.
616, 619 (D. Idaho 1971).
636 See, e.g., King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F2d 932, 939-40
(9th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 850 (1970); Corley v. Daunhauer, 312 F. Supp. 811, 816 (ED. Ark.
1970); Brownlee v. Bradley County Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360, 1366-67
(ED. Tenn. 1970); Wood v. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist., 303 F. Supp. 551,
553-54 (W.D.Tex. 1970).
637 See, e.g., StuUl v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1972); Masie
v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972); Berryman v. Hein, 329 F. Supp.
616, 619 (D. Idaho 1971); Martin v. Davison, 322 F. Supp. 318, 323 (W.D.Pa.
1971); Dawson v. Hillsborough County School Bd., 322 F. Supp. 286, 298-99
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It is difficult to determine whether there would be a difference in
result between courts that recognize a "fundamental" constitutional
right and those that recognize a lesser protectable right if genuine and
significant disruption were caused by a student's long hair. Both types
of courts have found that a showing of minor dissension will not justify
the regulation. 638 Whether there is any point on a scale of disruption at
which the two types of courts would part company remains problematical. The effect of either test is to shift to the state the burden of
justifying the rule with a factual showing of reasonableness. The advantage of the lesser test is that it theoretically enables the state to
meet this burden when it has good reasons in fact without demonstrating "compelling" purpose. The state's basic difficulty in the school context may be that in the vast majority of cases it has no factual basis
for fearing disruption. Yet, the theoretical difference might be important in other contexts, when the state interest is stronger or when the
interests on both sides of the controversy are different.
Such a conclusion is borne out in part by consideration of other
hair length litigation, in which use of an intermediate test may also be
perceived. 639 The courts in these cases have begun to focus on the particular interests involved in each situation, asking that the state justify
regulation, but recognizing valid interests when they are advanced. For
example, the Army's power to prescribe the hair length of its members
to promote discipline has been traditionally recognized by the judiclary. 40 Yet at least three courts have held that in the case of reservists,
who spend only a small part of their time on active duty, the Army must
at least make a showing that a reservist's wearing a wig would impair
the Army's efficiency. 4 1
In another group of cases, policemen or firemen have objected to
hair length regulations on constitutional grounds. Some courts have
adhered to the traditional view that police and fire departments are
"quasi-military" organizations in which discipline may be promoted for
(M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 445 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1971); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp.
706, 711 (D. Minn. 1969).
638 See Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075-76 (8th Cir. 1971) (lesser right);
Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1265 (7th Cir. 1970) (fundamental right Implied
by use of more rigorous test).
639

At least one court has noted the confusion that surrounds the question of

what test to use. Black v. Rizzo, 360 F. Supp. 648, 651-52 n.2 (ED. Pa. 1973). In
considering a hair length regulation for a fire department, the court found that
since a constitutional right of some dimension had been infringed, the state regulation "at a minimum" had to "bear a reasonable relation to a legitimato state
interest." Id. The court then applied a medium level test. Id. at 652-53.
640 See, e.g., Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 865 (1971); Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 976 (1969).
641 Friedman v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1351 (Ist Cir. 1972); Schreiber v. Wick,
362 F. Supp. 193, 194 (N.D. Ill. 1973) ; see Etheridge v. Schlesinger, 362 F. Supp.
198, 203-04 (E.D. Va. 1973) (equal protection analysis); Harris v. Knine, 352 F.
Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see McWhirter v. Froeldke, 351 F. Supp. 1098
(D.S.C. 1972) (National Guard).
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its own sake.64 Yet the Second Circuit has recently held that the police
are more like civil servants than like soldiers and that promotion of discipline per se is not a sufficient reason to curtail personal liberty. 4 3
The court found that the individual's interest in his own "physical integrity" was a nonfundamental liberty that merited protection from
"arbitrary government interference," but stated the police department
should be allowed to show that its regulation in fact promoted a valid
purpose. 6 " Finally, in a few recent cases, prisoners have asserted a
right to control the length of their hair. This right has been upheld as
against the state's interest in discipline and health in the case of pretrial detainees.8 45 In the case of convicts, the argument has been unsuccessful.6 0 A few courts have recognized a personal interest of potential constitutional dimension, but have found it less substantial because
of the context and outweighed by state interests in efficient
administra0 47
tion and in preventing prisoners from hiding contraband.
It is significant that the lower federal courts, faced with a claim
that clearly involves some element of personal liberty, have been evolving an intermediate due process test that enables them to weigh the
individual and public interests involved. By doing so, they ensure that
the liberty is not infringed without good reason, but still give cognizance to valid, noncompelling state interests. As an additional safeguard, the test can be supplemented by the use of an overbreadth or
means-related rationale. Thus, even if the state has a valid goal in
mind when it limits personal freedom, it may be able to achieve its goal
by measures that do not intrude upon the personal right. For example,
if the state's purpose is to promote health and safety by assuring that
long hair does not get caught in machinery, an individual may be
ordered to wear a hair net when working with dangerous equipment. 48
This general approach seems to be the most effective way to deal
with the hair length issue. Furthermore, the use of an intermediate test
should be extended to cover other instances in which lesser personal
642 See Stradley v. Andersen, 478 F.2d 188, 190-91 (8th Cir. 1973) ; Yarbrough
v. City of Jacksonville, 363 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Greenwald

v. Frank, 70 Misc. 2d 632, 334 N.Y..2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
643 Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1128-29 (2d Cir. 1973); see Black v.
Rizzo, 360 F. Supp. 648, 652-53 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
644 Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (2d Cir. 1973); see Black v. Rizzo,
360 F. Supp. 648, 651 (E-D. Pa. 1973); Hunt v. Board of Fire Comm'rs, 68 Misc.
2d 261, 327 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. CL 1971).
645 See Smith v. Sampson, 349 F. Supp. 268 (D.NIH 1972); Christmnan v.
Skinner, 323 N.YS.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1971). See also Palma v. Treuchtlinger, 12

Crim. L. Rptr. 2551 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1973) (case summary).

646 See Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970); Rinehart v.
Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Howard v. Warden, 348 F. Supp. 1204
(E.D. Va. 1972). See also Geraci v. Treuchtlinger, 13 Crim. L. Rptr. 2062 (ED.N.Y.
Mar. 20, 1973) (case summary) (equal protection analysis), appeal dismissed as
moot, 487 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1973).
647 See Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 10S, 112-13 (S.D. Iowa 1973);
Howard v. Warden, 348 F. Supp. 1204, 1205-06 (E.D. Va. 1972).
648 See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1971).
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liberties are infringed. A multitude of human activities are lodged
"within the commodious concept of liberty." 40 Only a few are so
"fundamental" that the state should have to demonstrate a "compelling"

interest in order to impose upon them. Yet, many are sufficiently important to merit allowing the affected individual to question the state's

reasons for intruding. In such instances, the state should have a basis
in fact for its action, beyond the appearance of rationality. Furthermore,
if the ends of both individual and state may be served without conflict
and without excessive burden on public resources, there is good reason

to ask that the state accommodate the individual. An intermediate due
process test can and should be used to promote a readjustment of the

balance between order and liberty.
E. When is Privacy not Privacy? Disclosure of Personal Information
One of the more interesting aspects of the constitutional right of

privacy is that it provides little or no protection for what one observer
has termed privacy in its "primary or strong sense"--the ability to keep
secret personal information about oneself.05 0 For the most part, the

individual's control over facts about his personal life is protected by
tort law.35' When the party acquiring or disclosing such information is

the government, the individual's power to restrict state activity depends
on the availability of a statutory cause of action.0 52 Generally, courts
have found no constitutional interest involved when personal information is gathered by government for a valid purpose,

disclosed to members of the

public.65 4

50

even if it is later

Distinctions can be drawn among the ability to maintain secrecy

about one's personal life, the ability to make decisions as to how one
will conduct one's personal life, and the ability to be free from governmental intrusion in the places where one's personal life is conducted. So
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1285 (1st Cir. 1970).
650 Gross, supra note 84, at 35-37; see Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475, 482-83
(1968).
651 See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, Civil Nos. 71-1902, 72-1993, 72-2312, at
5168-69 n.12 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1973); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d
560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970). See also Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.UL. Rev. 962
(1964); Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960); Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); Comment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1923
(1970).
652 See, e.g., Coalition of Black Leadership v. Doorley, 349 F. Supp. 127
(D.R.I. 1972).
658 See, e.g., Cantor v. Supreme Court, 353 F. Supp. 1307, 1321-22 (E,D. Pa.
1973); Thom v. New York Stock Exch., 306 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd
per curiamn sub norm. Miller v. New York Stock Exch., 425 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
654 See, e.g., Tosh v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 482 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1973);
Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 524-25 (2d Cir. 1973) ; Lamont v. Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 386 F.2d 449
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968). See also Doe v. McMillan, 459
F.2d 1307, 1311-12 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd in part on other grounds, 412 U.S. 306
(1973); Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966).
049

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

October 19731

CONSTITUTIONAL

PRIVACY

far, only the two latter interests are subsumed within the constitutional
right of privacy. Nevertheless, because of the close relationship of all
three concepts, 55 a few courts have used the right of privacy to raise
the right to control personal information to a constitutional level.
In Schulman v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.,' 0 the
court held that a Department of Health regulation that required disclosure to government on "fetal death certificates" of the names and
addresses of women who had had abortions constituted an invasion of
constitutional privacy. The court reasoned that while a woman had a
fundamental right to decide to have an abortion, a social stigma would
attach to single women who had abortions; both a single and a married
woman had a right to conceal the fact of their having had an abortion
from the state.057 The court found none of the governmental purposes
-- such as protecting the health of women who had undergone multiple
abortions-compelling enough to override the right.
Because of the abortion context, the Schulman court's inability to
distinguish a concern with autonomous decision from a concern with
secrecy is understandable. Other decisions are less easily explained.
The Second Circuit recently remanded a case for consideration by a
three-judge court on the grounds that the disclosure of personal information mandated by the New York State Controlled Substances Act
presented a substantial constitutional question of invasion of privacy."'s
Several other courts have used Griswold, without detailed analysis of its
precise meaning, to establish a right of privacy that is infringed by the
state's retention of arrest records when a subject is later acquitted or
charges are dropped.6 0
In such instances, the impulse to protect the individual from governmental intrusion appears justifiably strong. Moreover, the details of
activities protected by the constitutional right of privacy-the choice to
use contraceptives, to have an abortion, to be sterilized, to make decisions about family life, and to engage in consensual sexual acts-are of
the sort that one often would like to keep secret from government and
from other members of the public. Nevertheless, use of the constitutional
right of privacy to protect the individual when the question is secrecy
655 See Gross, supra note 84, at 36-40.
656 70 Asc. 2d 1093, 335 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. CL. 1972), vacated and remanded,
41 App. Div. 2d 714, 341 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1st Dep't.), judgment reinstated,-Misc.
2d-, 346 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. CL 1973).
657

Id. at 1095-97, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 346-47.

658 Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102, 107-08 (2d Cir. 1973), preliminary
injunction denied, 364 F. Supp. 536, 542-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (three-judge court).

See also Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (EDl. Pa. 1973) (testing program
invades privacy of students).

659 See Davidson v. Dn,--Colo.-, 503 P.2d 157 (1972); Eddy v. Moore, S
Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971). Other courts have accomplished the same
goal without resort to constitutional privacy decisions on the grounds that the state
has no valid purpose for retaining the records. See, e.g., United States v. Kal; ,
271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967). See also Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C.

Cir. 1970).
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and control over information rather than a right of autonomous decision serves only to confuse the issue and to make the "right of privacy"
more amorphous than it already is. Whatever the merits of using the
term "privacy" to denominate what is essentially a limited right of
autonomy, the courts would be well advised to treat various kinds of
"private" interests differently and to use Griswold and Roe only when
autonomy is involved. Until and unless the Supreme Court demonstrates an inclination to extend constitutional protection to the qualitatively different forms of "privacy" involved in disclosure cases, the two
issues should be kept dearly separated by lower courts.0 01
V
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's recognition in Griswold and Roe that individuals must be allowed to make certain decisions about the conduct of
their personal lives will surely play a role in future litigation in areas
other than contraception and abortion. The majority opinions in Roe v.
Wade and ParisAdilt Theatre I v. Slaton have already depicted a zone
of privacy generally protecting rights pertaining to home, family, family
planning and the rearing and education of children. This Note has attempted to explore that zone, first, by discussing possible techniques for
analyzing purported rights of privacy and, second, by examining some
specific interests which might arguably receive protection as aspects of
privacy. The interests discussed do not exhaust the list of possible
privacy rights. They are simply areas which thus far have spurred most
of the privacy litigation in the lower courts, and areas which bear certain resemblances to the rights protected in Griswold and Roe.
We have not attempted to locate the precise boundaries of the
zone of privacy or to determine which potential privacy rights should
be ranked as "fundamental." Rather, our concern has been with the
methodology of privacy decisions. Analysis has been the ingredient most
often lacking in lower court privacy opinions. It is also the element
most necessary if the emerging right of privacy is to become a viable
660 One possible approach that a litigant might take would be to claim that

the power to control access to personal information about oneself and one's family
is a substantive liberty protected by the due process clause. In view of the Court's
partial return to substantive due process in Roe, this claim would not be altogether
frivolous. An individual who is required to disclose information to government
could argue that a more rigorous scrutiny should be applied to his claim than Is
normally applied when nonfundamental rights are involved-in short, that dis-

closure must in fact serve a valid governmental purpose and that all of the Informa.
tion requested must be relevant to the accomplishment of that purpose. In many
contexts, for example, census-taking, taxation and crime-prevention, government

will be able to demonstrate such a purpose. On the other hand, there may be no
valid reason for government to pass such information on to other members of the
public. Recognition that the personal interest involved at least merits some showing

that the public interest will be served by state action would enable affected
individuals to obtain some control over information about themselves.
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doctrine for the protection of certain personal liberties rather than the
harbinger of another Lochner era.

ADDENDUM
As this Note goes to press, the Supreme Court has handed down an
opinion that bears upon the future of privacy litigation. In Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 42 U.S.L.W. 4186 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974),
the Court declared that state regulations requiring pregnant schoolteachers to take mandatory maternity leaves after five months of pregnancy were unconstitutional. See text accompanying notes 290-302
supra. For our purposes in this Note, Justice Stewart's opinion is significant in two major ways. First, although the doctrinal basis of the decision
is substantive due process and almost all of the principal privacy cases
are cited as precedent, the word "privacy" is not mentioned. Second, the
test against which the regulations are measured is an intermediate, meansoriented rational basis test, previously used only in equal protection
analysis. See text accompanying notes 219-20 supra.
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